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Abstract
Accounting for about 15-20% of GDP in developed economies,
public procurement is both a paramount economic phenomenon
and a leading activity of governments. Sound procurement
policies and practices are therefore essential not only to achieve
best value for money when purchasing goods and services of
public utility, but also to pursue strategic objectives of crucial
importance (e.g., sustainable growth and innovation) and to
optimize spending in an era where public money has a high
opportunity cost.
This dissertation contributes to the research on public pro-
curement by providing original investigations and results in
an interdisciplinary fashion. The three essays presented adopt
different methodologies to analyze relevant issues in public
procurement which have been so far neglected by the litera-
ture.
The first essay provides an auction-theoretical analysis of “Pre-
commercial Procurement” (PCP), which is an innovative step-
wise practice recently introduced in the EU for the public pro-
curement of R&D. In particular, PCP is modeled as a multi-
stage elimination contest with budget-constrained players and
non-sunk bids. The non-sunk feature constitutes a novelty
in the modelization of elimination contests and relies on the
consideration that when budget-constrained contestants ini-
tially strategize on how much to bid in each stage, they do not
regard bids spent in earlier stages as strategically irrelevant.
This is due to the fact that contestants face a trade-off when
allocating scarce resources over stages: the more they spend
earlier the less they have to spend later, and vice versa. In a
simple two-stage all-pay framework with complete informa-
xvi
tion and asymmetric players, it is found that, notwithstand-
ing the trade-off, the ex-ante strongest player is always able
to deter other players from submitting a positive bid in the
first stage, guaranteeing herself shortlisting with the small-
est outlay, and saving most resources for the second stage.
This is shown to imply that the two-stage all-pay contest has
a lower performance, in terms of expected revenue, than the
single-stage one. On the basis of these results, PCP does not
seem to be a very advantageous practice for the procurement
of R&D.
The second essay provides a contract-theoretical framework
to explain the occurrence of embezzlement of public money
in the execution of public contracts. It is argued that at the
core of the phenomenon is an agency problem where the room
for the contracting firm’s moral hazard is created by the op-
portunism of its principal - a corruptible top-tier politician.
It is considered that often corruption interests the execution
stage of a contract (rather than only the award stage) and has
a political nature (rather than only bureaucratic): top-level
politicians may as well have to gain from large-scale corrup-
tion. In particular, the model allows for the political principal
to be partially selfish and for both the auditing technology
and the stakes of corruption to be endogenous and depen-
dent on the selfishness of the politician. The model shows
that while a moderately opportunist politician prevents the
firm from embezzling money, an enough opportunist politi-
cian creates an incentive for embezzlement in optimal con-
tracts, in order to ask for a share of the money conditional
upon detection.
The third essay investigates empirically the relationship be-
tween the degree of centralization in a procurement system
and its performance. Despite its centrality, this issue has been
only marginally considered by the literature, and without con-
clusive findings. The essay exploits the TED dataset to pro-
xvii
vide a preliminary investigation of the issue for Italy. The
Italian case is appropriate in this context since all levels of
government plus a number of other public institutions are in-
volved in procurement, and are largely subjected to the same
rules. Using winning rebate as a measure of procurement
performance, and controlling for other determinants of re-
bate, it is found that small decentralized units (i.e., munici-
palities and public enterprises) are less efficient than (more)
central purchasers, despite they currently award most pro-
curement contracts. It is argued that at the basis of this per-
formance gap is the fact that small decentralized purchasing
units lack the specialized and competent human resources
which are needed to efficiently administrate the procurement
process. It is therefore concluded that the Italian procurement
system is probably too much decentralized and that some re-
organization on a more centralized basis could improve on
the general performance gap.
xviii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Accounting for about 15-20% of GDP in developed economies, public
procurement is both a paramount economic phenomenon and a leading
activity of governments (OECD, 20111).
It is therefore essential that governments design and implement sound
public procurement policies in order to achieve best value for money
when purchasing goods and services of public utility. Well-designed pro-
curement would also enable governments to pursue other strategic ob-
jectives of foremost importance for public welfare and competitiveness,
such as promoting sustainable growth, innovation, and Small-medium
Enterprises (SMEs). These objectives are particularly urgent nowadays,
in an era of economic instability and crisis, where a key concern for gov-
ernments is to optimize public spending in order to consolidate public
finances and clear fiscal space for other policies.
Given its large practical relevance, a great deal of economic research has
focused on public procurement. Whereas the methodologies adopted
and the specific issues under analysis differ across research agendas in
the literature, the central theme is the same, namely procurement perfor-
mance. Procurement performance can be defined as the extent to which
public procurement meets the objectives it is designed for. The literature
1The average for OECD countries is 12% when excluding procurement by state-owned
utilities. When these purchases are also accounted for, the size of procurement can increases
by an additional 2 to 13 percentage points of GDP (OECD (2011)).
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has been studying this issue with both a positive approach, with the aim
of identifying the determinants of the actual level of performance, and
with a normative approach, aiming at characterizing the mechanisms
which optimize performance.
Three economic disciplines which are central in the study of procure-
ment, and have been fostering a number of fertile research agendas, are
auction theory, contract theory and empirical research.
Insofar most public procurement contracts are awarded to suppliers by
means of auctions, it is both natural and relevant to study procurement
as an auction-theoretical problem. Indeed, many central issues in auc-
tion theory have been applied to the study of procurement as well2.
Studied topics include, among the others, the role of adverse selection
and of the nature of incomplete information (see e.g., Manelli and Vin-
cent (1995) and Albano et al. (2006c)), corruption (see e.g., Celentani
and Ganuza (2002), Burguet and Che (2004), Compte et al. (2005) and
Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2006)) collusion (see e.g., Bajari and Ye (2003)
and Albano et al. (2006a)), procurement risk (see e.g., Arvan and Leite
(1990), Zheng (2001), Calveras et al. (2004) and Ganuza (2007)), multi-
dimensional procurement (see e.g., Che (1993), Branco (1997) and Asker
and Cantillon (2010)), repeated and dynamic procurement (see e.g., Laf-
font and Tirole (1988), Lewis and Yildirim (2005)), multi-unit procure-
ment (see e.g., Dimitri et al. (2006b)), competition and entry (see e.g.,
Albano et al. (2006d)) and procurement of innovation (see e.g., Cabral
et al. (2006), Ding and Wolfstetter (2011)).
Therefore, auction theory provides useful frameworks and tools to prop-
erly analyze the issues related to the tender stage of procurement, hence
allowing to focus on ex-ante procurement performance. However, great
attention should be also given to the post-tender stage of procurement,
namely contract execution. At the contract implementation stage a typ-
ical incentive problem may emerge, namely that the selected firm can
exploit its informational advantage to engage in post-contractual oppor-
tunism (i.e., moral hazard) in order to ex-post increase its profit. Typi-
2For extensive reviews of central themes in auction theory see e.g., Klemperer (2004),
Milgrom (2004) and Krishna (2009).
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cally, the firm can provide sub-optimal levels of cost-reducing effort or
quality, i.e, activities that are difficult or costly to monitor. Obviously, this
has negative consequences on ex-post procurement performance. This
information problem is at the core of the contract-theoretical analysis of
procurement. Accordingly, an important research agenda in this litera-
ture focuses on optimal procurement contracting, i.e., the design of optimal
incentives for cost-reduction and quality in procurement contracts (Laf-
font and Tirole (1993)). Other central themes are the optimal allocation
of procurement risk, contract flexibility and reputation issues, which are
essential when contracts are not (fully) enforceable (see e.g., Bolton and
Dewatripont (2005), Albano et al. (2006b)). Moreover, to the extent that
the incentive structure of procurement contracts influences the behavior
of bidders at the tendering stage, many contributions stand at the inter-
section between auction and contract theory, focusing on the auctioning
of incentive contracts (see e.g., McAfee and McMillan (1986), Laffont and
Tirole (1987)) and of incomplete contracts (see e.g., McAfee and McMil-
lan (1987), Bajari and Tadelis (2001)).
While the theoretical disciplines provide useful frameworks to analyze
many central issues in public procurement, the great practical relevance
of the topic also calls for an empirical and more quantitative assess-
ment of the determinants of procurement performance. Accordingly, an-
other discipline which has been extensively adopted for the study of pub-
lic procurement is empirical analysis. Indeed, many of the themes listed
above have been analyzed empirically as well. This is the case for is-
sues like the impact of auction and contract design on moral hazard in
the contract execution (see e.g., Lewis and Bajari (2011), Lewis and Ba-
jari (2014)), the impact on procurement performance of corruption (see
e.g., Coviello and Gagliarducci (2010), Goldman et al. (2013)) and collu-
sion (see e.g., Porter and Zona (1993), Lee and Hahn (2002), Bajari and
Ye (2003)), relational contracting and reputation (Corts and Singh (2004),
Banerjee and Duflo (2000)), procurement of incomplete contracts (Bajari
et al. (2009), Bajari et al. (2014), Crocker and Reynolds (1993), Levin and
Tadelis (2010)), entry (Branzoli and Decarolis (2015)).
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the literature with three
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pieces of original research on relevant issues in public procurement which
have been so far neglected, and to do so in an interdisciplinary fash-
ion. Therefore, each of the three following chapters will focus on a dif-
ferent aspect of procurement and adopt one of the three methodologies
referenced above, namely auction theory, contract theory and empirical
analysis. In particular, Chapter 2 contributes to the auction-theoretical
research on procurement, while Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively fo-
cus on contract-theoretical and empirical analysis of procurement.
The rest of this introductory chapter gives a brief description of the re-
search problems addressed in the three following chapters, as well as an
essential review of the main findings.
Chapter 2 provides a preliminary auction-theoretical analysis of “Pre-
commercial Procurement”(PCP), which is an innovative practice recently
introduced in the EU for the public procurement of R&D. PCP is or-
ganized as a competitive step-wise process where a number of poten-
tial suppliers start developing alternative solutions and are sequentially
eliminated through the different R&D phases. In particular, PCP is mod-
eled as an elimination contest (i.e., a multi-stage contest where at each
stage a number of contestants is eliminated) with budget-constrained
players and non-sunk bids. The non-sunk feature constitutes a novelty
in the modelization of elimination contests and relies on the consider-
ation that when budget-constrained players initially strategize on how
much to bid in each stage, they do not regard bids spent in earlier stages
as strategically irrelevant in the decision of how much to bid in subse-
quent stages. This is so because they face a basic trade-off when allo-
cating scarce resources over stages: the more they spend earlier the less
they have to spend later, and the more they plan to spend later the less
they have to spend earlier. In a simple two-stage all-pay framework with
complete information and asymmetric players, it is found that, notwith-
standing the above mentioned trade-off, ex-ante budgets of players are
relatively more important - in determining the outcome of the game -
than their strategic ability in allocating limited resources over the con-
test. Due to the dynamic nature of the game and to the information
structure, the ex-ante strongest player is always able to deter other play-
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ers from submitting a positive bid in the first stage, guaranteeing herself
shortlisting with the smallest outlay in order to save resources for the
second stage, where mixed-strategies are played. This implies the result
that the two-stage all-pay contest has a lower performance, in terms of
expected revenue, than the single-stage one, due to the fact that the first-
stage yields almost no revenue and that shortlisting to the second-stage
is inefficient. According to these results, PCP does not seem to be a very
advantageous practice for the procurement of R&D. The contribution of
this work to the literature is two-fold. First, it provides some theoretical
modeling of PCP, which has not yet received attention from the litera-
ture, despite its potentially great relevance. Second, it contributes to the
auction literature, in providing a first characterization of the equilibria of
the two-stage elimination all-pay contest with non-sunk bids.
Chapter 3 provides a contract-theoretical framework to explain the oc-
currence of the embezzlement of public money by the contracting firm in
the execution of public contracts (i.e., cost-padding). It is argued that the
phenomenon can be explained as an agency problem where the room for
the contracting firm’s moral hazard is created by the opportunism of its
principal - a possibly corrupt top-tier politician. Differently from exist-
ing literature, which mainly focuses on corruption at the award stage of
procurement and mostly on bureaucratic corruption, the model consid-
ers that in real-world cases corruption can interest as well the execution
stage and have a political nature, i.e., involve top-level politicians, who
may as well have to gain from large-scale corruption. In particular, the
Chapter extends the contract-theoretic model of cost-padding in Laffont
and Tirole (1993) to allow for the political principal to be partially self-
ish - i.e., he is no longer a benevolent regulator but he rather maximizes
a weighted average between social welfare and his private utility - and
for both the auditing technology and the stakes of corruption to be en-
dogenous and dependent on the selfishness of the politician. The model
shows that while a moderately opportunist politician (by choosing a rel-
atively aggressive auditing technology) prevents the firm from engaging
in cost-padding, an enough opportunist politician (by choosing a rela-
tively weak auditing technology) creates an incentive for cost-padding
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in optimal contracts, in order to ask for a share of embezzled money con-
ditional upon detection. An additional finding is that an improvement
in the efficiency of the fiscal system, by lowering the social cost of cost-
padding, makes cost-padding easier to occur, since also less opportunist
politicians are tempted to engage in corruption.
Chapter 4 investigates empirically the relationship between the degree
of centralization of a procurement system and its performance. While
practitioners suggest that the advantages of centralization (in terms of
savings on purchase and process costs brought by economies of scale),
outweigh its costs (in terms of missed flexibility toward local needs and
protection of SMEs), it is the case that public procurement around the
world is largely decentralized. It is therefore convenient to ask whether
and to what extent such a prevailing decentralization trend is justifiable
on empirical grounds. Chapter 4 addresses exactly this research ques-
tion, which has been only marginally considered in the literature, despite
its great practical relevance, and without conclusive evidence. In partic-
ular, the TED dataset is exploited to provide preliminary evidence on the
relationship between procurement decentralization and performance for
Italy. The Italian case is appropriate and interesting to focus on in this
context since all levels of government (central and sub-central) plus a
number of other public institutions are involved in procurement, and are
largely subjected to the same rules. Using winning rebate as a measure
of procurement performance, it is found that small decentralized units -
in particular municipalities and public enterprises - are less efficient than
more central purchasers, despite they currently award most procurement
contracts. This result holds even after controlling for important determi-
nants of rebate, such as the award mechanism, the size of the purchas-
ing unit and local characteristics, suggesting that performance is affected
by some other unobservable characteristics which vary between classes
of contracting authorities. It is argued that these characteristics much
likely amount to the set of professional competences and incentives of
the purchasing unit’s procurement staff, which are needed to efficiently
administrate procurement and achieve best value for money. Differently
from (more) central purchasers, small decentralized units cannot afford
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specialized technical offices and hence are likely to perform relatively
badly. It is therefore concluded that the current system seems to be too
decentralized and that policy makers should consider re-organizing pro-
curement on a more centralized basis in order to address the general per-
formance mismatch.
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Chapter 2
Pre-commercial
Procurement as an
Elimination Contest
with Non-sunk Bids
2.1 Introduction
Governments all over the world are faced with continuously changing
and continuously emerging societal challenges. These include coping
with the impact of demographic aging (e.g., via ensuring high-quality
and cost-effective health care and elderly care) and pursuing environ-
mental sustainability (e.g., via improving energy efficiency of buildings
and public transport).
Often these needs are so technologically demanding and in advance of
what the market can offer that radically innovative R&D is required.
Therefore, the public sector needs to develop procurement strategies that
allow to stimulate the required innovation in a cost-effective way 1.
1Notice that procuring innovative goods may be more problematic than procuring stan-
dard goods, mainly because the “public good” nature of innovative knowledge combined
with the high multifarious uncertainty peculiar to the R&D process, results in firms under-
8
As it is well known, public procurement has a huge economic relevance,
insofar it accounts for a significant percentage of GDP (about 15-20%
in OECD countries 2) and, most importantly, has a direct impact on the
economy. Therefore, if R&D procurement strategies are appropriately
designed and forward looking, public purchasers would not only ensure
that high-quality and cost-effective solutions are delivered on time to ad-
dress contingent public needs, but would also have a positive impact on
the innovative performance of national industries, which in turns would
enhance their productivity, competitiveness and, ultimately, growth po-
tential 3. Moreover, the need of sound practices for procuring innovation
is more important than ever nowadays, given that societal challenges
for which innovative solutions are needed are getting more and more
pressing, and that public money has a high opportunity cost in an era of
economic instability 4.
However, according to the European Commission, public sectors in Eu-
rope tend to severely understate the potential of public procurement as a
driver of innovation, with the result that, in terms of innovative perfor-
mance, Europe lags behind its major trading partners and competitors5.
To contrast this trend, the European Commission published a Commu-
nication in 2007 (European Commission (2007)) where it called up Mem-
ber States to revisit the role of public procurement as a driver of inno-
vation, in particular by using a new procurement practice, called “Pre-
investing in innovation. See Cabral et al. (2006) for a discussion of these issues and a com-
parative analysis of incentive tools available to procure innovation.
2The average for OECD is 12% when excluding procurement by state-owned utilities.
When these purchases are also accounted for, the size of procurement can increase by an
additional 2 to 13 percentage points of GDP (OECD (2011)).
3See Aghion and Howitt (1997) for an essential reading about the impact of innovation
on growth.
4Edler and Georghiou (2007) provide a discussion on the role of public demand as a
potential major source of innovation, and Aschhoff and Sofka (2009) assess its performance
as a driver of innovation with respect to other policy tools (e.g., regulation, R&D subsidies
and basic research in Universities).
5The European Commission reports that the US are spending twenty times more than
Europe in procurement of R&D ($50Bn vs $2.5Bn per year), and that this gap in procure-
ment expenditures is responsible of approximately half of the overall R&D investment
gap between the US and Europe. Although the gap is mainly due to disparities in de-
fense/space budgets, expenditure is still four times higher in the US in non defense/space
sectors, such as health, energy, education, transport and environment.
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commercial Procurement”, as a more effective approach to procure the
R&D needed to develop solutions to public needs. Pre-commercial Pro-
curement (PCP) concerns the R&D phase before commercialization and
is based on three innovative features that potentially make it a much
more advantageous approach for the procurement of innovative goods
and services with respect to the practices commonly used in the EU 6.
The first distinct feature of PCP is that, unlike standard procurement ap-
proaches, it is organized as a competitive stepwise process, which is il-
lustrated in Figure 2.1: in PCP a number of firms enter the competition
and start developing alternative solutions, and after each of the R&D
phases - typically solution exploration, prototyping and development of
a limited volume of products in the form of a test series - intermediate
quality evaluations are run, on the basis of which participating firms are
sequentially eliminated. The firms who get successfully to the end of the
R&D process are then awarded a contract. The stepwise nature of PCP
should allow to steer the development of innovative products through-
out the R&D process to best fit the public sector needs, so that a faster
takeover of innovations is made possible, and to select the best potential
suppliers, thereby reducing the risks and costs of working with as yet
unproven technologies. Also, contracting R&D from a number of firms
rather than from a firm only, would ensure a future competitive market
for the innovative products, thereby allowing public purchasers to avoid
being bound to a single supplier.
The second innovative feature is that in PCP risks and benefits are shared
between contracting firms and public purchaser. This makes both parties
interested in the publication, standardization and commercialization of
results, which should contribute to speeding the uptake of inventions in
the market - and hence the delivery of solutions to social needs - as well
as reducing market fragmentation on the supply side. The third feature
is that in PCP the tender for the R&D contract is separated from the ten-
der for the commercialization of the innovative product. Separating the
procurement of R&D from the procurement of commercial volumes en-
ables the public purchaser to filter out the risks of the R&D phase before
6See the Communication for a detailed account of PCP characteristics.
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Figure 2.1: The Pre-commercial Procurement process (Source: Communica-
tion COM (2007) 799 European Commission (2007))
committing to procure large volumes.
These three characteristics contribute together to reduce the costs and
risks of procuring innovation with respect to the standard procurement
practices used in the EU (e.g., “Exclusive Development”). In these prac-
tices the public purchaser typically reserves all the R&D results for itself,
so that the contracting firms not only ask for higher prices, which implies
that the public purchaser is less likely to afford more R&D contracts in
each tender, but also that firms do not have the incentive to invest in the
publication, standardization and commercialization of results, with the
consequence that the uptake of the new inventions in the market will be
slower. Also, in standard procurement practices, the public purchaser
does not follow the entire R&D process, and the procurement of R&D is
not separated from commercialization, so that the purchaser bear all the
risk that after committing to procure commercial volumes, the innova-
tive product turns out to be unsuitable for the target market. As a conse-
quence, public purchasers tend to focus on near-to-market innovations,
which are less risky, rather than on radical, but likely riskier innovations,
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which are the most needed.
Therefore PCP seems very promising as an alternative practice to the
procurement of R&D. However, there is still little experience in the EU
with this approach, so it is difficult and premature to pass judgments or
predict the extent to which PCP could indeed be better than practices
commonly used 7.
Moreover, PCP has not yet received the attention of economic literature.
To the best of our knowledge the only exception is a work by Che et al.
(2014) where it is investigated the extent to which the pure unbundling
between R&D and commercial phases of procurement, as it is called for
in PCP, can be justified on contract-theoretical grounds. The authors find
that pure unbundling is never optimal, since the choice of the commer-
cial contractor should depend at least to some extent on the values of
the projects competing in the R&D tender8. Indeed, the development of
some more theoretical work would help to get a better understanding of
all the economic issues underlying PCP, and hence to rationalize the use
of PCP as a policy tool.
This work intends to take a step in this direction. In this essay we imple-
ment an auction-theoretic analysis of PCP. In particular, given the step-
wise nature of the shortlisting process at the basis of PCP, and the fact
that all participants incur a cost regardless of them winning (or being
selected through stages) or not, we find it convenient to model PCP as
a an elimination all-pay contest, namely a multi-stage contest where (i)
at each stage a subset of contestants is selected to go to the subsequent
stage - while the others are eliminated, (ii) shortlisting is determined by
a multi-unit all-pay auction, i.e., at each stage only a given number of
highest bidders is shortlisted but all contestants forfeit their own bid and
(iii) the contestants who are shortlisted in all stages, i.e., complete the
R&D process, are awarded a contract9. All-pay auctions have been com-
7A review of the EU funded PCP projects which are currently being implemented is
available at the European Commission web page on PCP.
8Also, there is some work about the legal aspects of PCP (e.g., see Apostol (2012)).
9The all-pay auction is a limit case of the Tullock’s contest. Tullock (1980) assumes that
a contestant’s probability of winning the contest equals the ratio between her own effort
and the sum of other contestants’ efforts, in order to capture the notion, common to many
contests in practice, that random factors, or “noise”, can play a role in determining the
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monly used in the literature to model R&D contests and races, as well as
other competitive scenarios where both losers and winners forfeit their
own bid or “effort”, such as sport competitions, lobbying, political cam-
paigns, job promotions, litigation and wars10.
Modeling PCP as an elimination all-pay contest allows to capture a fun-
damental feature of the competition between firms, namely the strate-
gic nature of their behavior in allocating limited resources between R&D
phases. The presence of a constraint on resources implies that firms face
a trade off when allocating resources between early and later stages: a
firm that spends little money on early stages in order to save resources
for later stages, is likely to conduct a low quality basic R&D, thereby risk-
ing to be eliminated early, but if it manages to get to later stages it has
a high probability of winning in the end. On the other hand, a firm that
spends most resources in early stages, is more likely to get successfully
to later stages, but may risk to run out of resources before the comple-
tion of the product development and consequently to miss the contract.
In this case the potential supplier will “lose everything” in the sense that
she will never be able to recover the resources she invested up to that
point. The presence of such a trade off has two fundamental implica-
tions in our model, which have been neglected by the literature. The first
implication is that when a player strategizes on how much she will bid at
each given stage she will be allowed to play, she will not regard the total
of the bids she has planned to spent until that stage as sunk, since they
are not strategically irrelevant in her decision of how much to bid in the
following stages. This is due to the interplay between stages explained
above: the more a contestant spends early the less she has to spend later,
the more she plans to spend later, the less she has to spend earlier. The
outcome of a contest. The all-pay auction is a fully discriminatory contest, that is the limit
case where there is no noise at all and the outcome is completely determined by the effort
exerted by players.
10All-pay auctions have been studied both under complete and incomplete information.
Basic references in the former strand are Hillman and Samet (1987), Hillman and Riley
(1989), Baye et al. (1993),Baye et al. (1996), Che and Gale (2003) and Siegel (2009). Basic
references to the latter are Hillman and Riley (1989), Amann and Leininger (1996), Kr-
ishna and Morgan (1997), Moldovanu and Sela (2001), Moldovanu and Sela (2006) and
Moldovanu et al. (2012).
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second implication is that the winner of the game may not be the player
with the biggest budget, but rather the player who is the ablest in allo-
cating resources between stages.
In a simple two-stage framework with complete information and asym-
metric players we find that, notwithstanding the presence of the trade-
off, relative ex-ante strengths of players are more important than their
relative abilities - in determining the equilibrium outcome of the game,
which is also proven to be unique. Due to the information structure,
the strongest player is always able to deter the other players from sub-
mitting a positive bid in the first stage, guaranteeing herself shortlisting
with the smallest outlay in order to save most resources for the second
stage, where mixed strategies are played. This leads to the result that
the two-stage all-pay contest yields a lower expected revenue than the
single-stage one, due to the fact that the first stage yields almost no rev-
enue and that shortlisting to the second stage is inefficient.
On the basis of these results PCP does not seem to be a very advanta-
geous practice for the procurement of R&D. However, the current ver-
sion of our model has adopted some simplifying assumptions so that
more work is needed to fully assess PCP on theoretical grounds.
Moreover, in modeling PCP as an all-pay elimination contest, we have
excluded from the analysis some other important features of PCP - such
as the role of intermediate quality evaluations in the selection process
(unless one assumes that higher effort leads unequivocally to higher qual-
ity), and risk-benefit sharing between the contracting firm and the pub-
lic purchaser. These aspects could inspire future work about alternative
modelizations of PCP.
Our work serves a twofold purpose. First, to introduce some theoretical
work about PCP, which has not yet received the attention of the economic
literature, despite its potentially great relevance. Second, to fill a gap in
the all-pay auction and elimination contest literature, since to the best of
our knowledge this is the first attempt to characterize the equilibria of an
elimination all-pay contest with non-sunk bids.
This essay is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the relation to
the literature; Section 2.3 presents the model; Section 2.4 characterizes
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the equilibria; Section 2.5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix A.1.
2.2 Relation to the literature
The body of literature on elimination contests, to which this work con-
tributes, is large and various. The aim of this section is to briefly review
this literature, with a particular attention to explain how and to what
extent our work departs from the bulk of contributions with respect to
three main features, i.e., (i) the approach of the analysis, whether norma-
tive or positive, (ii) the way of modeling the shortlisting process, and (iii)
the inclusion in the model of a constraint on resources.
Most contributions in the literature study contests from a normative point
of view, adopting an optimal contest design perspective, that is they are
aimed at identifying the set of “rules” which lead to the most-favorable
outcomes for the contest designer, i.e., most importantly, total effort max-
imization. In particular, studies belonging to this research agenda, initi-
ated by Rosen (1986) address three main questions, i.e., (i) which is the
optimal prize structure in contests (see e.g., Rosen (1986), Fu and Lu
(2012)), (ii) which is the optimal seeding of players, i.e., the best way
to match players in sub-contests on the basis of ability rankings - typi-
cally to avoid that the strongest competitors eliminate each other in early
rounds (see e.g., Rosen (1986), Groh et al. (2012)), and (iii) which is the
optimal structure of contests, i.e., the number of stages and the number
of contestants remaining at each stage (see e.g., Gradstein and Konrad
(1999), Moldovanu and Sela (2006), Fu and Lu (2012)).
An interesting investigation for the all-pay case is provided by Groh et al.
(2012), who consider a two-stage elimination tournament with asymmet-
ric players where players compete in pair-wise matches modeled as all-
pay auctions, and characterize the optimal seedings which are needed
to achieve the maximization of, respectively, the total tournament effort,
the probability of a final between the two strongest players, and the win-
ning probability of the strongest player.
Also, Gradstein and Konrad (1999), studying a Tullock contest with sym-
metric players, ask under which conditions it is better for the designer to
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choose a multi-stage format rather than a single-stage one, thereby en-
dogenizing the choice of the contest structure. They find that a single-
stage contest is preferable only when the contest rules are discriminatory
enough, i.e., when the effort exerted by contestants is relatively more im-
portant than random factors in determining the outcome of the contest,
like in an all-pay auction11.
A particular sub-strand in the literature about the optimal contest struc-
ture is the efficient entry literature. Works belonging to this agenda typ-
ically investigate two-stage contests where a shortlisting stage (or entry
stage) is introduced by the designer before the proper contest stage, with
the aim of inducing efficient entry in the contest, i.e., selecting the players
with the highest valuations to participate in the contest. In particular,
Fullerton and McAfee (1999) analyze a research tournament where an
auction is used to shortlist potential contestants for entry in the tourna-
ment, and show that for a large class of contests the optimal number of
finalists is two, and that while neither a first-price nor second-price for-
mat can generally induce efficient entry, an all-pay auction amended to
award a prize to all the entrants can12.
Another strand in the normative literature analyzes the role of informa-
tion revelation in settings with incomplete information where players
can signal and strategically misrepresent their preferences (see e.g., Lai
and Matros (2006), Zhang (2008) and Zhang and Wang (2009)). When
important information is revealed in the interim stages of a game, the
incentives of players in earlier stages are altered, so that whether and to
what extent it is optimal to reveal information about players’ ability at a
given stage of the game, is a fundamental aspect of contest design, which
is also relevant to many contests in practice13.
11Moldovanu and Sela (2006) implement a similar analysis but in an incomplete infor-
mation setting.
12In the context of indicative bidding, Ye (2007) analyzes a very similar game and reaches
the same conclusions. Other contributions to this research are Higgins et al. (1985) and Baye
et al. (1993).
13Another strand of literature that could be somehow related to our work analyze multi-
stage sequential all-pay auctions. In this research agenda, initiated by Leininger (1991),
multi-stage all-pay auctions are modeled as dynamic games where contestants enter the
game sequentially (rather than simultaneously), as it is the case in many real contests where
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Differently from all the works mentioned so far, we do not adopt a nor-
mative perspective but rather a positive one. If in the aforementioned
papers either the multi-stage or the all-pay features, or both, are intro-
duced to achieve efficient shortlisting, in our model both features are
rather a natural description of a stepwise competition where all players
forfeit their outlay. Our aim is not to provide an optimal design of the
PCP practice, but rather to give an essential modeling of the strategic
behavior of budget-constrained contestants in a dynamic setting such as
the PCP one.
Whereas a normative analysis would be as well useful and relevant in
our context, given that a priority in the design of all procurement prac-
tices should be to ensure the most cost-effective use of public money, a
positive analysis allows to detect the determinants of bidders’ behavior
when they are not constrained by the designer’s maximization problem.
A second point of divergence from our work and most contributions
in the literature is the way in which the shortlisting process is mod-
eled. Most of the contributions that we have mentioned typically adopt
a “multi-battle” kind of shortlisting, where at each stage the remaining
contestants are divided into groups where sub-contests or pairwise bat-
tles are run, and then the winners of these sub-contests compete again
against each other in later stages (e.g., this is how shortlisting works in
most team sport tournaments). On the other hand, we adopt an “all-
against-all” kind of shortlisting, where at each stage remaining contes-
tants do not meet just a subset of remaining competitors, but they rather
confront all the other survivors (e.g., this is how shortlisting works in
R&D races). Just a few papers in the elimination contests literature adopt
this kind of shortlisting. To the best of our knowledge this method is only
adopted in the efficient entry literature mentioned above and in Fu and Lu
(2012).
A third feature which is shared by most works in the literature is that the
role of a constraint on resources is typically not considered, despite of
contestants perform one after the other. Other contributions to this strand are Konrad and
Leininger (2007) and two very recent contributions by Segev and Sela (2011) and Segev and
Sela (2012).
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its relevance in most real world contests 14. Just a handful of papers em-
bed it explicitly in the analysis. Amegashie (2002) analyzes a two-stage
elimination contest and finds that when contestants face a symmetric cap
on total effort between stages, full “burning out” can happen in equilib-
rium, i.e., all active players may find it optimal to spend all resources
in the first-stage and be left with nothing in the second stage. Stein and
Rapoport (2005) introduce a budget constraint in a two-stage contest and
find that as the rent increases, the ratio between second stage and first
stage expenditures is constant if the budget constraint is not binding,
while it decreases non linearly in the value of the rent if the constraint is
binding15.
Similarly to these works, we do consider the fact that players face a con-
straint on resources, but do not introduce explicitly a budget constraint.
We rather consider that if players are to behave rationally, as is it cus-
tomarily assumed in economic models, they will never let the sum of
the outlays made through stages exceed their valuation, i.e. they will
consider the reservation value they assign to winning the good as an im-
plicit, natural cap on their total spending16.
The important point that we share with this limited literature, however,
is that when contestants are (artificially or rationally) budget-constrained,
a fundamental trade-off exists when allocating resources over stages: the
more resources a player spends in a particular stage the higher the chance
to get shortlisted to the next stage, but the lower the chance to get short-
listed in later stages and eventually win.
However, strangely enough, the aforementioned works did not realize
that the very presence of this trade-off implies that when a player strate-
gizes on how much she will bid at each given stage she will be allowed
14For the role of effort caps in single-stage contests see Che and Gale (2003), where it is
shown that if contestants are asymmetric it is optimal to handicap the most efficient one,
and Gavious et al. (2002) who endogenize the choice of imposing a bid cap.
15See also Matros (2006), who studies optimal seeding in an elimination tournament
where players face a fixed common budget constraint and the success function in each
round is stochastic.
16We are planning to work at a version of the model where the budget constraint is mod-
eled explicitly, which will allow to consider also the case where the budget constraint is
lower than the valuation (while the present analysis amounts to the case where the budget
constraint is greater or equal than the valuation).
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to bid, she does not regard the total of the bids she has planned to spent
until that stage as sunk, since they are not strategically irrelevant in her
decision of how much to bid in the following stages. When there is a
constraint on resources, expenditures made in earlier stages limit expen-
ditures that can be done in later stages: the more a contestant spends
early the less she has to spend later, the more she plans to spend later,
the less she has to spend earlier. Therefore bids are sunk only when a
contestant actually spends the money, but when she initially strategizes
they are not sunk.
To the best of our knowledge the present work is the first one in the
literature to make this simple but relevant point. The only paper that
somehow considered that outlays in early stages may play a role in later
stages, though with much different reasons and in a much different con-
text, is Baik and Lee (2000). Motivated by those real world cases where
efforts made in early stages affect the outcomes of later stages (e.g., sport
games where scores in qualification stages are carried over to the final
stage and added to the final-stage score), they study a two-stage Tul-
lock contest with symmetric players and “multi-battle” shortlisting, and
consider the effects on rent dissipation of allowing first-stage efforts to
be partially “carried over” to the second stage, i.e., first-stage efforts are
(partially) taken into account in second-stage decision making.
2.3 The model
Consider that N risk-neutral players participate to an all-pay elimination
contest with K stages and “all-against-all” shortlisting, that is a multi-
stage contest organized as K consecutive all-pay auctions where at each
stage a given number of highest bidders is shortlisted to go to subsequent
stages - but all players forfeit their own bid - and the players who are
shortlisted in all stages are awarded a prize.
Let us define the set of playersN = {1, 2, ..., i, ..., N} and the set of stages
K = {a, b, ..., k, ...,K}, with N ,K ⊂ N+ 17. We assume players to be risk-
17In the following, the subscript indices will refer to players and the superscripts will
refer to stages.
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neutral and asymmetric, i.e., players’ valuations for winning a prize are
v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vN > 0, where vi is the valuation of the i-th player, with
vi ∈ R+, ∀i ∈ N .
Also, we assume complete information, i.e., players know each other’s
valuations.
We indicate with qk the number of players to be shortlisted at stage k,
with k ∈ K, qk ∈ N+, so that qK is the number of final winners, i.e.,
players that are awarded a prize. We assume that qk can vary between
stages - since the contest sponsor has discretion over that - and that it is
exogenous, i.e., is determined and announced ex-ante by the sponsor.
Technically, the stage-auction at each intermediate stage k is a multi-unit
all-pay auction where qk “shortlisting tickets” are auctioned, while the
final-stage auction is a multi-unit all-pay auction where qK “final prizes”
are auctioned 18. In each stage each bidder demands one unit only. Each
bidder allowed to play at k offers a non-negative bid (effort) xki ∈ R+ ∪
{0} (the vector xk ∈ Rqk+ ∪ {0} being the profile of actions taken by the
players who can play at k) and the qk highest bidders are awarded the qk
shortlisting tickets to stage k + 1, but all players pay their own bid.
We further define as the marginal bid at stage k, and indicate it with xk(qk),
the qk-highest bid, i.e., the stage-k bid of the last - or “weakest” - player
who manages to get a ticket to stage k+1, so that shortlisted players have
bids: xk(1) ≥ xk(2) ≥ ... ≥ xk(qk). The bidder i such that xki = xk(qk) is the
marginal bidder at stage k 19. The bidders who bid below the marginal bid
at stage k are eliminated, while if a player bid exactly the marginal bid,
two cases can occur:
“More tickets than marginal bidders” case: either there are no ties at the
marginal bid or the number of players tying at the marginal bid is
lower or equal than the number of shortlisting tickets remaining
after that players who have bid higher than the marginal bid have
already been shortlisted. In this case no tie-breaking is needed: all
18We borrow the tickets analogy from previous works: Lai and Matros (2006) talk about
“entry tickets” and Fu and Lu (2012) about “tickets to the next stage”.
19We borrow this definition from Fullerton and McAfee (1999), with a slight difference:
in their work “marginal bidder” indicates the “first rejected bidder” while in our case it
indicates the “last accepted” one.
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the players who tie at the marginal bid will get shortlisted with
certainty.
“More marginal bidders than tickets” case: the number of players ty-
ing at the marginal bid is higher than the number of remaining
shortlisting tickets. In this case tie-breaking is needed and ties
are broken uniformly at random so that player i has # rem. tickets
mk
probability of getting shortlisted to stage k + 1, where mk is the
number of players (included i) who tie at the marginal bid in stage
k.
Obviously, the same two cases can occur at the final stage K, with the
only difference that players bid for prizes rather than for shortlisting tick-
ets.
The shortlisting process is depicted in Figure 2.2, where for each player
bidding at a given stage, it is indicated the bid which allowed her to get
shortlisted to that stage.
Figure 2.2: The shortlisting process in the elimination contest
For the sake of clarity, consider the following simple example. Sup-
pose that there are 6 players allowed to bid at a given stage and that a
total of 4 shortlisting tickets are available for the next stage. In this case
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the marginal bid is the fourth highest bid. Suppose that two players bid
higher than the marginal bid, one player bids lower and 3 players tie
at the marginal bid. The high-bid players get with certainty the ticket
to the next stage, and the low-bid player is eliminated. The number of
tickets left is 2, but there are 3 players tying at the marginal bid, so that
we are in the “more marginal bidders than tickets” case. Tie-breaking is
needed: the 3 players at the tie have 23 probability each to get a ticket.
Suppose instead that there are just two players tying at the marginal bid,
and two players bidding lower. In this case we are in the “more tickets
than marginal bidders” case and there is no need of tie-breaking: both
players at the tie get the ticket with certainty.
We define as the net valuation of player iwho is shortlisted at stage k, and
indicate it with NV ki , player i’s valuation net of the sum of the bids she
has made until stage k, i.e.,
NV ki , vi −
k∑
l=1
xli with NV
k
i ∈ R ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K (2.1)
Importantly, we assume that players’ spending is implicitly capped
by their own valuation: as discussed in the previous sections, a player’s
valuation, which represents the maximum amount of resources the player
is rationally willing to spend for winning the prize, represents a “natural”
cap on the total effort each player can exert as a whole in the competi-
tion20.
Therefore, player i faces the following implicit budget (or effort) constraint:
K∑
k=1
xki ≤ vi (2.2)
Notice that the maximum amount a player can spend at a given stage
k is her net valuation at stage k − 1, so that, relative to each stage k, we
could rewrite the budget constraint of Equation 2.2 as:
xki ≤ NV k−1i (2.3)
20See footnote 16.
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Obviously, if player i spends exactly her net valuation, xki = NV
k−1
i ,
she will have no resources left to spend from stage k + 1 onward. This
implies that other shortlisted players at stage k+ 1 would be able to beat
player i with an infinitesimal amount, making her losing the entire bud-
get. Therefore it is clear that in each stage where a player is allowed
to play, the total of the bids she has planned to spend until that stage are
not sunk, since they are not strategically irrelevant in her decision of how
much to bid in following stages.
The consideration above implies that the preferences of player i, as rep-
resented by the payoff function at the final stage K are as follows21:
Πi(h
K) =

vi −
∑K
k=1 x
k
i , if {xKi > xK(qK)}or{xKi = xK(qK)and rem. prizes > ties}
vi
mK
−∑Kk=1 xki , if {i ties at xK(qK)and ties > rem. prizes}
−∑rk=1 xki (r ≤ K), otherwise
(2.4)
The payoff function tells us that player i can end up in three situa-
tions: (i) if she makes it to the final stage and offers a bid higher than the
marginal bidder (which, at this stage, is the last player who is awarded a
prize), she “wins” (i.e., she is awarded a prize) with certainty. This also
happens if player i is the marginal bidder but either she does not tie with
anyone, or the number of ties is lower than the number of prizes left after
the shortlisting of highest bidders (“more tickets than marginal bidders”
case). In both cases she gets a payoff equal to her valuation net of the
sum of all the bids she has made until the final stage; (ii) if player i ties
with some other player(s) at the marginal bid in the final stage and the
number of ties is higher than the number of prizes left (“more marginal
bidders than tickets” case), she is awarded a prize only if she is selected
by the uniformly random tie-breaking mechanism, but the sum of the
bids she made is a certain outlay; (iii) if player i is eliminated before the
final stage, or if she makes it but bids below the marginal bid, she incurs
a loss equal to the sum of the bids she has made until the last stage she
has been shortlisted in. Notice that the losses are greater the further the
player is shortlisted through the stages.
21See Appendix A.1.1 for the complete and rigorous definition of the elimination all-pay
auction in game theoretic terms.
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It is plausible to think that if player i expects to get either a negative or
a zero payoff in the game, she has no incentive to bid positive in any of
the stages she will have a chance to bid in. In particular, we impose the
two following assumptions to hold in the model:
Assumption 2.1 Players who bid zero in a given stage are allowed to be short-
listed to the next stage.
In fact, it can be the case that the marginal bid is zero so that players
bidding (with or without ties) at zero have a positive probability to get
shortlisted. Therefore, unlike similar models, bidding zero is not equiv-
alent to stay out of the contest. This implies that it also makes sense to
assume that
Assumption 2.2 Players who expect to get either a negative or a zero expected
payoff always enter the game and bid zero in the first stage, as if they were not
indifferent between staying out from the contest and entering, even if expected
payoffs are the same.
The first assumption could seem strong, however other works adopt
similar ones. For example Fu and Lu (2012) assume that if all contestants
who participate in a round make zero effort, the winner of that round
is selected at random. We have used Assumption 2.1 in the current ver-
sion of the model for simplicity, but we are currently working to amend
the model so that zero bidders are no longer allowed to get shortlisted.
However, we do not expect our results to change significantly.
At this stage of work we consider the basic case were N = {1, 2, 3},
K = {a, b}, qa = 2 and qb = 1. That is, there are three players and
two stages, at the first stage two players are shortlisted and at the end
only one player wins (i.e., one prize only is awarded). The model can be
extended to the general case described above, and we plan to do that.
We analyze the case where players are asymmetric, i.e., have different
valuations for the prize, v1 > v2 > v3 > 0.
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2.4 Characterization of equilibria
We solve the game by backward induction, looking for the complete set
of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE), i.e., of triples of strategies
(xa∗i , x
b∗
i ) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Therefore, we first look for the Nash Equilibria
of the generic subgame after any possible (length-1) history ha, namely
the Stage-b all pay auction, and then, on the basis of continuation pay-
offs, we analyze the bidding in Stage-a 22.
2.4.1 Stage-b all-pay auction
In Stage-b the two players who got shortlisted from Stage-a, that is play-
ers i, j : xai , x
a
j ∈ {xa(1), xa(2)}, bid again to win the single final prize. No-
tice that since we are working backward, we do not know the identity of
these players, so that we indicate them generically with i, j. The Stage-b
(i.e., final) payoff function of player i (analogously for j) is as follows:
Πi(h
b) =

vi − xai − xbi , if xbi > xbj
vi
2 − xai − xbi , if xbi = xbj
−(xai + xbi ), if xbi < xbj
(2.5)
The payoff function above is obviously a particular case of the expres-
sion in Equation (2.4), and tells that: (i) if shortlisted player i bids higher
than the other shortlisted player, she wins the prize with certainty and
gets a payoff equal to her valuation net of the sum of the bids she has
made in the two stages, i.e., equal to her net valuation at Stage-b NV bi =
vi − (xai + xbi ), or, more meaningfully, equal to her net valuation at Stage-a
minus her Stage-b bid, i.e., NV ai − xbi where NV ai = vi − xai ; (ii) if i ties
with the other player, the winner of the prize is selected randomly but
the sum of the bids is a certain outlay for both; (iii) if i bids lower than
her opponent, she incurs a loss equal to the sum of the bids.
We observe here that differently from similar models (e.g., Groh et al.
(2012), Fullerton and McAfee (1999)), we do not need to assume that
players who make it to the final stage are all given a positive payment -
22For each ha ∈ R3+ there is a subgame, so that there are infinite possible subgames.
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like a prize for finalists - independent from their performance in the final
stage. This technicality is required in models where any player who bids
zero in the first stage is always eliminated, since in that context ensuring
that all players have a positive expected payoff from being shortlisted
to the final stage is a necessary condition for the existence of an equilib-
rium in the first stage. Instead, as it will be clear in the following, our
Assumption 2.1 implies that the case that some players have a zero ex-
pected payoff from being shortlisted to Stage-b does not create problems
for the existence of an equilibrium in Stage-a.
Notice that the Stage-a bid must be present in the Stage-b payoff since,
as said, we do not consider them as sunk. The Stage-a bid caps the max-
imum amount player i can spend in Stage-b, which is equal to her net
valuation at Stage-a, i.e., xbi ≤ NV ai .
Therefore, Stage-a net valuations represent the “updated” reservation
value that each player assigns to winning the game when he has to de-
cide how much to bid in Stage-b: this value takes into account that she
has already spent part of her resources to get shortlisted to Stage-b. There-
fore Stage-a net valuations play in the Stage-b all-pay auction the same
role that ex-ante valuations play in a standard all-pay auction. This im-
plies that the Stage-b subgame is analogous to a standard one-stage two-
player all-pay auction with complete information. It is well known that
this kind of auction does not have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies,
neither in the case where players are asymmetric nor in the case with
symmetric players, but, in both cases, it does have a Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies (e.g., see Hillman and Samet (1987) for the symmetric
case and Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1996) for the asym-
metric case.)
Notice that even if players are ex-ante asymmetric, i.e., they have differ-
ent valuations, after bidding in Stage-a they can become symmetric, in
the sense that they can get the same net valuation. Therefore, we should
consider two different cases:
ex-ante asymmetric - ex-post asymmetric players (“asym-asym” case):
shortlisted players have different net valuations: in this case we
will denote by H the player who is shortlisted to the Stage-b sub-
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game with the higher net valuation, NVH = vH − xaH , and by L
the player who is shortlisted to Stage-b with the lower net valuation,
NVL = vL − xaL, with H,L ∈ {i, j} and NVH > NVL ≥ 023.
ex-ante asymmetric - ex-post symmetric players (“asym-sym” case):
shortlisted players have the same net valuations, NVi = NVj ≥ 0:
in this case we will denote them by S and use the notation NVS =
vS − xaS , with S ∈ {i, j}. Notice that this case can only happen if
the ex-ante stronger between the shortlisted players made in Stage-
a a higher bid than the ex-ante weaker player. However, as we will
see, the “asym-sym” case will never occur in the SPNE.
The two following propositions characterize the equilibrium of the
Stage-b game:
Proposition 2.1 (Existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the
Stage-b all-pay auction)
1.1 No pure strategy equilibrium can exist in the subgame, neither in the “asym-
asym” case nor in the “asym-sym” case.
1.2 The equilibrium bid of each shortlisted player i in the Stage-b subgame is
a random variable with cumulative distribution function (CDF) Fi(xbi )
which is continuous over (0,∞).
1.3 The support of the equilibrium CDF is the same ∀i and is [0, NVL] in the
“asym-asym” case and [0, NVS ] in the “asym-sym” case.
1.4 In equilibrium at most one agent bids zero with strictly positive probability.
Proof. In the Appendix A.1.2.
Proposition 2.2 (Nash equilibrium of the Stage-b all-pay auction) The
Stage-b all-pay auction has one of two possible different asymmetric Nash equi-
libria in mixed strategies, depending on which case occurs:
2.1 “asym-asym” case: If players got shortlisted with different net valuations,
there is an unique equilibrium where the player who got shortlisted with
the higher net valuation (playerH) randomizes continuously over (0, NVL]
23Superscript of net valuations NVi are omitted since the only net valuations we will
refer to are those at Stage-a.
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according to the mixed strategy FH(xbH) = (x
a
L+x
b
H)/vL, and the player
who got shortlisted with the lower net valuation (player L) randomizes
continuously over (0, NVL] according to the mixed strategy FL(xbL) =
(NVH − NVL)/vH + (xaH + xbL)/vH . Players’ equilibrium payoffs are
respectively u∗H = NVH−NVL = vH−xaH−vL+xaL > 0 and u∗L = 0.
2.2 “asym-sym” case: If players got shortlisted with the same net valuation,
there is an unique equilibrium where both players i and j randomize
continuously over (0, NVS ] according, respectively, to mixed strategies
Fi(x
b
i ) = (x
a
j + x
b
i )/vj and Fj(x
b
j) = (x
a
i + x
b
j)/vi, and both get an
equilibrium payoff of zero, u∗S = 0 with S ∈ {i, j}.
Proof. In the Appendix A.1.3.
Notice that an interesting asymmetric external effect arises in the equi-
librium of the “asym-asym” case: player L has a positive external ef-
fect on player H through her past action xaL (
∂FH
∂xaL
> 0,
∂u∗H
∂xaL
> 0), the
insight being that the more player L has spent in the first stage, the
less aggressively player H will need to bid in the second stage to out-
bid L, and hence the higher will be her expected second-stage payoff.
Conversely, player H does not have external effects on L (by reducing,
FL(x
b
L) = (vH − vL)/vH + xaL/vH + xbL/vH ). Morevoer, player H does
not take into account his own Stage-a bid in his Stage-b equilibrium strat-
egy (despite it is not-sunk), while player L does, and such that ∂FL∂xaL > 0,
meaning that the higher her bid in the first stage the less aggressively she
will be able to spend in the second stage.
On the other hand, the equilibrium of the “asym-sym” case displays
symmetric external effects: each player’s equilibrium CDF contains the
Stage-a bid of the opponent (but not her own). Despite more work is
needed to fully understand these external effects and the intuition be-
hind them, it seems that they do not have much in common with the
effects studied in the literature on contests with externalities (see e.g.,
Klose and Kovenock (2015) ), where typically players care (ex ante, not
only in equilibrium) about the allocation of the prize in the event they
lose24.
24For a survey on contributions on externalities in winner-pay auctions see Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2006).
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Except for the presence of the Stage-a bids, the equilibrium strategies of
the “asym-asym” case are identical to the ones of the one-stage all-pay
auction with asymmetric players (see Theorem 3 in Baye et al. (1996)).
On the other hand, the equilibrium of the “asym-sym” case resembles
somehow the one of the one-stage all-pay auction with symmetric play-
ers (see Proposition 3 in Hillman and Samet (1987)), insofar both play-
ers get a zero expected payoff; however, differently from the one-stage
game, equilibrium strategies embed the Stage-a bids and also display
player-specific valuations at the denominator (obviously, given the ex-
ante asymmetry between players).
Notice that equilibrium payoffs are expressed in terms of net valuations, so
that they take into account Stage-a bids. Interpretation is that player L (in
the “asym-asym” case) and player S (in the “asym-sym” case), who get a
zero expected continuation payoff, sometimes win and sometimes lose,
and are on average able to exactly cover the sum of their outlays, whereas
player H (in the “asym-asym” case) is winning more often than losing,
so that, on average, she is able to more than cover the sum of her out-
lays. Moreover, notice that we cannot check yet whether the equilibrium
strategies respect requirement [1.4] in Proposition 2.1, since at this stage
we do not know the equilibrium values of Stage-a bids. As we shall see,
such requirement is met in the SPNE strategies.
Proposition 2.2 tells us something interesting: when players are ex-post
asymmetric (“asym-asym” case) the winner is, on average, the player who
got shortlisted to Stage-b with the higher net valuation, rather than the player
with the original higher valuation (i.e., the ex-ante strongest player), as it
was the case in the equilibrium of the one-stage game. The intuition be-
hind this result is that when players have limited resources to allocate between
stages, winning depends crucially not only on the relative strengths of players,
but also on how players allocate resources between the two stages. However,
we will see in the following that, due to the asymmetry between play-
ers, the strongest player (i.e., player 1) has an advantage over the other
players, so that in equilibrium she will always be the player who gets
shortlisted with the higher net valuation, and, consequently, will have
better chances to be the final winner. Instead, when players are ex-post
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symmetric (“asym-sym” case), no player has an advantage, so that they
have symmetric chances to be the final winner.
2.4.2 Stage-a all-pay auction
Now we go backward: given the continuation payoffs in Proposition 2.2,
we ask what are the optimal choices of players at Stage-a, i.e., after his-
tory h0.
The Stage-a all-pay auction is a multi-unit all-pay auction where two
shortlisting tickets are auctioned.
Notice that xa(2) is the marginal bid at Stage-a, so that player i (with
i = {1, 2, 3}) will get shortlisted with certainty only if her Stage-a bid
is greater than the marginal bid, or if she bids the marginal bid but we
are in the “more tickets than marginal bidders” case, which in this case
means that either xai = x
a
j > x
a
k or x
a
j > x
a
i > x
a
k. Instead, if i ties with
other players at the marginal bid but we are in the “more marginal bid-
ders than tickets” case, which in this case means that either xaj > x
a
i = x
a
k
(i.e.,ma = 2) or xai = x
a
j = x
a
k (i.e.,m
a = 3), ties will be uniformly broken
at random.
Formally, the Stage-a payoff function of player i is as follows 25:
Πi(h
a) =

u∗i , if {xai > xa(2)}or{xai = xaj > xak}or{xaj > xai > xak}
# rem. tickets
ma u
∗
i , if {xaj > xai = xak}or{xai = xaj = xak}
−xai , otherwise
(2.6)
where u∗i is the continuation payoff of player i in case she is short-
listed, such that:
u∗i =
{
0, if i = {L, S}
NVH −NVL, if i = H
(2.7)
25Notice that each possible history of length-1 is a profile of actions, so that ha = xa,
with xa ∈ R3+
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Therefore, player i knows that: (1) if she is not shortlisted, she will
incur a certain loss equal to her Stage-a bid; (2) if she is shortlisted with
NVL orNVS , she will get a zero expected payoff, i.e., on average she will
not be the final winner, while (3) if she is shortlisted with NVH , she will
get a positive expected payoff, i.e, on average she will be the final win-
ner.
From Assumption 2.2 we have that players who expect to end up ei-
ther in (1) or in (2) always enter the game and bid zero in Stage-a, and
from Assumption 2.1 we have that players who bid zero in Stage-a have
a chance to be shortlisted to Stage-b. On the other hand, if player i ex-
pects to end up in (3), she will bid in Stage-a the lowest possible amount
that allows her to get shortlisted. From the discussion above it is clear
that each player i’s optimal choice in Stage-a is to make such a bid that
allows her to get shortlisted with NVH . However, the presence of an ex-
ante asymmetry between bidders implies the following:
Proposition 2.3 (Advantage for ex-ante stronger players) A player with
a higher valuation has an “advantage” over a weaker player: if she underbids
(at limit, overlaps to) a bidder with a lower valuation, she will get shortlisted
with NVH with certainty, provided that her bid allows her to get shortlisted.
Formally:
∀xai , xaj ∈ {xa(1), xa(2)} with xai ≤ xaj , if vi > vj then vi−xai > vj−xaj
(2.8)
This result implies that due to complete information, an ex-ante weaker
player that anticipates to be shortlisted with an ex-ante stronger player
has no incentive to bid positive in Stage-a. This implies that in the equi-
librium of the Stage-a game players 2 and 3 optimally bid zero and player
1 bids a very small positive amount. While in the Appendix A.1.4 we pro-
vide a complete proof of this result, consider the following heuristic rea-
soning to get an intuition of why this is the case: for any couple of positive
bids she expects from her rivals, xai > x
a
j > 0 with i, j ∈ {2, 3}, player
1’s optimal choice is to “bid in between” i.e., such that xai > x
a
1 > x
a
j ,
since this always ensures that she is shortlisted with NVH . Notice that
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the case xa2 = x
a
3 > 0 will not occur in equilibrium insofar player 3 has
no incentive to overlap with a strictly positive bid to stronger players,
since in case she manages to get shortlisted, she will always getNVL and
hence a zero continuation payoff. But anticipating that this way they will
never be able to get shortlisted withNVH , players 2 and 3 have no incen-
tive to bid positive in Stage-a. One could think therefore that player 1’s
optimal response, anticipating that player 2 and 3 will bid zero, might be
to overlap and bid zero as well. However, notice that this way she would
risk not to get shortlisted at all. For this reason she might rather prefer to
bid an arbitrarily small positive amount,  > 0.
We prove that in fact this is exactly the case and that the following result
holds:
Proposition 2.4 (Equilibrium of the Stage-a all-pay auction) Given con-
tinuation payoffs in Equation 2.7, the Stage-a all-pay auction has a unique equi-
librium in pure strategies, which is xa∗ = {xa∗1 = , xa∗2 = 0, xa∗3 = 0}. In
this equilibrium only player 1 bids a positive amount, which is undetermined
but very close to zero. Also, only the “asym-asym” case occurs in equilibrium,
so that player 1 is always shortlisted with NVH .
Proof. In the Appendix A.1.4.
Proposition 2.5 (Equilibrium of the Stage-a all-pay auction - continued)
The Stage-a all-pay auction has no equilibria in mixed strategies, so that the
pure-strategy equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of Stage-a.
Proof. In the Appendix A.1.5.
2.4.3 SPNE of the two-stage all-pay auction
From Propositions 1-5 we get the following result:
Proposition 2.6 (SPNE of the two-stage all-pay auction) When players
have valuations v1 > v2 > v3 > 0, the two-stage all-pay auction has a unique
SPNE which is as follows:
(
xa∗1 =  ' 0, F1(xb1) = x
b
1
vj
∀xb1 ∈ [0, vj ]
)(
xa∗j = 0, Fj(x
b
j) =
v1−vj
v1
+
xbj
v1
∀xbj ∈ [0, vj ]
) (2.9)
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with j ∈ {2, 3}. Equilibrium payoffs are u∗1 = NV1−NVj = v1−−vj >
0 and u∗j = 0.
In this equilibrium only player 1, i.e., the ex-ante strongest player,
bids positive in Stage-a. Consequently, she gets always shortlisted and
always with NVH . Player 2 and 3 bid zero, and one of them gets short-
listed at random, and always with NVL26. In Stage-b shortlisted players
randomize over a common support, whose upper bound is ex-ante un-
determined and equal to NVj = vj (since xa∗j = 0). Player 1 gets a
positive expected payoff, i.e., on average she wins the game, while the
other shortlisted player gets a zero expected payoff, i.e., on average she
makes no losses, and the player who is not shortlisted gets an actual zero
payoff.
Therefore, even if the subgame result tells us that the player who will
win on average the game is not the ex-ante strongest player, but rather
the player who is able to allocate the resources such that she manages to
get shortlisted with the higher net valuation, however the SPNE result
tells us that in fact, this player is always player 1, so that it seems that players’
relative ex-ante strengths are more important, in determining the outcome of
the game, than their relative abilities to allocate optimally limited resources over
stages.
The intuition for this result is that since there is complete information
and the game is dynamic, players can use information about continua-
tion payoffs and rivals’ valuations to bid optimally in Stage-a. By Propo-
sition 2.3, a player who anticipates that in the second-stage she will meet
a stronger player, does not want to bid positive in the first stage. Because
of Assumption 2.1, she can still be shortlisted but on average she will
make no loss in the end. The information structure allows the strongest
player to deter other players from bidding positive in the first stage, so
that she can ensure to get shortlisted with a very small outlay and save
most resources for the second stage. Therefore, even if the information
structure in our model is different, we get a result similar to the litera-
ture about the effect of signaling in elimination contests with informa-
26Notice that the SPNE strategies meet the requirement 1.4 of Proposition 2.1.
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tion revelation (e.g.,Lai and Matros (2006)): too much information does
not necessarily lead to “good” outcomes. In both cases efficient shortlist-
ing of players is prevented: in their case this is due to misrepresentation
of preferences, whereas in our case it is due to the predatory behavior of
the strongest player. Unsurprisingly, this is detrimental for total revenue
(effort) extraction, as illustrated by the following proposition:
Proposition 2.7 (Expected Revenue) The two-stage all-pay auction yields a
lower expected revenue than the one-stage all-pay. The first stage yields virtu-
ally no revenue, whereas the second stage yields a lower expected revenue than
the two-player all-pay due to inefficient shortlisting, that is the fact that the
weakest player (i.e., player 3), has a positive chance to get shortlisted and to win
eventually.
Proof. In the Appendix A.1.6.
This result is consistent with the prediction in Gradstein and Konrad
(1999) that when the contest rules are discriminatory enough, a one-stage
contest yields a higher total effort than its multi-stage counterpart. In our
case this is due to the fact that the multi-stage contest implies a positive
probability that the second strongest player does not reach the final stage,
so that shortlisting is inefficient.
Therefore, what emerges from our analysis is that a multi-stage all-pay
auction does not seem to have very appealing features. However, it is
reasonable to think that our results may depend on the simplicity of our
analysis. In the next section we discuss some possible work develop-
ments aimed at enhancing the descriptive power of the model.
2.5 Conclusion
In this essay we have provided an auction-theoretic analysis of an in-
novative practice recently introduced in the EU for the procurement of
R&D, i.e., Pre-commercial Procurement (PCP). Given the stepwise na-
ture of PCP and the fact that all firms participating to the tender sustain
a cost regardless of them winning or not, we have modeled PCP as an
elimination all-pay contest with budget-constrained asymmetric players
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and non-sunk bids.
The non-sunk feature is a fundamental novel feature brought by our
modelization and relies on the consideration that when players are budget-
constrained, they face a trade off when deciding how to allocate resources
between earlier and later R&D phases: the more a player spends early the
less she has to spend later, the more she plans to spend later, the less she
has to spend earlier. This interplay between stages implies that when a
player initially strategizes on how much to bid at each stage she might
be called to play, she does not regard the total of the bids she has planned
to bid until that stage as sunk, since they are not strategically irrelevant
in subsequent stages. To the best of our knowledge, the present work
is the first one in the literature to make this simple but relevant point. A
second implication of the presence of the trade-off is that the winner may
not be the player with the biggest budget, but rather the player who is
the most able in allocating limited resources over stages.
However, focusing on a simple two-stage framework with complete in-
formation, we find that the relative strengths of players are more impor-
tant than their relative abilities, in determining the (unique) equilibrium
outcome of the game. This result stems from the fact that since the game
is dynamic and there is complete information, players can use informa-
tion about continuation payoffs and rivals’ valuations to bid optimally in
the first stage: a player who anticipates that in the second-stage will meet
a stronger player, does not want to spend resources in the first stage. The
information structure allows the strongest player to always deter other
players from bidding positive in the first stage, so that she can ensure to
get shortlisted with a very small outlay and save most resources for the
second stage (where mixed strategies are played). This leads to the result
that the two-stage all-pay contest yields a lower expected revenue than
the single-stage one, since the first stage yields basically no revenue (due
to the strongest player exerting a minimal effort in the first stage) and
shortlisting is inefficient (since the weakest player has a positive chance
to get shortlisted and eventually win).
On the basis of our results, PCP does not seem to be an advantageous
practice to procure innovative goods, so that procurement officials should
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not stick to such kind of practice. However, results are preliminary and
more work is needed to fully assess PCP on theoretical grounds. There-
fore, we are currently working at the implementation of a number of
steps aimed at enhancing the descriptive power of the model. First, we
are modifying the model so to no longer allow that players who bid zero
in the first stage have a chance to get shortlisted, and to allow for a more
realistic information structure. Also, we plan to assume players to be
risk-averse. This, combined with embedding in the analysis of some
modelization of the risk-sharing feature of PCP, will let us assess the
positive impact - on players incentives - of the presence of a risk-sharing
element in PCP with respect to other procurement practices which do
not feature risk-sharing. All together, these steps will enable us to check
whether our current results are in fact to some extent underestimating
the potential performance of PCP.
To our knowledge this work represents the first attempt to provide a for-
mal economic analysis of PCP. Assessing procurement practices on the-
oretical grounds (of both descriptive and normative nature) can comple-
ment the know-how of procurement practitioners in rationalizing their
use as policy tools. This is particularly relevant given the huge impact
that public procurement in general has on the whole economy, and in
particular the critical potential of the procurement of innovation for en-
hancing the innovative performance and competitiveness of national in-
dustries. With this work we have hopefully initiated a fruitful research
agenda on the theoretical analysis of PCP. An example of further work
in this agenda could be to implement an optimal contest design study of
PCP, which would help make the most of its potential. Also, the present
work provided a contribution to the all-pay auction and elimination con-
test literature, since to the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt
to characterize (under complete information) the equilibria of the elimi-
nation all-pay contest with non-sunk bids27.
27The only step left to complete the characterization of the two-stage elimination all-pay
contest is to analyze the case with ex-ante symmetric players. We also plan to extend the
analysis to the general case with N players and K stages.
36
Chapter 3
Political Corruption in the
Execution of Public
Contracts:
a Principal-Agent Analysis
3.1 Introduction
In June 2014 a huge corruption scandal burst in Italy concerning the pub-
lic works for the MOSE, the ambitious project of underwater barriers
designed to protect Venice from flooding. The inquiry led to the arrest
of 35 people among entrepreneurs, bureaucrats and politicians (includ-
ing the mayor of Venice and the former governor of Veneto), and to the
investigation of other 100 people, with the charges of fiscal fraud, cor-
ruption, extortion and money laundering. The inquiry unveiled a well-
established system where contracting and sub-contracting firms in the
consortium of firms in charge of the MOSE works, systematically em-
bezzled public funds, mainly via inflated and false billings. The embez-
zled money was then allocated to managers’ private use and to buy the
favoritism of national-level politicians (e.g., to unblock extra funding to
the project) and the connivance of the authorities in charge of the moni-
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toring of works1. Authorities reported that the money embezzled since
the beginning of works in 2003 amounts to 1 billion euros, i.e. 20 percent
of the current cost of the MOSE works (i.e., 5,6 billions euros at the 80
percent of completion).
The MOSE case, as well as other similar episodes, highlights two funda-
mental aspects about the relation between public procurement and cor-
ruption that have been neglected by the literature.
First, although it is well acknowledged that corruption may be a major
source of cost-overruns in public procurement (see e.g., Auriol (2006),
OECD (2007), TransparencyInternational (2006)), most contributions fo-
cus on corruption at the award stage (see e.g., Laffont and Tirole (1991),
Celentani and Ganuza (2002), Burguet and Che (2004), Compte et al.
(2005), Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2006), Burguet and Perry (2007), Aroza-
mena and Weinschelbaum (2009)), while the most severe overruns may
rather follow from corruption at the implementation stage of the contract
(see e.g., Piga (2011), Boehm and Olaya (2006)). Cases of corruption at
the post-tendering stage are widespread and significant (e.g., see Søreide
(2005) and Ware et al. (2007)). There are many forms in which post-tender
corruption can occur in procurement. Most notably, the contracting firm
can, with the connivance of some corrupt public official in charge of mon-
itoring the execution of the contract, engage in cost-padding, namely ac-
counting manipulations that allow it to inflate reimbursable costs and
1Authorities reported that the consortium paid real “annual wages”- ranging from
100.000 to 1 million euros per person per year - to regional and national level top politi-
cians (both right and left-wing and also as electoral funding), as well as to regional of-
ficers, judges, intelligence officers, one high official of the Italian Financial Police and
one judge of the Court of Accounts. In addition to monetary “wages”, substantial fa-
vors were paid in in-kind utilities such as “renovation of villas, stays in grand hotel in
Venice and Cortina, private flights, holidays in Tuscany, offers of unnecessary job po-
sitions in the consortium to sons and daughters of magistrates and officers, unneces-
sary consultancy contracts and hydro-geological studies which were not even read”(our
translation from http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/06/07/news/mose_
tangenti_e_sprechi_per_un_miliardo-88272959/?ref=search). The presi-
dent of the consortium, which was also nicknamed by people in the system as the “Doge”,
used diverted money to increase his own salary by one million per year, to benefit relatives
and even to build an image of himself as a philanthropist of Venice - creating job posi-
tions, funding university, sponsoring public events and even funding for 5 million the Italy
stage of the America’s cup (our translation from “Nonno Mose: trent’anni di tangenti a
prescindere”, il Venerdi di Repubblica, June 20-27, 2014).
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divert public money to private uses (as in the MOSE case)23.
However, despite the practical relevance of corruption at the execution
stage of public contracts, to the best of our knowledge only two works
have provided a theoretical analysis of this issue. The former is a pa-
per by Laffont and Tirole (1993) (Ch.12), who analyze cost-padding in
an extension of the standard regulatory problem with unobserved firm’s
productivity (see Laffont and Tirole (1986)), and allow for the possibility
that the firm bribes the supervisor - a bureaucrat who audits the firm on
behalf of a benevolent regulator - in order to consider the effect of cor-
ruption on optimal procurement contracts. More recently, Iossa and Mar-
timort (2013) have studied how the procurement contract (and in partic-
ular the allocation of risk between parties) should be designed in order
to minimize the scope for post-tender corruption, finding that the solu-
tion depends on a country’s quality of auditing institutions and levels of
corruption.
In the works above, the only kind of corruption which is allowed for
is bureaucratic corruption, namely the contracting firm bribes the bu-
reaucrat in charge of the monitoring of contract execution, since it needs
its connivance to engage in illegal activities. The very first economic
models of corruption focused on this problem, namely corruption is an
agency problem where the bureaucrat is a corruptible agent of the gov-
ernment, which is instead regarded as a benevolent regulator (see e.g.,
Becker and Stigler (1974), Banfield (1975), Rose-Ackerman (1975) and Kl-
itgaard (1988))4.
However, big corruption scandals like the MOSE, show that corruption
2There are many ways contracting firms can pad costs, among which increasing ex-
pense claims for materials and supplies (via over-billing), charging advertising and other
unallowable expenses to project costs, increasing managerial compensation, not reporting
cost-reducing improvements (see e.g., Ware et al. (2007)).
3Notice that not all causes of cost overruns are driven by the firm’s opportunistic be-
havior. For example, inadequate planning (due to complexity and uncertainty), and honest
mistakes may be sources of severe cost-overruns but are driven by unintentional behavior
of either the contracting firm or the purchasing authority. Another source of cost overruns
that is not necessarily opportunism-driven is the political bias in choosing “wrong” projects
and underestimating costs (like in the case of “white elephant” projects) (e.g., see Flyvbjerg
(2007)).
4See Aidt (2003) for a survey on economic models of corruption.
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may not be limited to minor bureaucratic levels, but rather involve higher
levels of the political hierarchy, namely top-level politicians, who may as
well have to gain from large-scale corruption5. Therefore, a second main
aspect of the relationship between procurement and corruption that was
neglected by the literature is that beside bureaucratic corruption, also po-
litical corruption can arise: when the potential gains from a corrupt deal
are large, bureaucratic malfeasance can be often sustained by dishonesty
at the top-level of the political hierarchy. While the general issue that
all levels of government are rent-seeking and hence corruptible has a
long-standing tradition in the “Public Choice” and political economy re-
search agendas (see e.g., Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Barro (1973), Fer-
ejohn (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Grossman and Helpman (2002),
Besley (2007)), the problem has not been analyzed for public procure-
ment in particular. To the best of our knowledge, the only exceptions
are two recent empirical studies. The former is a work by Coviello and
Gagliarducci (2010), who investigate the relationship between the time
politicians stay in office and the functioning of procurement, finding that
more time in office is associated with a worsening of procurement per-
formance. The latter is by Goldman et al. (2013) who analyze the ef-
fect of political connections of publicly traded corporations in the US on
the allocation of procurement contracts, and find that companies that are
connected to the winning (losing) party are significantly more likely to
experience an increase (decrease) in procurement contracts.
On the basis of the considerations above, in this work we want to pro-
vide a political corruption explanation of why cost-padding in the execu-
tion of public contracts is so widespread and substantial. We argue that
the occurrence of cost-padding is not only due to the opportunism of the
contracting firm, which takes advantage of the informational asymmetry
which naturally arises in contract execution, but also to the opportunism
5Other examples, beside the MOSE case, are the Italian corruption scandals concern-
ing the Milan world’s fair EXPO 2015 (see e.g., (in italian) http://www.repubblica.
it/argomenti/tangenti_expo ), and the recent case “Sistema Incalza”(see e.g., (in
italian) http://espresso.repubblica.it/plus/articoli/2015/03/20/news/
grandi-opere-i-nomi-del-sistema-ercole-incalza-1.205042 ) . In both
cases corruption was found to involve top level politicians and former politicians.
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of its political principal, who can be self-interested and corruptible and
have a gain from designing perverse incentive schemes in order to in-
duce the firm to embezzle money.
In particular, our model is an extension of the contract-theoretic cost-
padding model in Laffont and Tirole (1993), where we allow both for
the principal to be partially selfish - i.e., he maximizes a weighted av-
erage between social welfare and his own personal benefit - and for the
auditing technology and the stakes of corruption to be endogenous and
depending on the motives of the politician6: in our model the politician
(principal) himself audits the firm (agent) and, depending on his degree
of selfishness, decides both the level of auditing technology and, in case
evidence of cost-padding is found, whether to enter a corrupt transac-
tion with the firm, i.e., hide evidence in exchange of a share of the money
embezzled by the firm7. This framework allows to develop a theory of
endogenous political corruption: while in Laffont and Tirole (1993) cost-
padding could emerge in optimal contracts only due to asymmetric in-
formation, in this model cost-padding and, consequently, corruption, are
ultimately choices of the politician, which depend on his degree of self-
ishness.
We find that while a moderate politician (by choosing a relatively ag-
gressive auditing technology) prevents the firm from engaging in cost-
padding, an enough opportunist politician (via choosing a relatively weak
auditing technology) leaves an incentive to pad costs in optimal contracts
and, conditional upon detection, enters in a corrupt transaction with the
firm. Moreover, an improvement in the efficiency of the fiscal system
makes cost-padding easier to occur: this happens since a decrease in the
social cost of cost-padding (in terms of less distortionary taxation) im-
plies that also less opportunist politicians will be tempted to engage in
6The “mixed”view of the government was introduced by Grossman and Helpman
(1994) in the context of lobbying and special interest politics, and can be found in other
research agendas as well, e.g., in law enforcement and economics of crime (e.g., Garoupa
and Klerman (2002) and Dittmann (2006)). The latter literature also use the endogenization
of the detection technology.
7Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007) also have an agency problem where the principal (a
politician) can be partially self-interested and audit himself the agent (a corruptible bu-
reaucrat). However, the auditing technology is exogenous in their case.
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corruption. This result can be also interpreted in light of the recent debate
on State capacity (Besley and Persson (2010), Acemoglu (2010) Acemoglu
et al. (2011)): by increasing the gains from staying in power, a more ef-
ficient fiscal system increases the politician’s incentive to misuse public
office. Therefore, without a coincident increase in political accountabil-
ity, an increase in State capacity can be detrimental.
The rest of the essay is structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents the
model; Section 3.3 analyzes the auditing subgame; Section 3.4 character-
izes optimal contracts; Section 3.5 analyzes the optimal choice of audit-
ing technology for the politician; Section 3.6 concludes. All proofs are
gathered in the Appendix A.2.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Setting
A politician (principal) wants to contract the realization of a single and
indivisible project of public utility from a monopolistic firm (agent)8.
The politician is partially selfish, i.e. rather than being a purely benevo-
lent social welfare maximizer as in Laffont and Tirole (1993) (Ch. 12, LT
in the following), he maximizes a weighted average between social wel-
fare (SW ) and some measure of private utility (PU ), which will be both
defined shortly. Therefore, his objective function has the form:
U = SW + µPU (3.1)
where µ ∈ [0,∞) is a selfishness parameter measuring the weight placed
by the politician on private utility relative to social welfare (see e.g.,
Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007)9). According to the value of µ, politicians
8The firm might be the winner of a procurement tender or a concessionaire for that
project (like in the MOSE case).
9This modelization of the politician’s preferences was first introduced by Grossman and
Helpman (1994). A possible alternative modelization (see e.g., Dittmann (2006)) makes use
of a convex combination i.e.,
U = (1− α)SW + αPU (3.2)
with α ∈ [0, 1], where the limit cases are α = 0 (purely benevolent) and α = 1 (purely
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can be categorized as follows:
Definition 3.1 If µ > 1 the politician is “opportunist”, i.e., he cares relatively
more about his private utility; if µ ≤ 1 the politician is “moderate”, i.e., he cares
relatively more about social welfare.
The LT purely benevolent politician and the “Public Choice” purely
selfish politician are limit cases of this modelization, where, respectively,
µ = 0 and µ→∞.
As in LT, the firm’s technology is represented by the following linear cost
function
C(β, e, a) = β − e+ a (3.3)
where β is a parameter which measures the technological efficiency
(or “intrinsic productivity”) of the firm, with Cβ > 0 (a high β corre-
sponds to an inefficient technology), e is the level of cost-reducing effort
(Ce < 0) and a is the level of cost-padding, i.e., money embezzlement
(Ca > 0). The realized cost of the project is equal to actual cost (β − e)
plus cost-padding10.
The efficiency parameter β is private information to the firm. The politi-
cian only knows that there are two possible types of firms, a low-cost
(efficient) type L, and a high-cost (inefficient) type H , i.e., β ∈ {βL, βH},
with βL < βH , and has a prior distribution over the two types i.e.,
ν = P (β = βL) ∈ (0, 1). Cost-reducing effort e and cost-padding activity
a are post-contractual choice variables which are both unobservable for
the politician. Only the realized cost C is observable and verifiable by
the politician. Therefore, this is an extension of the standard regulatory
problem in Laffont and Tirole (1986) where the moral-hazard problem
becomes two-dimensional: the firm can try to inflate observed costs (and
hence the reimbursement it receives from the regulator) not only by ex-
erting a suboptimal level of effort, but also by embezzling money11.
Notice that despite both adverse selection and moral-hazard are present
selfish).
10If the firm exerts effort level e it reduces realized cost by e, and if it engages in a level
of cost-padding of a it increases realized cost by a.
11Two other cost-padding models that build on Laffont and Tirole (1986) are
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in this model, the key dimension of analysis is adverse selection (on
the efficiency parameter) since both moral-hazard variables (i.e., cost-
reducing effort and cost-padding) result deterministically in a level of
cost realization C12.
Moreover, exerting a cost-reducing effort level e brings disutility (ex-
pressed in monetary terms) of ψ(e) to the firm. The disutility increases
with effort ψe > 0 for e > 0, it is convex ψee > 0, and satisfies ψ(0) = 0
and lime→β ψ(e) = +∞. Following LT, for simplicity we assume that
equilibrium effort is always positive.
Also, we adopt the accounting convention that the politician reimburses
C to the firm, and compensates it by a net monetary transfer t in addition
to the reimbursement of the cost (it is assumed that otherwise the firm
does not accept the project). We impose the limited-liability constraint
t ≥ 0.
A contract between the politician and the firm can be based on observ-
ables C and t, and specifies a cost-transfer pair (C, t). If the firm does not
accept the contract, it gets its reservation utility, which is normalized to
zero.
The project has constant value S > 0 for consumers. To finance the re-
alization of the project, that costs (C + t) (where C of course includes
embezzled money), the politician levies distortionary taxation: for each
dollar raised by taxation, consumers bear disutility $(1 + λ), with λ > 0,
where λ denotes the shadow cost of public funds.
We also assume that for the politician it is worth realizing the project
even with an inefficient firm (β = βH )13. All agents (i.e., politician, firm
and consumers) are assumed to be risk-neutral.
Also, we rule out any issue of political accountability or of contractual
renegotiation. In particular, we assume that there is an implicit mecha-
nism that enforces all legal and illegal contracts and ensures credibility
Chu and Sappington (2007) and Bougheas and Worrall (2012). However, these models do
not introduce a second moral-hazard variable, arguing that cost-padding can be simply
interpreted as negative effort. Also in neither of these models there is auditing or collusion.
12Therefore, the contracting problem we analyze is technically one of screening, as is
standard in agency models of regulation already mentioned.
13LT also allow for the possibility of shut-down of the firm and find that it is worth to
keep the inefficient type active as long as S is sufficiently high.
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of announcements14.
3.2.2 Audit of Cost-padding and Corruption
We assume that after the contract has been implemented, i.e., the firm
has chosen its levels of effort and cost-padding, the politician audits the
firm about cost-padding15.
In this model the politician audits himself the firm rather than resorting
to a supervisor, so that the agency problem has a two-tier structure rather
than a three-tier one as in LT and in many other models of auditing and
regulation (see e.g., Tirole (1992), Laffont and Tirole (1993), Mookherjee
and Png (1995) and Kofman and Lawarree (1996)). We introduce this
simplification on the basis that the role of a corruptible supervisor in a
model where the principal is himself corruptible seems redundant16.
We assume that the auditing technology simply amounts to a level of
detection probability, ρ ∈ [0, 1], and is endogenous and dependent on the
degree of selfishness of the politician, ρ(µ). The politician chooses strate-
gically the level of detection probability, and announces it before offering
contracts to the firm. Therefore, we assume that at the moment of audit-
ing the firm, the politician will simply audit the firm according to the
predetermined auditing technology17.
The auditing technology is costless and produces hard-information, namely
for a given level of cost-padding a ≥ 0, the politician will detect the true
(and verifiable) level of cost-padding (aˆ = a) with probability ρ(µ) and
nothing (aˆ = ∅) with probability 1− ρ(µ) 18.
If no hard evidence of cost-padding is found, the firm keeps the en-
14We acknowledge that this assumption is strong and we are planning to relax it in an
extension of this work.
15We borrow this modelization of auditing from Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007), albeit in
their case the auditing technology is exogenous.
16However, this is less justifiable on practical grounds, since the politician typically use
bureaucrats to audit the firm, and would likely need the intermediation of the bureaucrat
to enter corrupt deals. See Section 3.6 for a discussion on possible extensions of the model.
17This is admissible insofar we have ruled out issues of commitment credibility. More on
this in Subsection 3.2.4.
18Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007) also adopt hard information auditing technology. LT
instead assume a different auditing technology which produces soft-information i.e., the
signals of the true level of cost-padding are always imperfect and errors can occur.
45
tire amount of diverted money19; if instead hard evidence is found, the
politician can either confiscate the money and return it to consumers as a
lump-sum transfer, or can offer to suppress evidence in return of a share
of the embezzled money20. This decision is endogenous and depends on
the degree of selfishness of the politician. If the firm accepts the sharing
offer, they divide the money and nothing is returned to consumers. If in-
stead the firm does not agree to share the money, the amount of diverted
money is confiscated and returned back to consumers21. Therefore, the
stakes of corruption, which amount to the level of money embezzled by
firm, are endogenous in this model and depend on the politician’s be-
havior. The optimal sharing between the firm and the politician is de-
termined by the Nash-bargaining solution22. We believe that this is the
appropriate modelization in our context, since what we have in mind
is the world of big projects where the gains from cost-padding are po-
tentially large and contractors are likely to have substantial bargaining
power relative to corrupt politicians (as it was indeed the case in the
MOSE scandal).
The timing of the game is summarized in Figure 3.1.
3.2.3 Agents’ Preferences
On the basis of the setting described above, we can now define agents’
preferences.
19Differently from LT, we assume that there is no deadweight loss associated with the
diversion of funds that is, the firm derives utility $1 from padding cost by $1. On the other
hand LT consider that accounting manipulations may be costly in expertise, time and need
of secrecy and hence create a deadweight loss.
20Differently from LT, we assume that the money diverted by cost-padding can be fully
recouped by the politician in case of detection, whereas LT assume that cost-padding is
fully consumed by the firm before the audit. The fact that successful auditing can end up
in a refund to consumers is also present in Baron and Besanko (1984).
21However, it could seem also plausible that in case of unsuccessful bargaining the politi-
cian instead keeps all the money for himself. A possible explanation could be that the
politician then fears that the firm may report something to the police, while he is safe if he
returns money back to consumers. Hence, the politician tries to pocket money only in case
an agreement with the firm is reached. For more on the modelization of a judicial authority,
see Section 3.6.
22This also is borrowed by Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007).
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 The politician offers contracts to the firm
The firm accepts or rejects the contract
The firm chooses levels of cost-reducing effort and cost-padding
The politician audits the firm
The game ends with respective payoffs
The politician returns money to consum The politician shares money w firm
Hard Information No hard Information
 The politician chooses and announces the detection technology 
Figure 3.1: The timing of the game
Firm
The profit of a firm of type β who accepts contract (C, t) and engages in
a level of cost-padding a ≥ 0 is:
Π(µ) =
{
t+ a− ψ(β − C + a), if aˆ = ∅
t+ aF (µ)− ψ(β − C + a), if aˆ = a (3.4)
That is, in case hard evidence of cost-padding is not found (aˆ = ∅) the
firm keeps the full amount of embezzled money a. If instead hard evi-
dence of cost-padding is found (aˆ = a), the share of embezzled money
accruing to the firm, aF , will depend on whether the politician will be
willing to enter Nash-bargaining with the firm, which, as said, is an en-
dogenous decision dependent on his selfishness µ. Notice that a repre-
sents both the level of cost-padding chosen by the firm and the gains
from cost-padding, and hence also amounts to the endogenous stakes of
corruption.
Also, due to the linearity of the cost function, when the firm commits
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to a contractual cost level C, choosing a level of cost-padding a will im-
ply that the level of cost-reducing effort e it needs to exert is determined
residually, e = β−C+a. Further, differently from LT, we assume that the
transfer t paid by the politician is not dependent on the outcome of the
auditing: the firm is not punished above the confiscation of the diverted
money23.
The expected profit of the firm can therefore be written as:
E[Π(µ)] = t+ E[aF (µ)]− ψ(β − C + a) (3.5)
where 0 ≤ E[aF (µ)] ≤ a.
Consumers
Analogously, the expected welfare of consumers when the contracting
firm is of type β, accepts contract (C, t) and engages in cost-padding level
a ≥ 0 is:
E[W (µ)] = S + E[aC(µ)]− (1 + λ)(C + t) (3.6)
where C = β − e+ a and E[aC(µ)] is the expected amount of embez-
zled money that will be returned back to the consumers as a lump-sum
transfer.
Politician
In this model the private utility of the politician will merely amount to
the share of embezzled money accruing to the politician, aP . Therefore,
the objective function of a politician with self interest µ when the con-
tracting firm is of type β, accepts contract (C, t) and engages in cost-
padding level a ≥ 0 is:
E[U(µ)] = E[SW (µ)] + µE[aP (µ)] (3.7)
23In LT, who assume that cost-padding cannot be confiscated because it is consumed by
the firm before auditing, the penalty in case of detection is the retention of transfer (ta = 0).
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Now we turn to defining social welfare SW in our model24. While
some authors in the literature (see e.g., Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007),
Garoupa and Klerman (2002)) argue that including profits in social wel-
fare is questionable because of the inclusion of proceeds of corruption
(and so they adopt consumer surplus as the measure of social welfare),
we rather believe that the utilitarian view, as adopted by LT, is more real-
istic, insofar real world regulators need to take into account the interest
of the private sector even if it may engage in illegal activities. However,
we go a step further with respect to LT. Since the self-interest of the politi-
cian does not interfere with the social-welfare component of the objective
function, we assume that conditional upon detection, the politician will,
regardless of his type, include in social welfare only the “socially efficient”
level of profits, ΠSW , i.e., profit net of the firm’s gain from cost-padding
(which after detection is observable and measurable)25. More formally,
Assumption 3.1 If aˆ = a, ΠSW (µ) ≡ t− ψ(β − C + a) ∀µ.
Accordingly, we will distinguish between the expected profit of the
firm E[Π(µ)], which was defined in (3.5) and using Assumption 3.1 can
be written as
E[Π(µ)] = ΠSW + E[aF (µ)] (3.8)
and the part of expected profit to be included in social welfare,
E[ΠSW (µ)] = ΠSW + E[aFSW (µ)] (3.9)
where E[aFSW (µ)] = [1−ρ(µ)]a is the fraction of expected firm’s share
of embezzled money to be included in the social welfare, such that
E[aFSW (µ)] ≤ E[aF (µ)].
Therefore, the politician’s objective function will be E[U(µ)] = E[W (µ)]+
E[ΠSW (µ)] + µE[aP (µ)], or extensively
E[U(µ)] = S+E[aC(µ)]−(1+λ)(C+t)+t+E[aFSW (µ)]−ψ(β−C+a)+µE[aP (µ)]
(3.10)
24SW is to be interpreted in monetary terms in order for the weighted average to be
meaningful.
25The increased disutility in effort remains the same since effort has already been exerted.
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Using the fact that E[ΠSW (µ)] = E[Π(µ)] + E[aFSW (µ)]− E[aF (µ)] we
can obtain a more meaningful expression for the social welfare compo-
nent of the objective function, namely
E[SW (µ)] = S+E[aC(µ)]+λ(∆E[aF (µ)])−(1+λ)(C−E[aFSW (µ)]+ψ(β−C+a))−λE[Π(µ)]
(3.11)
which tells us that social welfare is the difference between the con-
sumer surplus attached to the project S (increased by the expected trans-
fer to consumers E[aC(µ)] and by the social gain from not including cost-
padding in the profits conditional upon detection λ∆E[aF (µ)], where
∆E[aF (µ)] ≡ E[aF (µ)]−E[aFSW (µ)]) and the sum of (i) the total cost of the
project as perceived by taxpayers (1 +λ)(C −E[aFSW (µ)] +ψ(β−C + a))
and (ii) the social cost of giving the firm a rent above its reservation util-
ity λE[Π(µ)].
This expression also shows that, due to distortionary taxation, the politi-
cian dislikes leaving a rent to the firm.
3.2.4 Equilibrium Concept and Information Revelation
The relevant equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE),
since the politician both chooses the auditing technology and offers con-
tract under uncertainty about the type of firm he is facing (he just has a
prior belief). Notice that while the politician will update his beliefs after
the firm has chosen a contract (since the firm may reveal some informa-
tion about its type through the contract choice), however he will not use
this information in the following of the game (i.e., in the auditing sub-
game), since we assumed that he can credibly commit to the announce-
ment about the level of auditing made at the first stage: in this model the
politician is a “blind executor” at the auditing stage26. Also, notice that a
26Our conjecture is that nothing substantial would change in equilibrium in case he had
the possibility to change the level of auditing, at least as long as auditing is costless. We
will get back on this in Section 3.6.
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successful audit does not add any new information about the firm’s type
which has not already been revealed by the firm’s contract choice.
The game is to be solved by backward induction, therefore we will first
characterize the equilibrium of the auditing subgame and derive the equi-
librium expected shares of embezzled money E[aF∗(µ)], E[aP∗(µ)] and
E[aC∗(µ)]; then, on the basis of continuation payoffs we will analyze
optimal contracts for the politician (C∗(µ), t∗(µ))i , i ∈ {L,H} (which,
since the politician as usual acts as a Stackelberg leader, take into account
the firm’s optimal choices of cost-padding and cost-reducing effort); last,
on the basis of optimal contracts, we will analyze the optimal choice of
detection probability for the politician, ρ∗(µ). Notice that until the last
stage (Section 3.5), the detection probability is considered as a parame-
ter, ρ ∈ [0, 1].
3.3 The auditing subgame
If the politician does not discover hard evidence of cost-padding (aˆ =
∅) the equilibrium shares of embezzled money are trivially aF∗(µ) = a,
aP∗(µ) = 0 and aC∗(µ) = 0 ∀µ.
Instead, if the politician discovers hard evidence of cost-padding (aˆ = a)
he will choose the most profitable between the two options of entering
Nash-bargaining with the firm or returning money to consumers. This
decision will depend on the Nash-bargaining solution, which we now
derive.
If we let aP ∈ [0, a] be the politician’s share of the embezzled money, we
have that if the politician and the firm manage to reach an agreement on
the sharing of the cake, their respective payoffs are27:
UA = S − (1 + λ)(t+ C) + ΠSW + µaP (3.12)
27Notice that without Assumption 3.1 we would have a problem in implementing Nash-
bargaining, since the utility of one bargaining party- the politician - would have included
the utility of the other bargaining party - the firm. The interpretation of Assumption 3.1 is
that the politician temporarily confiscates the money and invites the firm to Nash-bargain
over it.
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ΠA = ΠSW + (a− aP ) (3.13)
If instead they do not manage to reach an agreement, the politician
returns money to consumers as a lump-sum transfer. Therefore, the dis-
agreement payoffs are:
UD = S + a− (1 + λ)(t+ C) + ΠSW (3.14)
ΠD = ΠSW (3.15)
The equilibrium shares will be given by the solution to the following
problem:
max
aP :(UA,ΠA)≥(UD,ΠD)
(UA − UD)(ΠA −ΠD) (3.16)
It is immediate to check that UA ≥ UD can hold only if the politician
is opportunist, i.e., µ > 1 (while the firm always find it profitable to enter
bargaining). As we expected, we have that Nash Bargaining will occur
only if the politician is selfish enough. Otherwise (µ ≤ 1), he will return
money to consumers. Importantly, notice that the politician does not
need to be fully benevolent (i.e., µ = 0) to decide not to enter the corrupt
deal. This is an interesting aspect of this result, since it allows for the re-
alistic interpretation that a politician may well be self-interested but not
enough to engage in corruption.
Therefore, if the politician is opportunist (indicated with subscriptO) the
optimal shares of embezzled money will be: aP∗O =
1+µ
2µ
a, aF∗O =
µ−1
2µ
a,
aC∗O = 0, where a
P∗ and aF∗ are given by the bargaining solution. Notice
that ∂a
P∗
O
∂µ
< 028. Interpretation is that a more eager politician is easier to
bribe: like impatience, selfishness reduces bargaining power.
Instead, if the politician is moderate (indicated with subscriptM ) the op-
timal shares are: aP∗M = 0, a
F∗
M = 0, a
C∗
M = a
29.
28Also, notice that limµ→∞ 1+µ2µ a =
a
2
, limµ→1+ 1+µ2µ a = a.
29There is a discontinuity at µ = 1: limµ→1+ aP∗ = a but for µ ≤ 1 aP∗ = 0.
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From the results above we can derive the optimal expected shares of em-
bezzled money (which take into account the case that hard evidence is
not found) and state the following result:
Proposition 3.1 (Expected equilibrium shares of a) The expected equilib-
rium shares of embezzled money depend on the type of politician and are as
follows:
E[aP∗j ] =
{
0, j = M
ρ 1+µ
2µ
a, j = O
(3.17)
E[aF∗j ] =
{
(1− ρ)a, j = M
(1− ρ 1+µ
2µ
)a, j = O
(3.18)
E[aC∗j ] =
{
ρa, j = M
0, j = O
(3.19)
The expected continuation payoffs for the politician and the firm from
the auditing subgame are simply the expressions in (3.7) and (3.8) where
money shares are at their equilibrium levels i.e.,
E[U∗j ] = E[SW ∗j ]+µE[aP∗j ], E[Π∗j ] = ΠSW +E[aF∗j ] j ∈ {M,O} (3.20)
Notice that so far we have just determined the optimal shares of em-
bezzled money, but the optimal level of cost-padding is yet to be deter-
mined and will be an optimal choice of the firm.
3.4 Optimal Contracts
3.4.1 Firm’s Optimal Cost-padding Choice
After accepting contract (C, t) the firm decides its optimal level of cost-
padding a by solving the problem
max
{a≥0}
E[Π∗j ] = t+ E[aF∗j ]− ψ(β − C + a) j ∈ {M,O} (3.21)
Remember that due to the linearity of the cost function, when the firm
commits to a contractual cost level C, choosing a level of cost-padding
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a will imply that the level of cost-reducing effort e it needs to exert is
determined residually, e = β − C + a. In particular, for a given C, an
increase in a needs to be counterbalanced by an equal increase e. This
suggests that, since the marginal disutility of increasing effort is lower
for the efficient type (ψeβ > 0), for a given cost level a more efficient type
will engage in more cost-padding than a less efficient type30. This result
is proved to be true and is stated as follows,
Proposition 3.2 (Proposition 1 LT) If for a given cost level C a∗L and a∗H are
the optimal levels of cost-padding for, respectively, βL and βH , then it must be
the case that a∗L ≥ a∗H .
Proof. In the Appendix (A.2.1).
It is important to remark that Proposition 3.2 asserts that the more
efficient type engages in more cost-padding than the less efficient type
for a given cost level, not that the more efficient type will engage in more
cost padding in equilibrium, since in general different types will produce
at different costs.
In order to derive optimal contracts, we will analyze the simple case
where cost-padding can take only two levels a ∈ {0, α} (α > 0) that is,
following LT, we stylize the firm’s cost-padding decision to a dichotomic
choice.Therefore, the optimal choice of cost-padding for the firm reduces
to the following: after accepting contract (C, t), the firm will engage in
cost-padding (i.e., a = α) iff E[Π∗j (a = α)] ≥ E[Π∗j (a = 0)], which implies
E[αF∗j ] ≥ ψ(β − C + α)− ψ(β − C) (3.22)
where E[αF∗j ] with j ∈ {M,O} is the firm’s equilibrium share of cost-
padding from Proposition 3.131. This condition simply tells that the firm
30Condition ψeβ > 0 amounts to the Spence-Mirrlees Single-crossing condition in our
case, which will ensure the sustainability of a separating equilibrium in optimal contracts
(see e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)). Notice that ψβ > 0 also holds, namely the
efficient type has a lower disutility from effort.
31In the following optimal contract analysis we will use the generic notation for the sub-
game equilibrium shares of cost-padding E[αF∗j ], E[α
P∗
j ] E[α
C∗
j ], and will make them ex-
plicit only later when needed. Also, we will omit the star superscript.
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will engage in cost-padding iff the gain from engaging in cost-padding
(i.e., the firm’s expected share of embezzled money) outweighs its cost
(i.e., the extra disutility of effort due to cost-padding).
3.4.2 Benchmark: No Cost-padding
As a benchmark, we first consider the case where cost-padding is unfea-
sible.
First, notice that in this case there is no possibility for the politician to
pursue his personal interest, since in our model this is uniquely repre-
sented by his share of embezzled money. Therefore, regardless of his
type, the politician’s objective function reduces to social welfare Uj =
SW ∀j ∈ {M,O} as if he were benevolent32. Also, the cost function of
the firm in this case is C(β, e) = β − e.
In this case the model is identical to the basic regulatory model in Laffont
and Tirole (1986), which is a standard model in contract theory33. While
referring to this work for the complete analysis, here we just briefly sum-
marize (in our notation) relevant results and intuitions.
Complete information
Under complete information, i.e. when the principal knows β and ob-
serves the cost-reducing effort e, the firm cannot misrepresent its type
and the politician can directly contract on the level of effort to be taken
by each type of firm34. The politician will offer contracts (ei, ti) (or equiv-
alently, (ei,Πi)) that maximize SW under Individual Rationality con-
straints i.e., Πi = ti − ψ(ei) ≥ 0 i ∈ {L,H}.
The solution of this problem (indicated with superscript BC) is
32Also notice that in absence of cost-padding E[ΠSW,j ] = t− ψ(β − C) ∀j ∈ {M,O},
so that the regulator is purely utilitarian.
33More exactly, is identical to the model in Ch.1 of Laffont and Tirole (1993), which is the
two-type version of Laffont and Tirole (1986).
34This is the definition of complete information in Laffont and Tirole (1993)(Ch 1). How-
ever, notice that in this case the principal does not need to observe effort, since, knowing β,
he can infer its level from observing costs e = β − C.
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eBCi = e
FB : ψ′(eFB) = 1; ΠBCi = 0 : t
BC
i = ψ(e
FB) i ∈ {L,H}
(3.23)
namely, for both types: (i) the optimal level of effort is the first best
one, namely the one which equates marginal social cost (i.e., marginal
disutility of effort) and marginal social benefit (i.e., marginal cost sav-
ings), and (ii) the firm receives no rent, since distortionary taxation is so-
cially costly. Therefore, the complete information solution is the socially
optimal one and corresponds to the politician offering both types a fixed-
price contract, such as e.g., t(Ci) = k−(Ci−CFBi ), whereCFBi = βi−eFB
and k = ψ(eFB), i ∈ {L,H} 35. Notice that this first best outcome
requires the same effort level for both types, since the disutility of ef-
fort function ψ(.) and the marginal productivity of effort are identical for
both types. Accordingly, they receive the same transfer but the inefficient
type is allowed to produce at a higher realized cost, CBCH > C
BC
L .
The value function of the politician in this case, which amounts to social
welfare under complete information, is
UBC = S − (1 + λ)(βi − eFB + ψ(eFB)) (3.24)
Incomplete information
Under incomplete information the politician can still observe the realized
cost C but does not know the true value of the efficiency parameter β
and does not observe the effort level e. In this case we have a standard
screening problem where the principal offers a menu of type-contingent
contracts based on contractibles (Ci, ti) (or equivalently, (Ci,Πi)) which
maximize expected SW under Individual Rationality (IR) and Incentive
Compatibility (IC) constraints: IRi : ti−ψ(βi−Ci) ≥ 0, ICi : ti−ψ(βi−
Ci) ≥ tk − ψ(βi − Ck), i 6= k, i, k ∈ {L,H}. This problem has the
following well-known solution (indicated with superscript BI):
35It is straightforward to check that level of effort that maximizes the firm’s utility {k −
(βi − ei − CFBi )− ψ(ei)} is exactly eFB .
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eBIL = e
FB, eBIH < e
FB : (1− ν)(1 + λ)[1− ψ′(eBIH )] = νλΦ′(eH)
ΠBIL = Φ(e
BI
H ) : t
BI
L = ψ(e
BI
L ) + Φ(e
BI
H ), Π
BI
H = 0 : t
BI
H = ψ(e
BI
H )
(3.25)
where Φ(eH) = ψ(eH)− ψ(eH −∆β), Φ′(eH) > 0 and ∆β = βH − βL.
The interpretation is as standard in these kind of screening problems.
The efficient type can profitably mimic the inefficient type (since thanks
to its higher efficiency he enjoys a rent in economy of disutility of effort),
so the principal needs to give him a positive rent if he wants to have both
types active. This rent is an increasing function of the effort level required
from the inefficient type, so that the principal reduces the rent by distort-
ing downward the effort required from the inefficient type, while still re-
quiring the first-best effort from the efficient type (“efficiency at the top”
is preserved). The optimal value of eH balances the trade-off between
the two regulatory goals of efficiency, which calls for high-powered in-
centive schemes (i.e., fixed-price contracts), and rent extraction, which
calls for low-powered incentive schemes (i.e., cost-sharing contracts)36.
The value function of the politician in this case, which amounts to social
welfare under incomplete information, is:
UBI = ν[S − (1 + λ)(βL − eFB + ψ(eFB))− λΦ(eBIH )]+
+ (1− ν)[S − (1 + λ)(βH − eBIH + ψ(eBIH ))]
(3.26)
3.4.3 Optimal contracts under cost-padding
Now we let the firm engage in cost-padding, so that the the cost function
of the firm is C(β, e, a) = β − e+ a.
We analyze first the case with complete information and then the case
with informational asymmetries.
36A marginal decrease eH has a marginal cost in terms of an increase by 1−ψ′(eH) in the
production cost of type H , but also a marginal benefit in terms of a decrease by Φ′(eH) of
the rent we need to give to type L. As shown by the FOC, the optimal level of eH equates
expected marginal cost (1−ν)(1+λ)[1−ψ′(eH)] and expected marginal benefit νλΦ′(eH).
57
Complete information
Knowing the true value of the efficiency parameter β and observing the
level of effort e, the politician can offer type-contingent contracts (ti, ei)
or - in our notation - (Πi, ei). Notice that given the observability of C,
the politician can infer the level of cost-padding, a = C − β + e, as if
auditing technology were perfect, i.e., ρ = 1: the politician will always
detect cost-padding when the firm does it37. While in LT this obviously
implies that the politician, who is benevolent, requires a = 0 (so that
the problem trivially backs to the case where cost-padding is unfeasible),
here we need to distinguish between the two types of politician, since
the decision depends on his selfishness. From the auditing subgame in
Section 3.3 we know that upon detection a moderate politician will con-
fiscate the money, aFM = 0. Therefore under a moderate politician the
firm will never engage in cost-padding, since condition (3.22) will never
hold ∀α > 0, and the solution is the same as when cost-padding is unfea-
sible (Equation (3.23))38. Instead, if the politician is opportunist he will
share embezzled money with the firm according to Proposition 3.1, so
that his maximization problem is:
max
Πi,ei
{S − (1 + λ)[βi − ei + ai + ψ(ei)]− λΠi + λaFiO + µaPiO}
s.t. IRi : Πi = ti + aFiO − ψ(ei) ≥ 0 i ∈ {L,H}
(3.27)
As usual, the individual rationality constraints IRi will be binding in
equilibrium39. Notice that the objective function of the politician differs
from the objective function in the case where cost padding is unfeasible
only through the term {−(1 + λ)ai + λaFiO + µaPiO}which is a constant in
37Notice that in this case the expectation operator disappears, and E[aFSW,ij ] = 0 and
∆E[aFij ] = a
F
ij ∀i, j.
38Remember that ψ′(.) > 0.
39The fact that in the auditing subgame both the firm and the politician have bargain-
ing power while in contracting all the bargaining power is in the hands of the politician
(i.e., he offers a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the firm) may seem an incongruence, but can be
meaningfully justified as follows: in legal transactions (such as contracting) the politician,
as a regulator, has all the bargaining power; in illegal transactions instead (such as taking
bribes) he needs to bargain to obtain a good deal.
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the maximization problem. Therefore even in the case of an opportunist
politician, the solution (indicated with superscript CC) is identical to the
solution in the benchmark case (Equation (3.23)), namely each type is of-
fered a fixed-price contract 40. Since the fixed-price contract makes the
firm residual claimant for its cost-savings, no type will engage in cost-
padding, i.e., aCCL = a
CC
H = 0: the effort level induced from a fixed-price
contract implies a marginal disutility of effort equal to 1 (ψ′(eFB) = 1),
so that each dollar diverted through cost-padding costs the firm 1 dollar
of monetary disutility from the required extra-effort. Paying the entirety
of diverted money, the firm has no incentive to pad costs.
Due to the ex-post absence of cost-padding, the value of the politician’s
objective function is the same as in (3.24). Therefore, regardless of the
type of the politician, the solution is ex-post identical to that in LT, as if
the politician were purely benevolent. This result does not seem much
plausible, since one would rather expect that if the politician is partic-
ularly opportunist (µ is very high), which means he values much more
private utility than social welfare, then he should let the firm engage in
cost-padding, since this is the only way he can obtain private gains. This
sort of inconsistency in our model is due to the linearity of the cost func-
tion, which reduces the level of cost-padding - i.e., the only determinant
of the personal utility of the politician - to a parameter in his maximization
problem. We are planning to work to a more sophisticated modelization
of costs, which should eliminate this inconsistency41.
We summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3 (Optimal contracts under complete information) Under
complete information the contracting solution is first-best with no cost-padding,
and the selfishness of the politician is irrelevant.
40The politician can offer the fixed-price contract t(C) = k − (Ci − CFBi ) where k =
ψ(eFB), Ci = βi − ei + ai and CFB = βi − eFB .
41Another possibility is that in this case the individual rationality constraint may not be
binding at the optimum.
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Incomplete information
We suppose now that the politician does not know β and does not ob-
serve e, but only observes C42. In this case the politician would in prin-
ciple want to proceed as in the benchmark case, namely choose type-
contingent contracts (Ci, ti) (or, (Ci,E[Πi])) to maximize her expected
utility E[Uj ] under individual rationality constraints IRi, and incentive
compatibility constraints ICi, with i ∈ {L,H}, j ∈ {M,O}. How-
ever, differently from the standard screening problem, here ICi are more
problematic to characterize, since we do not know which level of cost-
padding will a type choose when mimicking the other type, so that the rents
from mimicking are undetermined.
In order to obviate this problem LT consider different possible solutions,
and then check for which conditions on parameters can each of these op-
tima be an equilibrium. We follow the same approach, and consider that
depending on which are the optimal levels of cost-padding for each type
of firm, in principle four types of optima are possible:
Type1 Only the inefficient type engages in cost-padding: a∗H = α, a
∗
L = 0;
Type2 Only the efficient type engages in cost-padding: a∗H = 0, a
∗
L = α;
Type3 Both types engage in cost-padding: a∗H = α, a
∗
L = α;
Type4 Neither type engages in cost-padding: a∗H = 0, a
∗
L = 0.
We do not need to analyze all four types of equilibria, since the fol-
lowing holds:
Proposition 3.4 (Lemma 6 LT) In each type of optimum, the efficient type
is always offered a fixed-price contract, so that a∗L = 0. Therefore, only the
inefficient type can do cost-padding in equilibrium.
Proof. In the Appendix (A.2.2).
Proposition 3.4 implies that we can restrict attention to Type1 and
Type4 optima. In all the section it is exploited the fact that constraints
42This is the definition on incomplete information in LT. The intermediate cases where
only one of the two variables is unobservable are not considered.
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IRL and ICH can be ignored since the former is implied by ICL and
IRH , and the latter holds at the solution (See Appendix A.2.6).
Type1 optima: cost-padding by the inefficient type
Suppose the case a∗H = α, a
∗
L = 0 is an optimum. The cost level of
the inefficient type is then CH = βH − eH + α. Let us denote with amL
the optimal level of cost-padding for the efficient type when it mimics
the inefficient type (i.e., chooses contract (CH , tH)). Then, we know by
Proposition 3.2 that amL = α
43. Therefore, relevant constraints ICL and
IRH are respectively:
E[ΠL] = tL − ψ(βL − CL) ≥ tH + E[αFj ]− ψ(βL − CH + α) (3.28)
E[ΠH ] = tH + E[αFj ]− ψ(βH − CH + α) ≥ 0 (3.29)
Using the fact the these constraints will be binding at the optimum,
which implies that E[ΠH ] = 0 and E[ΠL] = ψ(eH) − ψ(eH − ∆β) =
Φ(eH) we can reduce the maximization problem of politician j’s to the
following unconstrained problem in ei,:
max
eH ,eL
{ν[S − (1 + λ)[βL − eL + ψ(eL)]− λΦ(eH)]+
(1− ν)[S − (1 + λ)[βH − eH + ψ(eH)] + (1− ν)G(αj)}
(3.30)
where G(αj) = E[αCj ]− (1 +λ)E[α−αFSW,j ] +λ∆E[αFj ] +µE[αPj ] is a con-
stant which adds to expected social welfare insofar the inefficient type
engages in cost-padding. Importantly, notice that the value of the con-
stant depends on the type of the politician.
Since G(αj) is a constant in the maximization problem, the contracting
solution (in terms of optimal effort and rent levels) is the same as in the
benchmark case, as stated in the following result:
43Notice that a∗H = a
m
L = α respects Proposition 3.2: for a given cost C = CH ,
amL ≥ a∗H .
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Proposition 3.5 (Type1 Optima: Cost-padding by type H) We define the
“Cost-padding Regime” as the contracting solution where the inefficient type
engages in cost-padding. This solution (indicated with superscript CP ) is the
same as in the benchmark case (Equation 3.25)44.
The value function of the politician will however be different since
the inefficient type engages in cost-padding:
UCPj = U
BI + (1− ν)G(αj) (3.31)
The incentive for the inefficient type to pad costs is due to the fact
that it is offered a cost-sharing contract, which implies ψ′(eH) < 1 so
that, unlike in the fixed-price contract, the gain from diverting 1 dollar
through cost-padding outweighs its cost (in terms of marginal disutility).
Therefore, under cost-sharing the firm does not pay the entirety of di-
verted money so that, unlike the efficient type, it has an incentive to pad
costs. Notice that, regardless of the type of the politician, cost-padding
would never arise if rent extraction were not a regulatory concern, since
the politician would always offer the fixed-price contract to both types45.
Moreover, the lower the optimal power of incentives (i.e., the lower the
effort required from the inefficient type), the higher it would be the in-
centive to pad costs for the inefficient type.
The Cost-padding Regime occurs in equilibrium when the inefficient type
wants to engage in cost-padding (i.e., he does not want to deviate to no
cost-padding) given optimal effort eCPH , therefore - using condition (3.22)
and βH − CH + α = eH - iff
E[αFj ] ≥ ψ(eCPH )− ψ(eCPH − α) (3.32)
Expliciting condition (3.32) with respect to the detection technology
ρ, yields the following result:
Proposition 3.6 (Occurrence of the Cost-padding Regime) Under either
type of politician j ∈ {M,O}, the cost-padding regime occurs when ρ ≤ ρ
j
,
where
44The only difference is that type H is given a zero expected - rather than actual - rent:
E[ΠCPH ] = 0 (or equivalently, a transfer t
CP
H = ψ(βH − CH + α)− E[αFj ].)
45Again, this is due to the assumption of linear costs. The more sophisticated modeliza-
tion we are planning to go for is likely to allow for the result that under an opportunist
politician cost-padding occurs even in absence of adverse selection (see Dhami and Al-
Nowaihi (2007)).
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ρ
j
=
{
α−[ψ(eCPH )−ψ(eCPH −α)]
α
, if j = M
α−[ψ(eCPH )−ψ(eCPH −α)]
α
(
2µ
µ+1
)
, if j = O
(3.33)
The intuition is that the firm has a relatively high incentive to engage
in cost-padding if the probability of being discovered is relatively low,
i.e., cost-padding is difficult to detect. Furthermore, the following results
hold: (i) when the gains from cost padding increase it is easier for the
cost-padding regime to occur (
∂ρ
j
∂α
> 0, j ∈ {M,O}); (ii) when the politi-
cian is opportunist, it is more likely that the cost-padding regime occurs
i.e., ρ
O
> ρ
M
, and (iii) the more opportunist is the politician the more
likely is the cost-padding regime to occur (
∂ρ
O
∂µ
> 0). These results are
plausible, since an opportunist politician is more eager to receive a share
of the cost-padding gains, which occur only in this regime46.
Proof. In the Appendix (A.2.3).
Type4 optima: no cost-padding
Suppose now that the case a∗H = 0, a
∗
L = 0 is an optimum. The cost
level of the inefficient type therefore would be CH = βH − eH .
In this case, if type L chooses contract (CH , tH), both amL = 0 and a
m
L = α
are admissible by Proposition 3.2. Therefore, the ICL is less trivial to
define than before, insofar we want that the rent of the efficient type is
such that he does not want to mimic the inefficient type neither without
engaging in cost-padding:
ICL(a
m
L = 0) : E[ΠL] ≥ tH − ψ(βL − CH) (3.34)
nor with engaging in cost-padding
ICL(a
m
L = α) : E[ΠL] ≥ tH + E[αFj ]− ψ(βL − CH + α) (3.35)
By using the fact that constraint IRH will bind at the optimum as
usual i.e., E[ΠH ] = tH − ψ(eH) = 0, we can rewrite (3.34) and (3.35)
respectively as
46It would be also possible to explicit condition (3.32) with respect to α, which is the
other relevant parameter, but ρ is the parameter of interest in our analysis and we checked
that the condition with respect to α is in fact driven by the behavior of ρ (i.e., we need
conditions on ρ to say something about α).
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E[ΠL] ≥ Φ(eH) (3.36)
and
E[ΠL] ≥ Γ(eH) (3.37)
where Γ(eH) ≡ ψ(eH)− ψ(eH −∆β + α) + E[αFj ].
Depending on which of the constraints (3.36) and (3.37) binds at the op-
timum, different regimes can emerge.
To consider all possibilities we set the following maximization problem,
where use is made of Proposition 3.4 (so that e∗L = e
FB and a∗L = 0), and
of E[Π∗H ] = 0:
max
eH ,E[ΠL]
U(eH ,E[ΠL]) = ν[S − (1 + λ)[βL − eFB + ψ(eFB)]+
− λE[ΠL]] + (1− ν)[S − (1 + λ)[βH − eH + ψ(eH)]]
s.t.(3.36), (3.37)
(3.38)
which yields the following result:
Proposition 3.7 (Type4 Optima: No Cost-padding) When type H does not
engage in cost-padding two contracting solutions can occur. We define the so-
lution where amL = 0 (i.e., when (3.36) is binding and (3.37) is not binding) as
the “Classical Regime”(indicated by superscript CL), while the solution where
amL = α (i.e., when (3.37) is binding and (3.36) is not binding) as the “Re-
pressed Cost-padding Regime”(indicated by superscript RC)47.
Under the Classical Regime the contracting optimum is the same as in the bench-
mark case (Equation (3.25)) i.e. eCLH = eBIH ,ΠCLL = Φ(eBIH ), and UCL = UBI .
Under the Repressed Cost-padding Regime the optimum is eRCH > eBI , ΠRCL =
Γ(eRCH ) > Φ(e
BI
H ) (or tRCL = ψ(eRCL ) + Γ(eRCH )), where eRCH : ψ′(eRCH ) =
1− λ
1+λ
ν
1−νΓ
′(eRCH ).
The two contracting solutions are mutually exclusive. Further, given the con-
cavity of the maximization problem in (3.38) the objective functionU(eH ,E[ΠL])
has a unique global maximum, so that UCL = URC = UBI .
Proof. In the Appendix (A.2.4).
Proposition 3.7 states that the optimal power of incentives is higher
in the Repressed Cost-padding Regime than in the other solutions, and
47In LT the Repressed Cost-padding regime is the case where both constraints are bind-
ing, which does not admit solutions in our case. See Appendix (A.2.4).
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in particular with respect to the benchmark solution where cost-padding
is unfeasible (eFBH > e
RC
H > e
CL
H = e
CP
H = e
BI
H ). This implies that also
the rent to be given to the efficient type is higher (ΠRCL > Π
CL
L = Π
CP
L =
ΠBIL > Π
FB
L ).
This is the main result in LT, who give the following intuition. Increasing
eH is more attractive in the Repressed Cost-padding regime, i.e., when
the efficient type would like to engage in cost-padding when mimick-
ing the inefficient type, sue to the fact that cost-padding increases the
marginal disutility ψ′(eH − ∆β + α) of the efficient type of mimick-
ing the inefficient type with respect to the case without cost-padding,
ψ′(eH − ∆β). This implies that a marginal increase in eH increases the
rent of the efficient type by less than when the efficient type does not
want to pad costs (Γ′(eH) < Φ′(eH))48.
The Classical Regime occurs in equilibrium iff the efficient type does not
want to engage in cost-padding when mimicking the inefficient type, i.e.,
iff Φ(eCLH ) ≥ Γ(eCLH ), or:
E[αFj ] ≤ ψ(eCLH −∆β + α)− ψ(eCLH −∆β) (3.39)
that is, when the cost of engaging in cost-padding (in terms of the
increase in disutility) outweighs the benefit from cost-padding. Notice
that this condition is necessary and sufficient for the emergence of the
Classical Regime, since we know from Proposition 3.2 that if the efficient
type does not engage in cost-padding for a given cost (CH in this case),
then the inefficient type will not deviate to cost-padding.
Expliciting condition (3.39) with respect to ρ we obtain the following re-
sult:
Proposition 3.8 (Occurrence of Classical Regime) Under either type of politi-
cian j ∈ {M,O}, the Classical Regime occurs when ρ ≥ ρj , where
ρj =
{
α−[ψ(eCLH −∆β+α)−ψ(eCLH −∆β)]
α
if j = M
α−[ψ(eCLH −∆β+α)−ψ(eCLH −∆β)]
α
(
2µ
µ+1
)
if j = O
(3.40)
The intuition is that the firm has a relatively low incentive to engage in
cost-padding if the probability of being discovered is relatively high (i.e.,
48The optimal level of eH is the one that equates the expected marginal benefit of in-
creasing eH , in terms of a reduction by [1 − ψ′(eH)] in the production cost of type H ,
and the expected marginal cost, in terms of an increase by Γ′(eH) of the rent for type L:
(1− ν)(1 + λ)[1− ψ′(eRCH )] = νλΓ′(eRCH ), which corresponds to the F.O.C.
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cost-padding is likely to be detected). Furthermore, the following results
hold: (i) when the politician is opportunist, it is less likely that the Classi-
cal Regime occurs, since ρO > ρM ; (ii) the more opportunist is the politi-
cian the less likely is the Classical Regime to occur ( ∂ρO
∂µ
> 0); (iii) when
the efficiency differential increases, the cost of cost-padding (in terms of
extra-disutility) drops, so that it is less likely for the Classical Regime to
occur ( ∂ρj
∂∆β
> 0); (iv)when the gains from cost padding increase it is more
likely for the Classical Regime to occur ( ∂ρj
∂α
< 0).
Proof. In the Appendix (A.2.5).
Result (iv) seems less intuitive but can be explained by remember-
ing that in our model α represents not only the gain from cost-padding
but also the level of cost-padding activity: while the marginal gain from
cost-padding is constant with respect to the level of cost-padding, the
marginal cost in terms of disutility is increasing, so that for an high
enough level of cost-padding, the cost outweighs the benefit.
On the other hand, the Cost-padding Regime occurs in equilibrium iff
the efficient type does want to engage in cost-padding when mimicking
the inefficient type, i.e., Γ(eRCH ) ≥ Φ(eRCH ) and the inefficient type does
not want to engage in cost-padding i.e., the reverse of condition (3.22)
holds (Proposition 3.2 does not help in this case). Therefore the follow-
ing double-condition must hold
ψ(eRCH )−ψ(eRCH −α) > E[αFj ] ≥ ψ(eRCH −∆β+α)−ψ(eRCH −∆β) (3.41)
Notice that (3.41) implies that the Repressed Cost-padding Regime
can occur only if
ψ((eRCH ))− ψ((eRCH )− α) > ψ((eRCH )−∆β + α)− ψ((eRCH )−∆β) (3.42)
This condition is verified with certainty only if ∆β > 2α. In remaining
cases i.e., ∆β ≤ α and α < ∆β < 2α it can be checked (by use of the
Mean Theorem) that it is impossible to determine unambiguously which
side of (3.42) is greater (apart for the limit case ∆β = 0, for which (3.42)
never holds). Therefore, to avoid such ambiguities, we will assume in
the following that
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Assumption 3.2 The Repressed Cost-padding Regime can occur only if ∆β >
2α.
Proposition 3.9 (Occurrence of the Repressed Cost-padding Regime) Un-
der both types of politician, the Repressed Cost-padding Regime occurs for in-
termediate values of detection technology i.e., ρ˜j < ρ ≤ ρ˜j , j ∈ {M,O} wherethe expression for ρ˜j is identical to the one in (3.33) with eRC in place of eCP ,and the expression for ρ˜j is identical to the one in (3.40) with eRC in place of
eCL.
The facts that ψ(.) is increasing and that eRCH > eCPH = eCLH imply that ρ˜ < ρand ρ˜ < ρ.
Combining the results obtained in Proposition 3.6 and Proposition 3.8,
we have the following results about the range of values of ρ that sus-
tain the Repressed Cost-padding Regime: (i) an increase in α shrinks the
range from both sides; (ii) the range under an opportunist politician is
shifted to right with respect to a moderate one, and the more he is op-
portunist the more is shifted; (iii) an increase in the efficiency differential
shrinks the range from right.
We are know able to gather results of this section in the following propo-
sition
Proposition 3.10 (Optimal contracts under incomplete information) Un-
der incomplete information, three different regimes can occur, depending on the
value of the detection probability ρ: (i) for 0 < ρ ≤ ρ˜j : only the Cost-paddingRegime occurs; (ii) for ρ˜j < ρ ≤ ρj either the Cost-padding or the RepressedCost-padding can occur; (iii) for ρ
j
< ρ ≤ ρ˜j only the Repressed Cost-padding
can occur; (iv) for ρ˜j < ρ ≤ ρj no regime can occur; (v) for ρj ≤ ρ < 1 only
the Classical Regime can occur.
In all regimes the efficient type is offered a fixed-price contract, which ensures
that he never engages in cost-padding in equilibrium. On the other hand, the
inefficient type is offered cost-sharing contracts which may leave an incentive to
pad costs. Cost-padding occurs in equilibrium only in the Cost-padding Regime.
Proposition 3.10 is represented in Figure 3.2 below, which shows that
the transition to one regime to the other at the increase of ρ it is not
smooth as it would be at the limit case where eRC = eCP = eCL, which
would imply ρ˜ = ρ and ρ˜ = ρ. Instead, there is an overlapping of Cost-padding and Repressed Cost-padding regimes in the range (ρ˜, ρ] and a
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Figure 3.2: Regime Transition
gap in the range (ρ˜, ρ] where no regime can occur. Both the overlapping
range and the gap shrink as eRC → eCP .
However, the relevant interpretation of results does not change with re-
spect to the case with smooth transition (see LT pag. 527): when the
probability of detecting cost-padding is low type H wants to engage in
cost-padding (as would type L if it were to mimic the type H), which
gives rise to the Cost-padding Regime. The power of incentives is the
same as when cost-padding is unfeasible; when the detection probability
increases a bit, the type H no longer has incentive to engage in cost-
padding, whereas the type L would still have incentive to do pad costs
if it were mimicking, which gives rise to the Repressed Cost-padding
Regime. In order to make such mimicking costly, the effort level of type
H is raised, which increases the marginal disutility of mimicking for type
L; when the probability of detecting cost-padding becomes even higher,
then neither type L has incentive to engage in cost-padding: we are in
the Classical Regime, and the effort required from type H return to the
level of the case where cost-padding is unfeasible.
3.5 The politician’s optimal choice
The last step is to analyze the politician’s optimal choice of detection
probability ρ on the basis of optimal contracts derived in last section.
Therefore, while in the previous sections the detection probability ρ was
regarded as a parameter, in this section we endogenize it.
3.5.1 Optimal auditing technology
The politician will choose the detection probability that ensures that he
ends up in the regime that gives him the highest continuation payoff
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(i.e., the highest value of the objective function), which will depend on
his type.
From Proposition 3.7 we know that the two cost-padding free solutions,
i.e., the Repressed Cost-padding Regime and the Classical Regime yield
the same value to the politician, which in turn is identical to the value
that the politician can obtain in the benchmark solution, UCL = URC =
UBI where UBI is given in (3.26). The only solution where the politician
gets a different value function is in the Cost-padding Regime, whereUCPj
is given in (3.31) and depends on the type of politician.
Therefore, the politician’s choice is reduced to compare UBI and UCP ,
i.e., to decide whether or not he wants to allow for cost-padding in equi-
librium. It is straightforward from (3.31) that the difference betweenUCP
and U IU is given by the constant G(αj), so that the choice of the politi-
cian will merely depend on the sign of this expression.
By straightforward calculation we get that G(αj) > 0 if and only if
µ ≥ 1 + λ, which leads to our main result:
Proposition 3.11 (Politician’s preferred regime) a) A moderate politician
(µ ≤ 1) never chooses the Cost-padding Regime, while he is indifferent between
Repressed Cost-padding and Classical regimes; b) An opportunist politician
chooses the Cost-padding Regime iff he is opportunist enough i.e., iff µ ≥ (1+λ)
(while if 1 < µ < 1 + λ he behaves as a moderate one). In particular, it must
be the case that the weight he puts on his personal utility is higher than the
disutility that consumers bear from distortionary taxation.
Our result is consistent with the “mixed”nature of the politician, who
cares both about social welfare and private utility: since cost-padding
implies a higher cost in terms of distortionary taxation, only a politician
who is eager enough will be willing to allow cost-padding. This result
is nice insofar it captures in a simple and clear way the realistic case that
a politician can well be partially selfish, but only particularly corrupt -
the ones who let private cause substantially exceed public interest - will
damage the public.
On the basis of Proposition 3.10 and Proposition 3.11 we can now easily
conclude about the optimal detection probability for each type of politi-
cian.
First notice that case (iv) in Proposition 3.10 (i.e., the “gap”) can be triv-
ially disregarded ρ∗j /∈ (ρ˜j , ρj ] ∀j ∈ {M,O}, while case (ii) (i.e., the
“overlapping”) can be ruled out for the moderately opportunist politi-
cian, since he has a strict preference for the cost-padding free solutions
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over the Cost-padding Regime, so that ρ∗M /∈ [ρ˜M , ρM ). On the other handthe very opportunist politician might allow for the overlapping.
We can now state our final result:
Proposition 3.12 (Politician’s optimal choice of detection probability) Mod-
erately opportunist politicians (indicated with superscript MO) (µ < (1 + λ))
will optimally choose any value of ρ in the intervalM = (ρ
j
, ρ˜j ]
⋃
[ρj , 1), where
j =
{
M, if µ ≤ 1
O, if 1 < µ < (1 + λ)
. Therefore, ρ∗MO = ∀ρ ∈M .
Very opportunist politicians (indicated with superscript V O) (µ ≥ 1 + λ) will
choose ρ∗V O = ρO = arg max
ρ∈(0,ρ
O
]
UCPO (ρ).
Notice that while UBI is constant with respect to ρ, so that the moder-
ately opportunist politician is indifferent between any value that sustains
any of the cost-padding free solutions, on the other hand UCPO depends
on ρ and hence the politician further maximize with respect to it.
The intuition beyond the optimal choice of the very opportunist politi-
cian is that he faces a trade-off when choosing the detection technology:
on one hand a higher detection probability would allow him to detect
cost-padding more often, which increases its expected share of embez-
zled money; on the other hand a higher detection probability deters the
firm from engaging in cost-padding (i.e., makes Cost-padding regime
relatively less likely to occur), which decreases its expected share of
money49. Therefore he optimally chooses the highest level of detection
probability such that the agent still finds it profitable to engage in cost-
padding, namely ρ∗V O = ρO.
Propositions 3.11 and 3.12 summarize the result we wanted to show,
namely that the presence of cost-padding in public projects can be given
a political corruption explanation. While in LT - where the politician is
benevolent and the auditing technology is exogenous - cost-padding can
emerge in optimal contracts only due to incomplete information (i.e.,
when preventing cost-padding is too costly in terms of the extra-rents
the politicians need to pay), and (bureaucratic) corruption can never oc-
cur in equilibrium (since the principal always makes a take-it-or-leave-it
49A similar trade-off occurs in Dittmann (2006), where an increase in detection probabil-
ity can have opposite effects on the revenue from fines: the proportion of criminals that are
detected and fined increases, which raises the revenues from fines, but more individuals
are deterred from committing crime, which decreases revenue.
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offer to the corruptible bureaucrat), in this model, due to the endogeniza-
tion of the detection technology, cost-padding and (political) corruption
can occur in equilibrium and are ultimately choices of the politician. Par-
ticularly opportunist politicians, who are eager to get a share of the gains
from illegal activity, will misuse public office to allow for its occurrence
(via choosing a relatively low detection probability and hence leaving an
incentive to pad costs in optimal contracts) and enter in corrupt transac-
tion when they have the chance to do so.
3.5.2 A State Capacity interpretation
Closer inspection of condition µ ≥ 1+λ yields two additional interesting
results.
First, we have that an improvement in the efficiency of taxation (i.e.,
a decrease in λ) makes the cost-padding regime easier to occur, inso-
far a lower degree of selfishness is needed for the politician to go for
the Cost-padding Regime. In the limit case of a perfectly efficient fiscal
system (i.e., λ = 0) all opportunist politicians (i.e., ∀µ > 1) will allow
cost-padding to occur. The intuition is that a decrease in the distortion
of taxation reduces the social cost of cost-padding, which implies that
also moderately opportunist politicians will have an incentive to let cost-
padding occur.
Also, notice that the extent to which the politician is able to pursue his
private agenda rather than social welfare depends on the effectiveness
of the political system, in terms of the political accountability it man-
ages to create. Therefore µ can be interpreted as a measure of political
accountability: the more efficient is the political system, i.e., the more
accountable are politicians, the lower is µ (see e.g., Shapiro and Willig
(1990)). If we do so, we also have a second result, namely that a decrease
in λ must be more than counterbalanced by a decrease in µ in order to
make cost-padding less easier to occur. This result can be explained in
the light of the Acemoglu (2010) discussion about State capacity50. A re-
duction in the distortion of taxation has ambiguous effects on welfare:
on one hand it has a direct positive effect insofar it improves redistribu-
tion and allocation of resources. On the other hand however, it has an
indirect negative effect insofar it increases the potential benefits of ruling
the state, so that pursuing personal interest becomes more attractive for
the politician: the higher the improvement in efficiency the lower degree
50Also see Acemoglu et al. (2011)
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of selfishness is needed to find it convenient for the politician to prefer
the cost-padding regime51.
Therefore, our results confirm Acemoglu (2010) insight that an improve-
ment in State capacity (like a more efficient fiscal system) is not good per
se (as instead argued by Besley and Persson (2010) - who neglected the
impact that an increase in State capacity has on political equilibrium) but
it is beneficial only if it comes from or is coincident to an increase in the
political accountability of politicians.
3.6 Conclusion
In this essay we have provided a contract-theoretical framework to ex-
plain why cost-padding and corruption are so widespread in the execu-
tion of public contracts.
To do so, we have extended the contract-theoretic cost-padding model in
Laffont and Tirole (1993), to allow for the principal to be partially self-
ish and for the auditing technology to be endogenous. In our model the
principal (a top-level politician) audits himself the firm and, depending
on his degree of selfishness, he decides both the level of auditing tech-
nology and whether to enter (upon detection) a corrupt bargaining with
the firm to share embezzled money. The stakes of corruption are hence
endogenous and depend on the politician’s motives.
This framework enabled us to develop a theory of endogenous political
corruption and to argue that the occurrence of cost-padding can be given
a political explanation: opportunist politicians can gain a personal bene-
fit from allowing contracting firms to embezzle public money. While in
Laffont and Tirole (1993) cost-padding and, consequently, (bureaucratic)
corruption, could emerge in optimal contracts only due to asymmetric
information, in this model cost-padding and corruption are ultimately
choices of the politician, which depend on his degree of selfishness.
We found that while a moderate politician (by choosing a relatively ag-
gressive auditing technology) prevents the firm from engaging in cost-
padding, a very opportunist politician (via choosing a relatively weak
auditing technology) leaves in optimal contracts an incentive to pad costs
and, upon detection, share embezzled money with the firm. Moreover,
an improvement in the efficiency of the fiscal system makes cost-padding
easier to occur, due to the fact that since the social cost of cost-padding
51In Acemoglu (2010) an increase in the potential benefits of controlling the state intensi-
fies the political conflict aimed at capturing this control.
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is lower, also less opportunist politicians will be tempted to engage in
corruption. This result can be also interpreted in light of the recent de-
bate on State capacity (see Besley and Persson (2010)), Acemoglu (2010),
Acemoglu et al. (2011)): by increasing the gains from staying in power,
a more efficient fiscal system increases the incentive for misusing public
office. Therefore, without a coincident increase in political accountabil-
ity, an increase in State capacity can be detrimental for welfare.
Despite its relative simplicity, our model is able to produce interesting
results. Still, there are a number of dimensions along which this work
could be further developed. First, it would be interesting to relax the as-
sumption of automatic enforcement of contracts and announcements to
see how issues of contract renegotiation and credibility problems add up
to our results. In particular, this would allow for the information revela-
tion issues to have more bite in the model, and to analyze the problem of
credibility underlying the politician’s auditing choice.
Second, it would be interesting to assume that auditing is costly. This
would make the modelization of the auditing technology more realis-
tic and may enrich the results about the politician’s optimal choice. In
particular, the optimal choice of the level of auditing will no longer only
depend only on the trade-off between favoring cost-padding (which calls
for weak auditing) and detecting cost-padding (which calls for strong au-
diting), but also on the fact that auditing is costly. This would also likely
produce interesting implications in combination with the issue of time-
consistency highlighted above 52.
To further enhance the descriptive power of the modelization of audit-
ing, it would be possible to separate the roles of the politician and of the
supervising bureaucrat. This could be done by adopting the three-tier
agency structure of classical auditing models, but still allowing for both
the bureaucrat and the politician to be corruptible.
Third, it would be interesting to open the “black box” of the politician’s
self-interest µ. There are two main ways this step could be implemented.
The first is “institutional” and amounts to incorporating a more realis-
tic modelization of power in the model. This could be implemented
either by introducing a judicial system which could detect and punish
corrupt politicians, or introducing voting so to allow for a constituency
to keep the politician accountable. In either case, however, the prob-
lem should be not be degenerated to a new agency problem where the
52For example, after the firm reveals its type through the choice of the contract, the politi-
cian may decide not to audit an efficient firm since it would never engage in cost-padding.
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political principal becomes the judicial system or the Constituency and
the non-benevolent politician acts as the supervisor or regulator of the
firm (as in Laffont and Tirole (1993), Section VI)). Instead, one should de-
velop a model where the politician remains the political principal, i.e., a
social-welfare maximizer, albeit partially selfish, and a clever way of in-
corporating some element of separation of powers. A simple possibility
of that kind is to introduce the judicial system as a pair of parameters,
the former defining an exogenous probability of detection of the corrupt
deal between the firm and the politician, and the latter defining the pun-
ishment they should incur upon detection. A more sophisticated mod-
elization of the institutions could also allow to endogenize the efficiency
of the fiscal system λ.
The second way to open the black box of self-interest would be “motiva-
tional”and would consider the role of psychological and social factors on
the intrinsic motivation and self-regulation of the politician. This alterna-
tive way may refer to the recent literature about more sophisticated be-
havior of economic agents (see e.g., Be´nabou and Tirole (2002), Be´nabou
and Tirole (2003) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2006)).
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Chapter 4
Decentralization and
Procurement Performance:
Some New Empirical
Evidence from Italy
4.1 Introduction
Public procurement accounts for a large share of the economic activity in
developed economies (15-20% of GDP, OECD average1).
Therefore, it is essential that governments design and implement sound
public procurement policies and practices to achieve best value for money
when purchasing goods and services needed to address public needs.
This is particularly urgent nowadays, in an era of economic instability
and crisis, where a key concern for governments is achieving savings in
order to consolidate public finances and clear fiscal space for other nec-
essary policies.
A central issue in the debate on how to improve the performance of pub-
lic procurement spending, is how much public procurement should be
centralized i.e., whether procurement should be mostly administered by
1The average for OECD countries is 12% when excluding procurement by state-owned
enterprises. When these purchases are also accounted for, the size of procurement can
increases by an additional 2 to 13 percentage points of GDP (OECD (2011)).
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central governments (or agencies) or rather delegated to sub-central lev-
els of authority.
In practice, despite in recent years many countries have increased their
degree of procurement centralization, often with the institution of a cen-
tral procurement agency which concludes procurement agreements on
behalf of other public purchasers, public procurement is largely decen-
tralized2. Figure 4.1 clearly shows how in many OECD countries local
governments account for substantial percentages of procurement spend-
ing (on average 48% in OECD), with Italy (80%), Finland (72%), Denmark
(69%), Japan (69%) and Sweden (69%) displaying the highest degrees of
decentralization3.
Figure 4.1: Share of government procurement by level of government
(2011). Source: OECD (2013). Percentages exclude procurement by social security
funds and public enterprises.
What then is natural and convenient to ask is whether such a pre-
vailing decentralization trend in procurement systems is justifiable on
economic grounds or whether public purchasing should be rather more
centralized, and to what extent.
2Centralization usually occurs in the form of the stipulation of so called “framework
agreements” signed by central procurement agencies on behalf of public purchasers.
Framework agreements are agreements between one or more contracting authorities and
one or more economic operators, the purpose of which is to establish the terms govern-
ing contracts to be awarded during a given period, in particular with regard to price and,
where appropriate, quantity (see Dimitri et al. (2006a)).
3See McCue and Pitzer (2000) for an overview on recent trends on centralization in pub-
lic procurement.
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Procurement practitioners argue that at the heart of the issue is the trade-
off between the potential savings created by purchasing aggregation,
which call for centralization, and the need of responding to local specific
needs, which calls for decentralization. This can be seen as an expression
of the more general trade-off underlying the provision of public goods,
which is at the core of the long-standing debate in the fiscal federalism lit-
erature (see e.g., Oates (1985), Besley and Coate (2003) and Oates (2005)).
More specifically, the main arguments in favor of centralization are the
following4. First, the aggregation of purchases enables public purchasers
to obtain a better per-unit price (since suppliers exploit economies of
scale), and to increase their bargaining power, which both result in sav-
ings on purchase costs. Second, aggregation allows for savings on du-
plication of (potentially substantial) process costs, such as advertisement
and organization of tenders, and litigation. Moreover, centralization helps
to afford and concentrate qualified and specialized human resources, i.e.,
procurement professionals recruited and trained to optimize procure-
ment design and implementation. On the other hand, hiring and training
experts can be prohibitively expensive for small decentralized units.
Such gains from centralization, however, are possible mostly when prod-
ucts are relatively standardized (e.g., ICT equipment, IT servers, station-
ary and paper, fuel, natural gas, meal coupons etc.5). When products are
less standardized, local authorities may have better information about
local needs and local markets, so that decentralization may be prefer-
able. However, local authorities might also be more prone to favoritism
and corruption than central ones, due to invested political interests and
lobbying of local suppliers (e.g., see Vagstad (2000), Fisman and Gatti
(2002), Faguet (2004), Bordignon et al. (2008) and Coviello and Gagliar-
ducci (2010).). Also, the application of ICT technologies to procurement
(so called “e-procurement”), may both streamline information from the
periphery to the center - hence reducing the information-gathering costs
that the latter would incur - and further save on administrative costs.
This would again call for centralization, since, due to the economies of
scale created by ICT investments, the larger volumes of transactions are
affected, the larger the potential savings.
However, a (potentially large) drawback of centralization is that it may
disadvantage small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which, due to lower
4For an extensive analysis of relative advantages and disadvantages of procurement
centralization see Dimitri et al. (2006a).
5In fact, these products are usually procured by central purchasing agencies in several
countries (Dimitri et al. (2006a)).
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production volumes and profit margins, may find it difficult to compete
in big tenders. This would both have a negative impact on the compe-
tition level in procurement, possibly facilitating collusion between big
firms, and deplete the industrial fabric of the economy.
All considered, practical evidence seems to be in favor of a rather cen-
tralized procurement, albeit some degree of decentralization should be
allowed to ensure flexibility and protection of SMEs. However, albeit
much informative, the arguments summarized above are of qualitative
nature, whereas it would be indeed useful to assess the relationship be-
tween procurement decentralization and performance on a more quanti-
tative basis, and in a framework which allows to control for other deter-
minants of performance.
The aim of this work is exactly to give such kind of contribution. In
particular, we exploit the TED dataset, based on mandatory contract
award notices in the EU, to provide a preliminary empirical assessment
of the relationship between procurement decentralization and procure-
ment performance in Italy. The Italian case is appropriate and interest-
ing in this context since all levels of government (central and sub-central)
plus a number of other public institutions (e.g., local health authorities,
universities, state-owned enterprises) are involved in the procurement of
goods, services and works, and are largely subjected to the same rules,
at least as far as EU-relevant procurement is concerned.
Using winning rebate as a measure of procurement performance, we find
that small decentralized units are generally less efficient than (more) cen-
tral authorities in procuring goods and services. In particular, munic-
ipalities are the least efficient purchasers. This is particularly relevant
since municipalities are the level of government that award most pro-
curement contracts (24.7% in our data, against 8.5% awarded by cen-
tral government, 3% by regions and 2.2% by provinces). According to
our main estimates, if a tender awarded by a municipality were instead
awarded by central government, the winning rebate would on average
increase by 6.6%, which would result - according to a back on the en-
velope calculation - in an average per-tender saving of 132.000 euros6.
The same kind of conclusion seems to be true as well for public enter-
prises, which also turn out to have a relatively low performance, despite
being the institutional class that award in absolute the greatest number
6This calculation is computed using the OLS estimate of the effect of the contracting au-
thority being the central government rather than municipality (which is used as reference)
on the winning rebate, for a public contract with an average starting value/reserve price of
about 2 million euros.
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of contracts (27% in our data). Importantly, these findings hold even af-
ter controlling for other important determinants of rebate, such as the
award mechanism, the size of the purchasing unit, and local character-
istics, suggesting that performance is affected by some other unobserv-
able characteristics which varies between different classes of public pur-
chasers. We argue that these unobservables much likely amount to the
endowment of professional competences and incentives of the procure-
ment staff in purchasing units. Differently from (more) centralized pur-
chasers, municipalities and other small decentralized units are likely to
lack the trained, competent and motivated human resources which are
needed to properly implement procurement procedures and achieve best
value for money.
What our results suggest therefore, is first, that there is a general per-
formance mismatch in the Italian system of public procurement, in the
sense that the classes of contracting authorities that are responsible for
the largest volumes of procurement, are also the least efficient; second,
incompetence is likely to have a crucial role in explaining this perfor-
mance gap. The latter confirms the striking finding of Bandiera et al.
(2009), namely that waste in procurement in Italy is largely due to bu-
reaucratic incompetence (rather than to corruption).
With the reservations that our analysis is preliminary and results cannot
be readily interpreted in causal terms, a policy implication that seems to
emerge is that the Italian procurement system should be re-organized on
a more centralized basis in order to improve on the general performance
gap.
Previous empirical works focusing on the relationship between the de-
gree of centralization and procurement performance in Italy are limited,
and empirical evidence is conflicting.
The paper closest to ours is Guccio et al. (2014), who assess the time per-
formance in the execution of public works by different levels of govern-
ments in Italy. Similarly, they obtain that local governments (and munic-
ipalities in particular) are less efficient (i.e., incur higher cost-overruns)
than central government in the procurement of public works. In con-
trast with these result, Bandiera et al. (2009), focusing on purchases of
standardized goods by different classes of Italian public purchasers, find
that the least efficient class is central government (although they do not
give an explanation or intuition of why this should be the case), while
the average municipality is the second most efficient class after semi-
autonomous bodies (e.g., local health authorities and universities).
Moreover, there are other papers that albeit not mainly focusing on the
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performance differential between different levels of government, pro-
vide some marginal evidence on that issue. D’Alpaos et al. (2013), for
example, in a study about the opportunistic use of time overruns in pub-
lic works, also find that municipalities, although awarding the largest
number of contracts, show higher cost-overruns than the average of the
dataset; Decarolis (2014), also has that municipalities are typically as-
sociated with higher cost-overruns (with respect to provinces); Guccio
et al. (2012) in a study about determinants of cost-overruns in public
works, find, like Bandiera et al. (2009), that all institutional levels of pur-
chasers tend to have lower adaptation costs than central government,
while the evidence about local governments is not significant7. They ar-
gue that this result can be explained on the grounds that central govern-
ment should have higher political incentives in underestimating costs.
All of these papers, as virtually all recent empirical studies on procure-
ment for Italy, use data on public works contracts8. On the other hand
we focus on supplies and services, which both in terms on number and
value of contracts, account for the greatest share of the procurement mar-
ket9.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe
the Italian institutional background for public procurement, and in Sec-
tion 4.3 the data. In Section 4.4 we present the empirical model and es-
timation results, and discuss some robustness checks. We conclude with
Section 4.5. Tables and figures are relegated in the Appendix A.3.
7However, this may be due to the fact that they put all levels of sub-central government
(i.e., regions, provinces and municipalities) in the same category, which in our opinion is a
too loose classification. Bandiera et al. (2009) put provinces and municipalities in the same
category.
8In fact, the mentioned works all use the same dataset, which was provided by the Ital-
ian Authority for the Surveillance of Public Procurement (Autorit per la Vigilanza sui Con-
tratti Pubblici di Lavori, Servizi e Forniture, A.V.C.P.), before it was terminated in 2014 (and
merged with the Italian Anti-Corruption Authority). These data, which are no longer avail-
able, had the advantage to contain information on the execution of public work contracts,
so that they allowed to build ex-post performance measures such as cost-overruns and
time-overruns. Other works based on these data, beside the mentioned ones are Coviello
and Gagliarducci (2010), Bucciol et al. (2013), Coviello et al. (2013), Coviello and Mariniello
(2014), Decarolis and Giorgiantonio (2014), Moretti and Valbonesi (2015), Branzoli and De-
carolis (2015).
9 Of all public tenders called in 2012, 36% were for services contracts, 34,3% for supplies
and 29,7% for works. As for contract values, services accounted for the 45,4% of value,
supplies for 27,8% and works for 26,8% (Autorita` di Vigilanza sui Contratti Pubblici di
Lavori (2013)).
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4.2 Institutional Background
Italy is an interesting case study for analyzing variation of procurement
performance at different degrees of procurement decentralization, be-
cause all levels of government, plus a variety of other public institutions,
are involved in the procurement of goods, services and works, and are
mostly subjected to the same rules. This is particularly the case for larger
contracts which are of EU relevance10: in this case the Italian national
Parliament must establish procurement rules according to the principles
of the relevant EU legislation, and sub-central governments have limited
power to implement changes to the national legislation11. The main im-
plication is that all public purchasers in Italy procure largely according
to the same rules. Hence the differences in performance are not to be
attributed to differences in the rules, but rather to specific characteristics
of different categories of public purchasers (see Guccio et al. (2014)).
In particular, since 2006 the public procurement of works, supplies and
services of EU relevance is regulated in Italy by the Legislative Decree 12
April 2006, n. 163, so called “Code of public contracts of works, supplies
and services”, (henceforth, the Code), which is the transposition of Direc-
tives 2004/17/EC (EC (2004b)), regulating the award of contracts in the
utilities sectors (i.e. water, energy, transport and postal services), and Di-
rective 2004/18/EC (EC (2004a)), which regulates the award of contracts
in ordinary sectors 12.
The Code updates provisions, among other things, about a) the public
subjects allowed to act as contracting authorities, b) the award proce-
10Contracts of works, goods and services whose reserve price is higher than given thresh-
olds are considered of EU relevance and are regulated by relevant EU Directives (see e.g.,
Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos (2014) for more detail on this).
11However, Decarolis and Giorgiantonio (2014) report that due to the ambiguousness
of the Italian Constitution on the allocation of legislative power between central and sub-
central governments about public procurement, sub-central levels often adopt their regula-
tions despite national regulation expressly prohibits local legislation, among other things,
on award procedures and criteria. Often this hyperregulation at local level constitutes an
impediment to competition, beside making legal compliance burdensome.
12Very recently, new Directives have been approved that update the current regula-
tion, but still have to be transposed in Member States legislation. These are Direc-
tive 2014/24/EU (EU (2014a)), which will repel the Directive 2004/18/EC, Directive
2014/25/EU (EU (2014b)), which will repel the Directive 2004/17/EC, and Directive
2014/23/EU (EU (2014c)), which for the first time will provide a separate regulation for
concessions.
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dures and c) the award criteria13.
In the matter of the subjects allowed to act as contracting authorities, it is
provided (Art. 32) that such subjects are: central government, local govern-
ments (i.e., regions, provinces, municipalities, mountain village councils, island
councils), public institutions with non-economic purpose, bodies of public law,
publicly financed enterprises which realize works or produce goods or services
which are non destined to free competition markets, concessionaires and other
private subjects in some limited circumstances 14.
As for the award procedures, three main options are identified (Arts. 54-
62 and 220-222): open procedure, restricted procedure and negotiated proce-
dure, the latter having two suboptions i.e., negotiated with call for competi-
tion and negotiated without call for competition15. Each procedure allows a
varying degree of control over the award mechanism and of the interac-
tion with tenderers. In the open procedure, all interested suppliers can
submit a tender. In the restricted procedure there is a shortlisting stage
before the tender stage, which enables the contracting authority to check
in advance whether potential suppliers have the appropriate experience
and resources to meet its needs. In the negotiated procedure the contract-
ing authority instead invites a restricted number of firms with whom it
negotiates the terms of the contract before the awarding. According to
the EU rules, while the open and the restricted procedures can be used
without restrictions, the negotiated procedure with call for competition
should only be used in restricted circumstances, and the negotiated pro-
cedure without call for competition can be used only in very exceptional
cases, namely when a supplier is the sole source of the good or service
required, in cases of extreme urgency, or when the precise specification
can only be determined by negotiation16.
As for the award criteria, the Code (Arts. 81-84) states that contracts are
either awarded via the lowest price criterion, or the criterion of the most
economically advantageous tender (aka MET or MEAT), where some other
criteria are considered beside price for the award of the tender (e.g., qual-
13The Code (in italian) is available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?
urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2006-04-12;163.
14For all details see Art 32 of the Code.
15In fact, there is a fourth option, which is used very rarely, called competitive dialogue,
which was introduced for addressing particularly complex procurement contracting situa-
tions, where contracting authority needs to “dialogue” with potential suppliers before the
award phase.
16This holds for ordinary sectors, which account for most contracts. In the utilities sectors
the negotiated procedure with call for competition can be used without restrictions, while
the option without call for competition is still limited to exceptional circumstances.
82
ity, environmental characteristics etc). In the former case, participants
simply bid the price at which they are willing to implement the contract,
in the form of a percentage reduction (so called “rebate”) with respect
to the reserve price (i.e., the auction’s initial value as announced by the
contracting authority). In the latter, participants submit a complex bid
composed by an economic part, based on the offered rebate, and a tech-
nical part, detailing how the contract will be implemented with respect
to the other (non-price) criteria. In this case the highest rebate is not nec-
essarily the winning rebate17.
4.3 Data
The data we use are part of a unique dataset based on mandatory con-
tract award notices published on Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), which
is the official online version of the Supplement of the Official Journal of
the European Union (OJEU)18.
Contracting authorities are obliged to publish contract notices (i.e., calls
for tenders) and award notices on TED for all contracts with reserve price
exceeding the EU public procurement thresholds1920. TED contains con-
tract notices, contract award notices and many other procurement docu-
ments in electronic format. Since 2006, TED has published procurement
statements on more than 700.000 tenders. The dataset is updated 5 times
a week with some 1.500 public procurement notices from the European
Union, the European Economic Area and beyond21.
17As a matter of fact, this can happen also under the criterion of the lowest price, due
to a complex mechanism implemented to prevent firms from overbidding (i.e., to offer too
high a rebate, which could then jeopardize the implementation of the contract): the bids
that after a preliminary trimming of the top/bottom 10% of the collected bids, exceed the
average by more than the average deviation, are inspected and may be excluded, in which
case the winning bid is the highest among the remaining bids (see Arts. 86-89 of the Code).
18 c©European Union 1998-2015, http://ted.europa.eu.
19In many cases, however, award notices of tenders below thresholds are also reported.
Reasons are that authorities are not prevented from doing so, and the fact that as a result
of competition, even though the reserve price is above or at the threshold, the final award
value might be below the threshold.
20The thresholds may vary between Directive (ordinary vs utilities), by type of contract
(supplies vs services vs works), and by level of authority (central government vs subcen-
tral entities). The current thresholds can be find at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/
single-market/public-procurement/rules/current/index_en.htm.
21The TED archive contains documents for the last 5 years of tenders i.e., the time span of
the archive shifts over time to cover exaclty 5 years of tenders. This amount to the archive
containing at each time almost 900.000 contract notices and almost 800.000 award notices.
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However, it is very difficult to build a dataset from the document-based
TED archive. Luckily, OpenTED - a project started in 2012 by an inde-
pendent group of researchers and developers - is converting the TED
electronic format tender documents into a spreadsheet format and mak-
ing them available under permission of the EU22.
This work is based on OpenTED data for Italy. The original sample is
a multi-year cross-section containing 43222 observations relative to con-
tracts of services, supplies and works awarded in Italy from 2008 to 2014.
The observation unit is the single contract award. For each observation
the dataset includes the following informations: name, address, institu-
tional category and main activity of the contracting authority; name and
address of the winning firm; object of the contract according to the Com-
mon Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) coding; type of contract (supply vs
service vs work); initial value of the contract (i.e., reserve price); final
price of the contract (i.e., price of award/winning bid); date of award
of the contract; award criterion; award procedure; number of offers re-
ceived; EU directive regulating the tender; identity and address of the
appeal body; number of lots if the contract was divided in lots; whether
an electronic auction was used; whether the tender was covered by the
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) or related to EU funded
projects; identity and details of final client if the contracting authority
was operating on behalf of some other entity; other technical informa-
tion (e.g., date of document dispatch).
From the original sample we extracted the sample of interest, according
to the following criteria. First, since our measure of procurement perfor-
mance is the winning rebate in each contract award, we kept only ob-
servations for which both reserve price and final price (as well as other
fundamental entries) were not missing23. For the same reason, we ex-
cluded cases where it was not possible to clearly define the winning re-
bate, namely multi-lot contracts (where the contract is divided in parts
(i.e., lots) which are awarded separately) and tenders where the win-
ner was a temporary consortium of firms (“Associazione Temporanea
d’Impresa”, ATI). Also, since we were interested in building variables
based on the identity of winning bidders and contracting authorities, we
Users can freely browse the archive, search and sort procurement notices by country, year,
business sector and more.
22For more on the OpenTED project see http://ted.openspending.org/.
23There are many missings in the data, probably due to scarce attention in the compiling
of the original award notice documents. Further, there is no official data dictionary, so that
the variables content is not always clearly understandable.
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dropped all observations for which their names were missing24. Last but
not least, we decided to focus only on procurement of goods and ser-
vices and disregard data on public works. There are three reasons for
that. First, with the exception of Bonaccorsi et al. (1999) and Bandiera
et al. (2009), all empirical literature on procurement in Italy focused on
public works so we wanted to clearly focus on what has been mostly ne-
glected. Second, supplies and services account for the largest share of
procurement, both in terms of quantity and value of contracts25. Third,
while winning rebate can be a reasonably adequate performance mea-
sure for the procurement of supplies and services, the same is not true
for the case of public works, since very often the final cost (as measured
at the end of the execution of works) exceeds the contracted cost. Since
TED data only provide information on the award of the contract, we can-
not build the ex-post performance measures, such as cost overruns and
time overruns, which would be more meaningful indicators in the con-
text of public works26.
Our final sample consist of 4805 observations on awards of services and
supplies contracts, relative to 42 industrial macro-sectors (as identified
by the CPV codes) and awarded between January 2011 and April 2014
by contracting authorities belonging to different institutional classes27.
We have complemented these data with further geographical informa-
tions taken from the National Statistical Institute (ISTAT (2011)), in par-
ticular about the province and the region of the contracting authority, the
province and the region of the winning firm, and the population of the
municipality where the contracting authority was located28.
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Our measure of procurement performance is the winning rebate, defined
as the percentage discount of the final price (i.e., the price at which the
contract is awarded) over the reserve price (i.e. the price announced by
the contracting authority). The winning rebate is a standard measure of
24Also, due to many small permutations of spellings for the same firm, we assigned by
hand an univocal name to each firm.
25See footnote 9.
26As already mentioned, the AVCP dataset contained such kind of follow-up information
(See footnote 8).
27For more details on the CPV coding see http://ec.europa.eu/growth/
single-market/public-procurement/rules/cpv/index_en.htm.
28The TED/OpenTEd only contained information on the winning firm’s and the con-
tracting authority’s towns and postal codes.
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ex-ante performance in procurement, indicating the extent to which the
functioning of the award process, as administered by the purchaser, al-
lows the latter to achieve a discount with respect to the maximum price
it would have been willing to pay 29.
More formally, rebate = reserve price−final pricereserve price x100.
As it is shown in Table A.1 in Appendix A.3, the average winning rebate
is 16.33% (with a standard deviation of 18.5%)30. The minimum rebate is
0% and the maximum rebate is 99.95%31.
Figure A.1 in Appendix A.3 plots the empirical distribution of rebate,
(together with a Kernel density estimate), showing that the distribution
is clearly skewed and has a spike at 0: a relatively high share of observa-
tions (10%) has 0% rebate. The latter seems an anomaly, which we will
further investigate shortly.
Table A.1 summarizes the main features of the sample according to (i)
the type and object of the awarded contract; (ii) the institutional class of
the contracting authority (CA, in the following); (iii) the awarding pro-
cedure and the awarding criterion; (iv) geographic location and year of
award.
Concerning the type of contract, 64.8% of the sample concerns tenders
of services, while 35.2% tenders of supplies. As for the object of the
contract, 83.7% of the sample regards ordinary sectors and 15.6% util-
ities32. In particular, the majority of tenders concerns sewage, refuse,
cleaning and environmental services (12.5%), health and social work ser-
vices (8.5%), medical equipment, pharmaceuticals and personal care prod-
ucts (7.8%), repair and maintenance services (7.2%) and transport equip-
29See e.g., Coviello and Gagliarducci (2010), Coviello et al. (2013), Decarolis and Gior-
giantonio (2014), Decarolis (2014). However, notice that in case the reserve price was over-
estimated or badly calculated, a high rebate does not necessarily imply that the public
purchaser has paid a “good”price.
30We dropped the bottom and top 500th percentile of the empirical distribution of rebate
to exclude outliers.
31184 observations presented a negative rebate (i.e., the final price was higher than the
reserve price). These were dropped for conservative reasons. Some of the cases were almost
surely reporting errors (the final price was equal to the reserve price but multiplied by 10).
Also, according to the Code, offers with negative rebate should be regarded as inadmissible
(although this, of course, does not imply that “illegal” offers were in practice prevented
from winning).
32The remaining 0.7% regards tenders in the sectors of defense and security, which have
a special regulation according to Directive 2009/81/EC (EC (2009)).
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ment and auxiliary products to transportation (7%)33.
According to the discussion in Section 4.2, a meaningful and not cumber-
some categorization of CA for Italy consists of the following categories:
central government, region, province, municipality, mountain council, insti-
tution, other institution, public enterprise, and concessionaire”34. With in-
stitution we refer to those public bodies with budget autonomy, namely
local health authorities, public hospitals and universities. The impor-
tant aspect of these institutions is their semi-autonomous nature35. Other
institution includes all other public bodies which are not included in in-
stitution36. Public enterprise includes all firms run out by (mostly) public
money, such as those in charge of utilities (e.g., “Anas”, “Ferrovie dello
Stato”, “Poste Italiane” etc.). Concessionaire refers to those usually private
companies (e.g., those in charge of building and managing highways)
which must follow the Directive prescriptions when acting as CA37.
In our sample the majority of contracts were awarded by public enter-
prises (27.1%) and municipalities (24.7%), followed by other institutions
(17.2%), institutions (14.8%), central government (8.5%), regions (3%),
provinces (2.2%), concessionaires (1.3%) and mountain councils (1.1%).
As for the award procedures, 75.8% of the tenders were awarded with the
open procedure, while the restricted procedure and the negotiated pro-
cedure without a call for competition were respectively used in 10.3% of
33Tenders relative to financial and insurance services have been disregarded for conser-
vative reasons.
34We changed the categorization with respect to that provided in the OpenTED data
(which had 9 categories: body governed by public law, European institution/agency or interna-
tional organization, ministry or any other national or federal authority, regional or local authority,
regional or local agency/office, utilities, national or federal agency/office, other and not specified).
That classification was inadequate for our purposes insofar (a) there were missings and er-
rors (i.e., sometimes the CA was classified under an objectively wrong category and some-
times the same CA was classified under different categories); (b) it was not enough precise
(e.g., regions and municipalities were put in the same category). Our new categorization is
similar to the one adopted in Guccio et al. (2014).
35This definition is similar to that used by Bandiera et al. (2009).
36In our sample these include, among the others: institutions for residential housing
(“Istituti per l’Edilizia Residenziale Pubblica”), the Bank of Italy, Chambers of Commerce,
nursing homes, research institutes, sport federations, the National Institute for the Workers
Insurance (Inail), the National Institute for Social Security (Inps), the National Statistical
Institute (Istat).
37All the tenders awarded by the Armed Forces were listed under central government
since the Armed Forces are directly dependent from the Ministry of Defense. The same
was done for prisons, “Prefetture”, “Provveditorati” and “Soprintendenze” which are de-
pendent from the Ministry of Justice. Unions of municipalities were listed under mountain
council. We dropped municipalities with less than 500 inhabitants to avoid limiting size
effects.
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cases. In the remaining cases it was used the standard negotiated (with
call for competition) procedure (3.7%)38. By looking at these figures, it
is possible to detect an important anomaly in the use of award proce-
dures. While the standard negotiated procedure was rarely used, in line
with the Code prescription that it should be used only in particular cases
(at least in ordinary sectors), the negotiated procedure without a call for
competition was the second most used procedure (after open), regard-
less of the legal requirement that it should be used only in exceptional
cases (typically, emergencies)39. Therefore it seems that CAs are overus-
ing a non-transparent procedure. The abuse of the negotiated procedure
without call for competition also explains the surprising frequency of ob-
servations with winning rebates of 0%: virtually all the tenders with 0%
winning rebates were awarded with the negotiated without call proce-
dure. This suggests that CAs may often lack the incentive to set compet-
itive procedures and may instead prefer non-competitive and not trans-
parent procedures, possibly to engage in favoritism or corrupt practices.
Investigating some more on this, we found that the CA categories which
used relatively the most this procedure are central government (15.1% of
all awards), other institutions (14.8%) and public enterprises (14.3%). Ge-
ographically, relatively higher use of this procedure was found for Lazio
(27% of all awards), Marche (14.2%) and Emilia Romagna (13.4%)40.
As for the award criteria, 53.7% of the tenders were awarded with the
most advantageous tender criterion, while the 41.3% with the lowest
38Again, we changed the classification with respect to the OpenTED original one, which
had too many categories. The negotiated procedure in our classification corresponds to the
merging of negotiated procedure, accelerated negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue in
OpenTED. The restricted procedure corresponds to the merging of restricted procedure and
accelerated restricted procedure. The negotiated without a call corresponds to the merging of ne-
gotiated without a call for competition and award of contract without prior publication of a contract
notice (which from a double check on original tender documents in TED seem to refer both
to negotiated procedures without a call for competition).
39Percentages are substantially the same when considering separately ordinary and util-
ities sectors.
40Almost 30% of all the tenders that were awarded in Rome, adopted the negotiated
procedure without call. In most of these cases the CAs were public enterprises. Also,
Rome accounts for half of all the observations of negotiated procedure without call in the
dataset. These considerations might suggest some evidence of so called “Mafia Capitale”,
i.e. a deep-rooted and widespread phenomenon of corruption which has been recently
unveiled in Rome. According to the authorities, one of the main mechanism by which the
“Mafia Capitale” system worked, was the systematic award of contracts without call for
competition, on the basis on inexistent urgency reasons, in order to favor “friend” firms.
The high use of this procedure in Emilia Romagna could be instead be due to genuine
emergency induced by the 2012 earthquake.
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price (in the remaining 5% of cases the award criterion was not speci-
fied).
The number of offers per auction ranged from a minimum of 1 offer to
a maximum of 67 offers41. The average is 4.3 offers per auction. 27.4%
of tenders received 1 offer only, 19.9% 2 offers, 14% 3 offers and 11.2%
4. The level of competition was on average very low, which of course
also depends on the award procedure used: 30% of the tenders which
received one tender only were awarded with the negotiated procedure
without call42.
As for the geographical location, 47.1% of the contracts were awarded in
the North, 32.5% in the Center and 20.4% in the South43.
In 28.2% of the cases the winning firm was registered in the same province
as the CA, in 14.8% of cases in the same region, in 54.3% in the same coun-
try. Only in 2.7% of cases the contract was awarded to a foreign firm44.
Finally, most of the auctions in the sample were awarded in 2012 and
2013 (respectively 46.5% and 42.6%), whereas 2011 and 2014 have fewer
auction (respectively, 4% and 7%) since these are the starting and ending
points of the dataset, for which only data relative to some months were
extracted. Table A.2 shows some preliminary evidence about the relation
between winning rebate and institutional class of the CA.
It is shown that average winning rebate is highest for private concession-
aires (22%), followed by central government (19.8%) and regions (19.6%),
while it is lowest for municipalities (12.2%) and mountain village coun-
cils (9.3%).
From these raw data it seems that municipalities have a relatively low
procurement performance, as measured by average winning rebate. This
might have relevant implications, since municipalities are the level of
government that award most contracts in the dataset (and the second
CA class in absolute, after public enterprises). On the other hand, central
government seems to be the level of government which has the highest
performance (and second in absolute among CA classes, after conces-
41We excluded outliers with none or more than 100 bidders.
42But more than half (57%) were awarded with the open procedure, which more difficult
to explain.
43According to the Istat classifications, North includes the regions of Valle d’Aosta, Lig-
uria, Lombardia, Piemonte, Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Veneto, Trentino-Alto
Adige; Center includes Lazio, Umbria, Toscana, Marche and South Abruzzo, Basilicata,
Molise, Campania, Puglia, Calabria Sicilia, Sardegna.
44When the winning firm is a big firm with many branches in different locations, we
used the legal location (i.e., the province where the firm is registered) as location for all the
observations of that firm.
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sionaires), despite in the current system it awards only a modest quan-
tity of contracts.
The figures of Table A.2 in are confirmed graphically in Figure A.2 which
shows the empirical cumulative distribution function of the average win-
ning rebate separately for the different institutional classes of CA.
This preliminary evidence is interesting, but of course a regression anal-
ysis is needed to control for other important factors which may influence
the winning rebate, and hence isolate the effect of the institutional class
of the CA on the rebate.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
We are interested in estimating the relationship between the institutional
class of the CA and the winning rebate, used as a general measure of
procurement performance. We consider award-level data, controlling
for province, industrial sector and year of award. We assume that the
relationship of interest can be specified by the following linear model:
rebateipts = α+ CA
′β +X ′iδ + γp + ηs + θt + ipts (4.1)
where rebateipts is the winning rebate in tender i, awarded in province
p and in year t, and whose object is relative to industrial sector s. CA
is a vector of 9 dummies, one for each institutional class of contracting
authority, namely central government, concessionaire, institution, public en-
terprise, region, municipality, province, mountain council, other institution. β
is the vector of coefficients of interest. Xi is a vector of characteristics of
the award i, γp are province fixed effects, that capture local characteris-
tics which are constant (or slowly changing) over time, ηs are sector fixed
effects, that capture sector or market specific time-invariant characteris-
tics, θt are year fixed effects, and ipts is the usual white noise component.
The vector of auction characteristics Xi contains the following variables
and sets of variables: offers number is the number of bids received in the
auction, which controls for the actual level of competition; open, restricted,
negotiated and negotiated without call are 4 award procedure dummies,
which account for the different degree of competitiveness created by dif-
ferent award procedures; lowest price, met and non specified are 3 award
criterion dummies. To account for heterogeneity between purchases we
include reserve price, i.e., the starting value of the auction as announced
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by the CA, expressed in 1000 euros and in 2010 OECD equivalents45; ser-
vice is a dummy variable indicating whether the purchase was relative
to a service rather than to a supply; ordinary, utilities and security are
3 dummies indicating which directive rules the specific tender, which
should account for differences in regulation; behalf is a dummy variable
indicating whether the CA was purchasing on behalf of another entity.
Also, to account for differences in competitiveness between industrial
sectors, we add potential bidders i.e., the number of potential competitors
as measured by the total number of suppliers observed in the database
in a particular sector46. To control for size effects, in absence of data on
annual expenditure of CAs, we included population, i.e., resident popu-
lation (in 1000) in the municipality of the CA town. Size effects may be
important, since larger towns may have more potential competitors in
auctions and larger CAs, which are likely to have more qualified human
resources.
Moreover, the availability of data about the identity of the CA and of the
winning firm, allowed to build measures of winning firm’s incumbency,
CA’s experience and favoritism. incumbency is the number of contracts
awarded to the winning firm by all the CA in the dataset in the previ-
ous tenders i.e., for each observation relative to a given firm we sum the
number of auctions previously won, including that of the current obser-
vation i 47. Similarly, CA experience is the number of contracts awarded
by each CA in the dataset in the previous tenders48.
Also, we introduce possible measures of favoritism of the CA either to-
ward a particular bidder or toward a particular category of bidders. As a
measure of favoritism to a particular bidder, we use repeated interact i.e.,
the number of contracts awarded to each winning firm by the same CA
in the previous tenders49. In principle, the presence of repeated interac-
45http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MEI_PRICES
46Bonaccorsi et al. (1999) also use this measure of competitiveness. However, this effect
could be already captured by sector fixed effects.
47A problem with this measure is that we do not have information on the tenders
awarded before the beginning date of our dataset. However, including year fixed effects
in the analysis should partially control for this potential truncation problem. Alternative
measures of incumbency used in the literature are the number of contracts awarded to each
firm by all the CA in the dataset (see e.g., Guccio et al. (2012)) and the maximum percentage
of adjudications to the same firm per year, weighted by the number of auctions (see e.g.,
Coviello and Gagliarducci (2010).
48Also in this case there is a potential problem of truncation. Bucciol et al. (2013) use the
log of this number. Branzoli and Decarolis (2015) use the number of auctions run in all the
sample period.
49Again, year fixed effects will be needed to account for truncation. Gil and Marion
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tions may simply indicate that the winning firm is the “best” on the mar-
ket (which should have a positive effect on rebate). On the other hand,
it could witness the presence of a repeated corrupt relationship (which
should have negative impact on rebate).
Favoritism can also occur on a geographical basis, insofar the CA may
prefer local firms even if they are not the best available suppliers, which
could have a negative effect on rebate. On the other hand, local firms
may naturally win more often since due to lower transportation and lo-
gistic costs they can afford to bid higher rebates. To check the direction
of this effect we introduce 4 dummies to indicate whether the winning
firm is registered in the same province of the CA (local win) or in the same
region (but different province) (regional win), or in the same country (but
different region), (national win) or if the winning firm is registered in an-
other country (international win)50.
To control for geographical effects we include province FE, i.e., a set of 110
dummies for Italian provinces. Importantly, by controlling for time in-
variant characteristics at the local level, province fixed effects should also
control for the levels of social capital, corruption and other long-term in-
stitutional characteristics which are unobservable.
To control for inter-sectoral heterogeneity we include sector FE, i.e., a set
of 42 dummies for all the macro industrial sectors as defined by the CPV
coding.
Last, we introduce year FE, namely a set of 4 indicators for the year of
award (2011-2014) to control for possible time effects.
We estimate equation 4.1 using OLS and clustering the standard errors
at sector level.
4.4.1 Empirical Evidence
In Table A.3 we report the OLS results from fitting different specifications
of equation 4.1 to the data.
The specification in Column 1 only includes the set of dummies for the
institutional class of the CA. The omitted category is municipality. Esti-
mates clearly show that all institutional classes perform better, in terms
of the average winning rebate they are able to induce, than municipal-
(2009) use a similar measure of repeated interaction in the context of subcontracting in
public works.
50Other papers in the literature use this information (i.e., whether the winning firm is reg-
istered in the same province/region of the CA) as a dependent variable (see e.g., Coviello
and Gagliarducci (2010) and Decarolis and Giorgiantonio (2014).
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ity (mountain council is the only class that seems to have a lower perfor-
mance, but its coefficient is never significant). In particular, among the
levels of government, the institutional class that performs best is central
government, followed by region and province. As for the other (i.e., non-
governmental) types of CA, concessionaire is in absolute the best perform-
ing class (better than central government), followed by institution and other
institution. The worst non-governmental CA class is public enterprise. In
particular, according to these first estimates, if a contract awarded by
a municipality were instead awarded by central government, the aver-
age rebate would increase by 7.6%, and by 7.4% if it were awarded by
a region (while the coefficient of province is not significant). As for the
non-governmental CA, the average rebate would increase by as much as
9.8% if the CA were a concessionaire rather than a municipality, by 6.2%
if it were a semi-autonomous institution, by 5.2% if it were some other
institution and by 4.8% if it were a public enterprise.
According to this preliminary evidence, municipal authorities seem to be
the least efficient among public purchasers. However, these results are
not fully reliable, since the specification in Column 1 does not control for
many other characteristics that are likely to influence the winning rebate.
Column 2 includes in the analysis province, sector and year fixed effects.
Province FE are jointly significant at 1% level, and the same is true for
sector FE51. The introduction of the FE reduces the magnitude of many
of the coefficients of the CA institutional classes, although preserving
their sign and significance. This indicates that unobservable local and
sectoral characteristics are important determinants of procurement per-
formance, and omitting them would crate bias in the estimates. While
the coefficient of central government falls just marginally, all other coeffi-
cients sensibly drop. In particular the coefficient of concessionaire drops
by more than 2%, meaning that, once sectoral and local characteristics
are accounted for, private concessionaires are not sensibly more efficient
than central government in procuring supplies and services (with respect
to municipalities). Also, the coefficient of region falls by more than 3%,
meaning that the performance lead of regions with respect to municipal-
ities is sensibly downsized when accounting for local and sectoral char-
acteristics. Still, these estimates my suffer from omitted variable bias.
Column 3 includes the most relevant controls among those discussed in
the previous sub-section. These are the award procedure, the award cri-
terion, the number of offers, the population of the municipality of the
51While year FE are not jointly significant.
93
CA, and the reserve price. As expected, most of these variables have a
relevant impact on average rebate, and further reduce most of the coeffi-
cients of interest. In particular, when controlling for these characteristics,
central government turns out to be in absolute the most efficient institu-
tional class with respect to municipalities. Moreover, the coefficients of
the controls have expected sign and significance. Using a restricted or
a negotiated procedure rather than an open procedure (reference cate-
gory), has, ceteris paribus, a negative impact on average rebate (-2.2% in
case of a restricted and even -10% in case of a negotiated without call52).
Adopting the criterion of the lowest price rather than the most econom-
ically advantageous offer (reference category) has a positive effect on re-
bate (+3.7%). The coefficients of population and of reserve price are equal
to 0 and not significant, possibly due to the fact that size effects may be
already captured by geographical fixed effects. Also, the coefficient of of-
fers number, albeit with the expected sign and significance, seems to have
a quite weak effect (1 more bidder in the tender makes average rebate
increase by hardly 1%). Suspecting a problem of functional misspecifica-
tion, in column 4 we replace the offers number with its natural logarithm,
which improves the fitting of the model53. This change in the functional
form of offers number also almost halves the coefficient of negotiated with-
out call, indicating that the two variables are likely correlated, which is
obvious insofar the award procedure is likely to sensibly drive the par-
ticipation in a tender.
In column 5 the remaining available variables are included. With the ex-
ception of regional win and international win, none of the new coefficients
is significant. For most of the variables, a plausible explanation is that
their effect is already captured by other regressors already included in
the analysis. For example, the effect of potential bidders is likely to be
already captured by the sectoral fixed effects. Also, the difference in reg-
ulation (ordinary vs utilities vs security) may have an effect on rebate only
through the choice of the award procedure54. The same can be true for
the effect of CA experience and repeated interact: a greater experience of
the CA, in terms of the number of auctions it has administered before
the auction under analysis, can have an impact on rebate only to the ex-
tent that a more experienced CA adopt some more appropriate (or less
52The coefficient of negotiated, albeit with the correct sign, is not significant.
53This can be ascertained by implementing usual diagnostic tests on linearity. Also, no-
tice that the adjusted R2 goes from 0.195 to 0.239.
54For example, as already said, the negotiated procedure can be used as a standard pro-
cedure in the utilities sectors but not in the ordinary sectors.
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appropriate but more illegally profitable) award procedure or award cri-
terion; similarly, the CA can choose a less competitive procedure or the
MET criterion in order to manipulate the award the contract in favor of
some preferred bidder55. As for incumbency, its effect is possibly already
captured by the number of bidders: if a firm is incumbent in a particular
market, it will be the only or among the few bidders in a tender relative
to that market.
The coefficients of international win and regional win are negative, indi-
cating that a not local winner may offer a lower rebate with respect to a
local winner (reference category) due to higher transportation or logistic
costs (with this effect increasing in case the winner is foreign).
Column 6 finally, includes only regressors that were found significant in
the previous specifications, in order to improve on the efficiency of the
estimates of interest. From this last specification, we conclude that the ev-
idence provided by Column 1 is essentially confirmed, namely that the
institutional class that has the best performance is central government
(rebate +6.6% with respect to municipalities) followed by concession-
aires (+ 5.5%), regions (+ 4.4%), semi-autonomous institutions (+4.2%),
other institutions (+3.5%) and public enterprises (+2.5%). The only CAs
which seem to behave on average worse than municipalities are moun-
tain councils (- 1.1%) but the coefficient is never significant (like the coef-
ficient of provinces (+ 1.8%)).
Also, the fact that the coefficients of interest have remained large and sig-
nificant after controlling for other relevant determinants of rebate such
as the award procedure, the award criterion and geographical and so-
cial factors, indicates that there are some intrinsic characteristics which
vary between institutional classes of CA which matter in explaining the
variation in procurement performance. We argue that such residual dif-
ferences in CAs much likely amount to the set of professional and tech-
nical competences and incentives owned by the human resources in the
CA. Specific competences as well as motivation are needed to admin-
ister properly the procurement process e.g., by estimating correctly the
reserve value and selecting the most appropriate award procedure and
criteria. Small CAs, such as most municipal authorities and public enter-
prises, naturally lack this kind of professionalism, differently from cen-
tral authorities, which can often rely on big technical offices.
Therefore, an explanation of why small decentralized units seem to per-
form relatively badly in procurement is that they miss those competences
55Similar explanations can be found for service and behalf
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and motivation which are needed to achieve best value for money when
purchasing. This result is particularly relevant when considering that
municipalities and public enterprises are the CA classes that currently
award most contracts in Italy56. This finding confirms the result of Guc-
cio et al. (2014), namely that municipalities, despite being the level of
government which awards most contracts, are by far the least efficient in
doing so. Also, our result is in line with the Bandiera et al. (2009) finding
that an important source of waste of public money in procurement is the
professional incompetence of the bureaucracy in charge of administering
the tenders, which is not able to select the best offer available57.
Therefore, even if our results are preliminary and cannot be automati-
cally given a causal interpretation, there seems to be a systematic and
statistically evidence that 1) there is a general performance mismatch in
the Italian system of public procurement, in the sense that the CAs that
are responsible for the largest procurement volumes in Italy (i.e., munic-
ipalities and public enterprises), are also the least efficient in procuring
and 2) at the basis of this performance gap is much probably the fact
that small decentralized units cannot achieve the efficient level of pro-
curement competences (in terms of specialized and motivated human
resources) which are needed to set up efficient procurement practices. In
Section 5 we discuss some policy implications.
4.4.2 Robustness Checks
Our OLS analysis might be affected by three problems. First, regression
residuals are clearly not normal. This can be ascertained both graph-
ically from Figure A.3, where the Kernel density function of residuals
is plotted against a Normal density function, and by implementing the
standard Shapiro-Wilk test, which strongly rejects the null hypothesis of
normality58.
The second problem is potential sample selection bias. Our sample of in-
terest excluded categories of auctions for which the rebate can be system-
atically lower (or higher) so that we might observe auctions with smaller
(respectively, higher) rebate as a result of a selection bias and interpret
56The Italian Courts of Auditors have often highlighted criticism relative to the inefficient
and corrupt management of public enterprises.
57Differently from our results, however, they find that the most wasteful institutional
class is central government.
58The test was implemented for specification 6 of Table A.3, with a value of the test of
14.834 (p-value = 0.00000).
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that as a less (respectively, more) virtuous behavior of the CA59.
The third potential problem has to do with errors in variables, due to the
relatively poor quality of the data. While the third problem is difficult to
address, we can check the robustness of our results against the two other
problems60.
Non-normality of residuals does not pose problems of bias or inconsis-
tency of estimates, but makes hypothesis testing not reliable, since stan-
dard errors and hence t-statistics may be wrong. The problem of non-
normality of residuals in our data is most likely due to the fact that the
dependent variable is a percentage, so it is bounded. When there are
many observations pushed up against the bound - as it is the case in our
data, where a peak is observed at 0 - residuals are typically not normal.
According to the technical literature (see e.g., Baum (2008)), a strategy for
handling proportion data in which zeros and ones as well as intermedi-
ate values are plausible was proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
This method accounts to a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) which uses
the logit link function (i.e., the logit transformation of the response vari-
able) and the binomial distribution, which may be a good choice of fam-
ily even if the response is continuous. This technique can be used to gen-
erate predictions from the model and transform them back into the units
of the response variable. This approach is preferred to that of dropping
the observations with zero or unit values, which would create a trunca-
tion problem61.
In Column 2 of Table A.4 we report the estimates of the GLM regres-
sion run on the specification in Column 6 of TableA.3. For comparability
reasons, the latter is reported in Column 1 of Table A.4, with the only dif-
ference that the dependent variable rebate is expressed in decimal rather
than percentage form, since the GLM method can be used only when the
dependent variable is between 0 and 1. It can be seen that the sign and
the significance of coefficients of interest remain unchanged, indicating
that the non-normality of residuals did not affect severely the inference
59In particular this may concern tenders awarded to a temporary consortium of firms
(ATI) and those awarded in multi-lots, which have been excluded from the analysis.
60Usual diagnostics checks have shown that there are no relevant problems of multi-
collinearity or of non-linearity. Potential influence problems were addressed by dropping
outliers, while heteroscedasticity and correlation of errors were addressed by clustering
errors at the sector level for all specifications.
61The GLM approach, while properly handling both zeros and ones, does not allow for
an alternative model of behavior generating the limit values (0 and 1). However, in our
context there is no reason to believe that different factors generate the observations at the
limit points, so that this should not be a source of sample selection issues.
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in our case.
Next we address potential sample selection bias. To do so, we run re-
gressions over different subsamples of the original samples in order to
reduce the variability and, this way, sample selection in the data (e.g.,
see Bucciol et al. (2013)., Decarolis (2014), Guccio et al. (2014)). If esti-
mates obtained with subsamples are similar to those obtained with the
full dataset it is suggested that sample selection is not driving the previ-
ous findings62.
Specifications in Columns 3-5 of Table A.4 run the same model as Col-
umn 6 of Table A.3, but on different subsamples of data. In Column 3
the subsample of interest corresponds to those contracts belonging to the
5 most frequent industrial sectors in the dataset63. Column 4 considers
only contracts awarded in the North, and Column 5 only contracts rel-
ative to ordinary sectors. Estimates confirm the robustness of our main
findings.
Two further robustness checks that we have implemented are shown in
column 6 and 7, in which we have respectively changed the clustering
of standard errors from the sector to the province level, and changed
the geographical fixed effects from the province level to the region level.
Again, results confirm the robustness of findings of interest.
Overall, there is evidence about the robustness of the main result of the
analysis, namely that small decentralized purchasing units, and in par-
ticular municipalities and public enterprises, are ceteris paribus less effi-
cient than more central purchasers in administering public procurement
of supplies and services.
4.5 Conclusion
In this work we used the TED data to provide some preliminary em-
pirical evidence on the relationship between the degree of centralization
of a procurement system and its performance. For this purpose, we fo-
cused on the procurement of supplies and services in Italy, which is a
convenient case study, insofar all levels of governments (plus a number
62Notice that given the non-normality of errors, no Heckman correction methods can be
applied in this case.
63As already said, these are “sewage, refuse, cleaning and environmental services”
(12.5% of the sample), “health and social work services” (8.5%), “medical equipment, phar-
maceuticals and personal care products” (7.8%), “repair and maintenance services” (7.2%)
and “transport equipment and auxiliary products to transportation” (7%)
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of other categories of public institutions) are involved in procurement
and follow substantially the same rules.
Using winning rebate as a measure of procurement performance, we
found that more decentralized units are generally less efficient than more
central units in procuring goods and services. In particular, municipali-
ties and public enterprises turned out to be the least efficient purchasers,
while central government the most efficient one. This result remained
true even after controlling for other important determinants of rebate,
such as award procedure and criterion, contract-authority size and local
characteristics, which also account for the quality of local institutions.
This suggested that performance is affected by some unobservable char-
acteristics which vary between institutional classes of public purchasers.
We argued that these unobservables much likely amount to the endow-
ment of specialized competences and incentives of procurement profes-
sionals employed in the contracting authority. Most contracting author-
ities in Italy are too small to be able to achieve an efficient dimension of
the technical offices in charge of procurement, and hence are much likely
to lack all the proper professional competences needed to set up effi-
cient procurement practices and achieve best value for money in procure-
ment. Bureaucratic incompetence is therefore confirmed to be a possibly
much relevant source of waste of public money, as was already found by
Bandiera et al. (2009). These considerations seem particularly relevant
when considering that municipalities and public enterprises are the cat-
egories of public purchasers that currently award most contracts in Italy.
In conclusion, although our results are preliminary and cannot be di-
rectly interpreted as casual implications, there is evidence that 1) there is
a general performance gap in the Italian system of public procurement,
in the sense that the classes of contracting authorities that award most
contracts are also the least efficient in doing so; and 2) at the basis of this
performance gap is most likely a lack, in most contracting authorities, of
competent and specialized professionals.
Therefore, a policy implication suggested by our results, is that the de-
gree of decentralization of procurement in Italy should be reconsidered
and downsized. The number of contracting authorities should be sub-
stantially reduced, so that it would be possible to concentrate in those
remaining qualified and specialized human resources. These profession-
als should also be well remunerated, which would foster motivation and
reduce the incentives for corruption and collusion. An option for imple-
menting this rationalization could be to strongly reduce or eliminate the
possibility for (smaller) municipalities to act as contracting authorities,
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and shifting their share of procurement at upper levels, like provinces
(for less standardized goods), which are close to local needs, or regions
(for more standardized goods), which are both likely to have better com-
petences than municipalities, and would also allow for some degree of
purchase aggregation. This partial centralization would also ensure that
SMEs are not handicapped with respect to larger competitors64.
In sectors where potential economies of scale are larger or the govern-
ment is a dominant purchaser - most notably defense and health - pro-
curement should be probably fully centralized, in order to enable the
public purchaser to fully exploit bargaining power and achieve poten-
tially large savings (Dimitri et al. (2006a)). For example, health procure-
ment nowadays largely occurs on a very decentralized basis, i.e., single
hospitals and other local health authorities independently procure what
they need. In this sector there are potentially substantial missed gains
from centralization65. In these purchases where full centralization is de-
sirable, a more extensive use could be done of the national procurement
agency - Consip - which has an internationally acknowledged reputation
of efficiency and best practice. Also, some measures should be imple-
mented to ensure that SMEs are not disadvantaged66.
Also, it could be valuable to centralize and streamline the collection on
procurement data, which would enable to detect wastes and other po-
tential problems on time.
64See e.g., Gustavo Piga’s considerations at http://www.gustavopiga.it.
65According to Dimitri et al. (2006a), in some specific markets for sophisticated medical
equipment (e.g., MR, ecotomography) the government is virtually a monopsonist.
66A possibility is to provide set-asides, as it is currently the case in the US.
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Appendix A
A.1 Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1.1 Game-theoretic Definition of the Game
In game-theoretic terms, our elimination all-pay contest with non-sunk
bids can be defined as an extensive game with complete information
and simultaneous moves (see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Ch.6). The
game is described by the following elements:
1. A set of players: N = {1, 2, ..., N}.
2. A set of histories: H = {hk, 0 ≤ k ≤ K}, where h0 is the empty se-
quence (i.e., ∅) and hr = (xk)k=1,...,r with r ≤ K.
Each member ofH is a history, i.e., a sequence of profiles of actions
taken by players. A history hr is terminal if r = K. The set of ter-
minal histories is called Z . The set of actions available for players
after history hr is A(hr) = {xr+1 : (hr, xr+1) ∈ H}.
3. A player function P that assigns to each non terminal history (each
member of H\Z) a set of members of N . P(hr) being the set of
players who take an action after history hr:
P(h0) = {1, 2, ..., N} ,P(hr) = {i : xri ≥ xr(qr)} (A.1)
xr(1) ≥ xr(2) ≥ ... ≥ xr(qr)
4. For each player i a preference relationi on Z . These preferences are
represented by the payoff function of player i at the final stage K,
i.e.,
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Πi(h
K) =

vi −
∑K
k=1 x
k
i , if {xKi > xK(qK)}or{xKi = xK(qK)and rem. prizes > ties}
vi/mK −
∑K
k=1 x
k
i , if {i ties at xK(qK)and ties > rem. prizes}
−∑rk=1 xki (r ≤ K), otherwise
(A.2)
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Arguments needed for the characterization of the equilibrium in this case
are totally analogous to those used by Hillman and Riley (1989) and Hill-
man and Samet (1987) for characterizing the equilibria of the one-stage
all-pay auction, respectively for the asymmetric and the symmetric case.
The only difference is that in place of players’ ex-ante valuations vi, we
will consider here players’ net valuations at Stage-a, NVi. For the sake
of clarity, in the following we reformulate all the main arguments so that
they fit our case.
Lemma A.1 No pure-strategy equilibrium can exist in the Stage-b subgame,
neither in the “asym-asym” case nor in the “asym-sym” case.
Proof.
“Asym-asym” case. For any bid of the other player which is below the
lower net valuation NVL, each player has an incentive to slightly over-
bid the other player, so that there is a race to the top until NVL (there is
no equilibrium below NVL). There is no equilibrium above NVL either,
since player L will never bid more than her net valuation, and conse-
quently neither player H would bid above. Also, there is no equilibrium
for ties at NVL, since player L would be better off bidding zero, and the
race to the top would start again. Therefore, the “asym-asym” case can-
not have an equilibrium in pure strategies.
“Asym-sym” case. For any bid of the other player which is below the com-
mon net valuation NVS , each player has an incentive to slightly overbid
the other player, so that there is a race to the top until NVS (there is
no equilibrium below NVS). There is no equilibrium above NVS either,
since no player will bid more than her net valuation. Also, players will
never tie at NVS , since they are better off by bidding zero. Therefore
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the “ asym-sym” case neither can have an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Q.E.D
Lemma A.2 No player will, in equilibrium, ever spend a positive amount with
strictly positive probability, i.e., equilibrium strategies are continuous mixed
strategies.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that player i spends some xbi = β > 0
with strictly positive probability. Then player j will always beat that bid
with a marginally greater bid (the probability that j beats i rises discon-
tinuously as a function of xbj at x
b
j = β). Therefore, there is some  > 0
such that j will bid in the interval [(β − ), β] with zero probability. But
then, agent i would be better off by bidding β−  rather than β, since her
probability of winning would be the same, contradicting the hypothesis
that xbi = β is an equilibrium strategy in the subgame.
Lemma A.3 In equilibrium the two players must have the same maximum
spending level.
Proof. From Lemma A.2 it follows that, if x¯bi is player i’s maximum spend-
ing level, player j wins with probability 1 by spending x¯bi and vice versa.
Hence, the upper bound of the support is the same for both players and
it is equal to NVL in the “asym-asym” case and NVS in the “asym-sym”
case.
Lemma A.4 In equilibrium the minimum outlay is zero for each player.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that player i picks xbi = β > 0 as her
minimum bid (i.e., she spends less than xbi = β > 0 with zero probabil-
ity). Then, any bid in the interval (0, β) would yield a negative payoff to
player j, since the probability of winning is zero in that interval. Since
player j can always bid zero, it follows that she neither will bid in the
interval (0, β). But then player i could reduce her bid below β without
changing her probability of winning, contradicting the hypothesis that
agent i’s optimal minimum spending level was some β > 0. Hence, the
lower bound of the support is the same for both players and it is equal to
zero.
Given these results, if we define 1 − Fi(xbi) to be the probability that
player i spends more than xbi , then Fi(x
b
i) is continuous over (0,∞). If
0 < Fi(0) < 1 then player i spends a strictly positive amount with prob-
ability less than 1 and her alternative is to spend zero.
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Lemma A.5 At most one agent bids zero with strictly positive probability.
Proof. If both players bid zero with positive probability then each has
a chance of winning. However, this will not occur in equilibrium, for
if one player spends zero with positive probability, the other can with
an arbitrarily small positive bid increase her probability of winning and
hence her expected payoff.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Player i’s expected payoff (with i = {H,L, S}) is:
EΠi(h
b) = (vi−xai −xbi)Fj(xbi)+(−xai −xbi)[1−Fj(xbi)] = viFj(xbi)−xai −xbi
(A.3)
Equilibrium requires that, for any bid in her support, each player
earns a constant expected payoff, given the mixed strategy of the other
player.
The equilibrium condition we need to impose for player i is therefore as
follows:
EΠi(h
b) = viFj(x
b
i)− xai − xbi = u∗i ∀xbi ∈ [0, NVn] (A.4)
where u∗i is a constant and n ∈ {L, S}. Setting xbi = NVn, we are able
to derive the expression for player i’s equilibrium expected payoff:
u∗i = NVi −NVn (A.5)
Therefore for the “asym-asym” case we have the two following cases:
Case1. If player i is shortlisted with the lower net valuation, i.e., i = L and
NVi = NVL, then she will get on average a zero equilibrium payoff,
u∗L = 0.
Case2. If player i is shortlisted with the higher net valuation, i.e., i = H and
NVi = NVH , then she will get on average a positive equilibrium
payoff, u∗H = NVH −NVL > 0.
whereas for the “asym-sym” case we have NVi = NVj = NVS , so
that both of them will on average get a zero equilibrium payoff u∗S = 0.
Consequently, the equilibrium conditions for the “asym-asym” case
will be as follows:
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EΠH(h
b) = vHFL(x
b
H)−xaH−xbH = NVH−NVL ∀xbH ∈ [0, NVL] (A.6)
EΠL(h
b) = vLFH(x
b
L)− xaL − xbL = 0 ∀xbL ∈ [0, NVL] (A.7)
The equilibrium mixed strategies are uniquely determined as the so-
lutions of the system of the two above equations, and are as follows:
FL(x
b
L) =
{
NVH−NVL
vH
+
xaH+x
b
L
vH
, ∀xbL ∈ [0, NVL)
1, ∀xbL ≥ NVL
(A.8)
FH(x
b
H) =
{
xaL+x
b
H
vL
, ∀xbH ∈ [0, NVL)
1, ∀xbH ≥ NVL
(A.9)
On the other hand, the equilibrium conditions for the “asym-sym”
case are as follows:
EΠi(h
b) = viFj(x
b
i)− xai − xbi = 0 ∀xbi ∈ [0, NVS ] (A.10)
EΠj(h
b) = vjFi(x
b
j)− xaj − xbj = 0 ∀xbj ∈ [0, NVS ] (A.11)
from which the following equilibrium strategies are uniquely deter-
mined:
Fi(x
b
i ) =
{
xaj+x
b
i
vj
, ∀xbi ∈ [0, NVS)
1, ∀xbi ≥ NVS
(A.12)
Fj(x
b
j) =
{
xai +x
b
j
vi
, ∀xbj ∈ [0, NVS)
1, ∀xbj ≥ NVS
(A.13)
Therefore in both the “asym-asym” case and in the “asym-sym” case,
the Stage-b subgame has a unique asymmetric equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies Q.E.D.
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A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4
The proof is articulated in two parts. We first prove that the triple (xa1 =
, xa2 = 0, x
a
3 = 0) is an equilibrium of the Stage-a all-pay auction, and
then that it is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium.
Proof that the triple (xa1 = , xa2 = 0, xa3 = 0) is an equilibrium of Stage-
a all-pay auction
We need to check whether any player has any incentive to deviate.
Consider player 1 first. Obviously, she would never deviate upward,
but we need to check that in fact she does not find it profitable to bid
zero rather than a positive amount. Player 1 will profitably deviate iff
the expected payoff of deviating is higher than the expected payoff of
not-deviating, namely 1:
EΠ1(x
a
1 = 0, x
a∗
−1) > EΠ1(x
a∗) (A.14)
Notice that if player 1 deviates, so that all players bid zero, the marginal
bid is zero and we are in the “more marginal bidders than tickets” case
and ties are broken randomly. In this case two possible events may occur:
• with probability 2/3 player 1 is shortlisted. In that case she will
meet player 2 with probability 1/3 and player 3 with probabil-
ity 1/3. By Proposition 2.3 we have that, given equality between
bids, player 1 will always have NVH whoever the other shortlisted
player among player 2 and 3 will be. Her expected continuation
payoff will be u∗1 = NV1 −NVi = v1 − vi, with i ∈ {2, 3};
• with probability 1/3 player 1 is not shortlisted. However she makes
no loss since her bid is zero.
The expected payoff from deviating is hence:
EΠ1(x
a
1 = 0, x
a∗
−1) =
1
3
(v1 − v2) + 1
3
(v1 − v3) (A.15)
On the other hand, when player 1 does not deviate and bids  > 0,
she is shortlisted and pays her bid with certainty. With probability 1/2
player 1 will meet player 2 and with probability 1/2 she will meet player
3, but whether she will have NVH , NVL or NVS depends on :
1Remember that each possible history of length-1 is a profile of actions, so that ha = xa,
with xa ∈ R3+.
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if  < v1 − vi (with i ∈ {2, 3}): thenNV1 > NVi, i.e., v1− > vi, so that
1 = H and u∗1 = NV1 −NVi = (v1 − )− vi.
if  > v1 − vi: then NV1 < NVi, so that 1 = L and u∗1 = 0
if  = v1 − vi: then NV1 = NVS , so that 1 = S and u∗1 = 0
Therefore, for the expected payoff of not deviating one should make
three cases 2:
EΠ1(x
a∗) =

1
2
(v1 − v2) + 12 (v1 − v3)− , if 0 <  < v1 − v2
1
2
(v1 − − v3), if v1 − v2 ≤  < v1 − v3
0, if  ≥ v1 − v3
(A.16)
Remember that continuation payoffs are expressed in terms of net
valuations, so that they take into account Stage-a bids. Interpretation is
that player L (who gets a zero continuation payoff) is able on average
to exactly cover the sum of her outlays, whereas player H on average is
able to more than cover the sum of her outlays.
It is clear that the payoff function in Equation A.16 is maximized
when  is as closest as possible to zero (of course it must be strictly pos-
itive, otherwise she would be deviating) so that player 1 will optimally
choose the smallest  above zero 3. Therefore, to see when it is profitable
to deviate for player 1 (Equation A.14) we need to compare the payoff
of deviating (Equation A.15) with only the first line of the payoff of not
deviating (Equation A.16). We easily get that the condition in Equation
A.14 holds iff :
 >
1
3
v1 − 1
6
(v2 + v3) (A.17)
Since the  that player 1 optimally chooses is as close as possible to
zero, she will never find it profitable to deviate.
Consider now player 2. From Proposition 2.3 we know that she does
not find it convenient neither to overlap nor to overbid player 1, since
this way she would be shortlisted with NVL with certainty. Hence, the
2Notice that since v1 > v2 > v3, when the condition  ≤ v1 − v2 holds, then it also
holds that  < v1 − v3. Specularly, when  ≥ v1 − v3, then  > v1 − v2.
3The fact that the optimal  is undetermined is due to the tie-breaking rule. If tie-
breaking were in favor of player 1 (i.e., player 1 wins in all ties), player 1 would optimally
bid exactly zero.
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only possibly profitable deviation would be to underbid player 1 by an
amount δ. Therefore, player 2 will deviate iff :
EΠ2(x
a
2 = (− δ), xa∗−2) > EΠ2(xa∗) (A.18)
If player 2 does not deviate and bids zero, she has 1
2
probability to
get shortlisted. In that case she meets player 1 and always get shortlisted
with the NVL, since by the maximization problem of player 1 (Equation
A.16) we have that player 1’s optimal bid  is such that NV1 > NV2, so
that player 2’s expected payoff from shortlisting is 0. With 1
2
probability
she is not shortlisted and she gets an actual payoff of zero, since she bid
zero. Therefore:
EΠ2(x
a∗) = 0 (A.19)
On the other hand, if player 2 deviates and underbids player 1, she
gets shortlisted with certainty. She happens to have NVH (and hence get
a positive payoff u∗2 = NV2 −NV1) iff
v2 − (− δ) > v1 − → v1 − v2 < δ ∀ > 0 (A.20)
Otherwise she has NVL (and gets u∗2 = 0).
Notice that since δ <  by definition, then we have that the condition
from player 1’s maximization problem (Equation A.16) i.e.  < v1 − v2,
implies δ < v1 − v2, so that the condition above on δ is never met, and:
EΠ2(x
a
2 = (− δ), xa∗−2) = 0 (A.21)
Therefore player 2 never finds it profitable to deviate.
Also, notice that since v2 > v3, then δ < v1 − v2 implies δ < v1 − v3, so
that player 3 neither has any incentive to deviate.
Therefore, since no player has any incentive to deviate, we can conclude
that (xa1 = (' 0), xa2 = xa3 = 0) is an equilibrium of Stage-a all-pay
auction Q.E.D.
Proof that the triple (xa1 = , xa2 = 0, xa3 = 0) is the unique equilibrium
of Stage-a all-pay auction
The proof is by contradiction and articulated in lemmas.
Lemma A.6 No triple of the form (xai > xaj > xak), with xak ≥ 0, can be an
equilibrium.
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Proof. Suppose it is. Then no player has any profitable deviation. Con-
sider players i and j. Either vi > vj or vj > vi. If vi > vj , then by
Proposition 2.3 i makes a profitable deviation by underbidding (at limit
overlapping) to xaj . On the other hand, if vj > vi, then i makes a prof-
itable deviation by bidding zero. Therefore (xai > xaj > xak) is never an
equilibrium Q.E.D.
Lemma A.7 No triple of the form (xai = xaj > xak), with xak ≥ 0, can be an
equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose it is. Then no player has any profitable deviation. Again,
consider players i and j. Either vi > vj or vj > vi. If vi > vj , then j makes
a profitable deviation by bidding zero. On the other hand, if vj > vi, then
i makes a profitable deviation by bidding zero. Therefore (xai = xaj > xak)
is never an equilibrium Q.E.D.
Lemma A.8 No triple of the form (xai = xaj = xak), with xak ≥ 0, can be an
equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose it is. Then no player has any profitable deviation. There
are two possible cases:
3.1 (xai = xaj = xak = 0)
We have just proved that player 1 finds it always profitable to bid
a positive amount rather than zero. Therefore 1 makes a profitable
deviation by bidding a positive amount rather than zero.
3.2 (xai = xaj = xak > 0)
Player 3 makes a profitable deviation by bidding zero rather than a
positive amount.
In both cases we reach a contradiction with the initial assumption, so that
(xai = xaj = xak) can never be an equilibrium Q.E.D.
Corollary A.1 From Lemmas A.6-A.8 it follows that all plausible equilibria
must be of the form (xai > xaj = xak), with xak ≥ 0.
Lemma A.9 No triple of the form (xa3 > xa1 = xa2), with xa1 = xa2 ≥ 0 can be
an equilibrium (i.e., player 3 cannot be the highest bidder).
Proof. Suppose it is. Then no player has any profitable deviation. But
player 3 does a profitable deviation by bidding zero rather than a positive
amount. Therefore (xa3 > xa1 = xa2) cannot be an equilibrium Q.E.D.
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Lemma A.10 No triple of the form (xa2 > xa1 = xa3), with xa1 = xa3 ≥ 0 can be
an equilibrium (i.e., player 2 cannot be the highest bidder).
Proof. Suppose it is. Then no player has any profitable deviation.
Consider player 1. We need to check whether she has any incentive to
slightly overbid player 3, such that xa1
′ = xa3 +  ≤ xa2 , with  > 0.
If she does not deviate she will get shortlisted with probability 1/2. In
this case she will meet player 2 and by Proposition 2.3 she will always
have theNVH , and get a positive continuation payoff u∗1 = NV1−NV2 =
v1 − xa1 − (v2 − xa2). With probability 1/2 she will not get shortlisted and
will incur a loss equal to her bid, u∗1 = −xa1 , with xa1 ≥ 0. Therefore, the
expected payoff of non deviating is:
EΠ1(x
a∗) =
1
2
(v1 − v2 + xa2)− xa1 (A.22)
Now suppose that she deviates and bids xa1
′ = xa3 +  = x
a
1 + , with
xa1 = x
a
3 ≥ 0. In this case she will get shortlisted with certainty, and
always with NVH , so that the expected payoff from deviating is:
EΠ1(x
a
1
′ = (xa1 + ), x
a∗
−1) = v1 − v2 + xa2 − xa1 −  (A.23)
from which we easily get that
∀ : 0 <  < 1
2
(v1 − v2 + xa2) (A.24)
it holds that
EΠ1(x
a
1
′ = (xa1 + ), x
a∗
−1) > EΠ1(x
a∗) (A.25)
i.e., player 1 will find it convenient to deviate. Notice that player 1
will optimally choose an  which is closest as possible to zero, so that
Equation A.25 will always hold and player 1 will always deviate. There-
fore the triple (xa2 > xa1 = xa3), with xa1 = xa3 ≥ 0 cannot be an equilibrium
Q.E.D.
Corollary A.2 From the previous steps it follows readily that the only possible
equilibrium of the Stage-a all-pay auction is (xa1 =  ∼= 0, xa2 = xa3 = 0).
Moreover since the optimal xa1 is very close to zero, it will always be the case
that NV1 > NV2 if player 2 is shortlisted, and NV1 > NV3 if player 3 is
shortlisted, so that only the “asym-asym” case occurs in equilibrium.
Q.E.D
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A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 2.5
We know from Equations 2.6 and 2.7 that, in the event a player gets short-
listed (which we will refer to as SH in the following for notational conve-
nience), she will get a positive continuation payoff iff her net valuation
will be higher than the net valuation of the other shortlisted player, and a
zero continuation payoff if her net valuation will be lower or equal than
her opponent’s; if instead she does not get shortlisted (NO-SH in the fol-
lowing), she will incur a loss equal to her Stage-a bid. Therefore, each
player i’s expected payoff from playing mixed strategies in Stage-a is as
follows:
EΠi(h
a) = (NVi −NVj)P (NVi > NVj |i, j SH)P (i, j SH)+
+ (NVi −NVk)P (NVi > NVk|i, k SH)P (i, k SH)− xaiP (i NO-SH)
(A.26)
with i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Remember that a couple of players i, j get shortlisted with certainty if
their Stage-a bids are the two highest i.e., we have either (xai > xaj > xak)
or (xaj > xai > xak) or (xai = xaj > xak) . On the other hand, when either
(xai > xaj = xak) or (xaj > xai = xak) occur, there is
1
2
probability that
both i and j are shortlisted, whereas in case (xai = xaj = xak), there is
1
3
probability that both i and j are shortlisted. Since events are mutually
exclusive, the probability that the couple of players i, j are shortlisted is
as follows:
P (i, j SH) = P (xai > x
a
j > x
a
k) + P (x
a
j > x
a
i > x
a
k) + P (x
a
i = x
a
j > x
a
k)
+
1
2
P (xai > x
a
j = x
a
k) +
1
2
P (xaj > x
a
i = x
a
k) +
1
3
P (xai = x
a
j = x
a
k)
(A.27)
On the other hand, in the events (xai < xaj < xak), (xai < xak < xaj )
and (xai < xaj = xak) player i never gets shortlisted, whereas in the events
(xai = xak < xaj ), (xai = xaj < xak) and (xai = xaj = xak) there is a posi-
tive probability that player i does not get shortlisted (respectively, 1
2
in
the first two events and 1
3
in the third). Therefore the probability of no
shortlisting for player i (with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is:
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P (i NO-SH.) = P (xai < x
a
j < x
a
k) + P (x
a
i < x
a
k < x
a
j ) + P (x
a
i < x
a
j = x
a
k)
+
1
2
P (xaj > x
a
i = x
a
k) +
1
2
P (xak > x
a
i = x
a
j ) +
1
3
P (xai = x
a
j = x
a
k)
(A.28)
Similarly to what noticed for the pure-strategy analysis, we have here
that relatively stronger players have an advantage over weaker ones,
since they can restrict optimally their support so to make sure to get a
positive continuation payoff, conditional on shortlisting.
In fact, one can see that by choosing the interval [0, v1 − v2) as her sup-
port, player 1 makes it sure that for any bid she may plausibly expect
from player j ∈ {2, 3}, i.e., for all xaj ∈ [0, vj)4, it will always be true that
xa1 < (v1 − vj) + xaj , so that P (NV1 > NVj |1, j SH) = 1 and P (NVj >
NV1|1, j SH) = 0. Therefore, player 1 is able to optimally choose the
support to make it sure that, in case she gets shortlisted, she will have
the higher net valuation, and hence get a positive continuation payoff,
regardless of whom the other shortlisted player is.
On her hand, player 2 can do a similar reasoning and pick [0, v2 − v3) as
her support, which ensures that in case she gets shortlisted with player 3,
she always has the higher net valuation and gets a positive continuation
payoff: for any plausible bid from player 3 - i.e., for all xa3 ∈ [0, v3) - it will
always hold that xa2 < (v2 − v3) + xa3 , so that P (NV2 > NV3|2,3 SH) = 1
and P (NV3 > NV2|2,3 SH) = 0 , whereas she knows that if she gets
shortlisted with Player 1 she will get a zero continuation payoff.
Consequently, player 3 knows that in case she gets shortlisted, she can-
not do nothing to prevent her opponent to have the higher net valuation.
So she expects a zero continuation payoff from shortlisting regardless of
whom the other shortlisted player is.
Note that the presence of an upper bound on players’ rational bidding
has an impact on the probability of shortlisting, but players do not have
an interest in getting shortlisted if they expect not to take a positive con-
tinuation payoff: their goal is to maximize their expected payoff, rather
than getting shortlisted per se.
Given the considerations above, we have that players’ expected payoffs
from randomizing in Stage-a are as follows:
4Notice that no player would bid her own entire valuation in Stage-a, since in case she
gets shortlisted she will have no resources left to bid in Stage-b, so that the other shortlisted
player would be able to win with an infinitesimal amount, making her losing the entire
budget.
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EΠ1(h
a) = (NV1−NV2)P (1,2 SH)+(NV1−NV3)P (1,3 SH)−xa1P (1 NO-SH)
(A.29)
EΠ2(h
a) = (NV2 −NV3)P (2,3 SH)− xa2P (2 NO-SH) (A.30)
EΠ3(h
a) = −xa3P (3 NO-SH) (A.31)
Since EΠ3(ha) ≤ 0, player 3 never finds it convenient to randomize
and, due to Assumption 2.2 in the model, we conclude that player 3 will
bid zero with probability 1, i.e., P (xa3 = 0) = 1.
Considering that (i) players randomize independently, (ii) given xa3 = 0
then P (xai < xa3) = 0 (with i ∈ {1, 2}) and (iii) P (xai = xaj ) = 1− P (xai >
xaj ) − P (xai < xaj ) ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we can explicit the expected payoff
of Player 1 (Equation A.29) as follows:
EΠ1(h
a) = (NV1 −NV2)[P (xa1 > xa2)P (xa2 > xa3) + P (xa2 > xa1)P (xa1 > xa3)+
+ (1− P (xa1 > xa2)− P (xa1 < xa2))P (xa2 > xa3) +
1
2
P (xa1 > x
a
2)(1− P (xa2 > xa3))+
+
1
2
P (xa2 > x
a
1)(1− P (xa1 > xa3)) +
1
3
(1− P (xa1 > xa2)− P (xa1 < xa2))(1− P (xa2 > xa3))]+
+ (NV1 −NV3)[ 1
2
P (xa1 > x
a
2)(1− P (xa2 > xa3))+
+
1
3
(1− P (xa1 > xa2)− P (xa1 < xa2))(1− P (xa2 > xa3))]− xa1 [P (xa1 < xa2)(1− P (xa2 > xa3))+
+
1
2
P (xa2 > x
a
1)(1− P (xa1 > xa3)) +
1
3
(1− P (xa1 > xa2)− P (xa1 < xa2))(1− P (xa2 > xa3))]
(A.32)
Notice that in Equation A.32, we assumed that Player 1’s support is
[0, v1 − v2), so that she might play zero with a positive probability. In the
following we show that Player 1’s expected payoff from keeping zero in
the mix, i.e., randomizing over [0, v1−v2) is lower than the expected pay-
off she could get by dropping the bid on 0 from the mix, i.e., randomizing
over (0, v1 − v2).
By imposing P (xa1 > 0) = 1 in Equation A.32, we can calculate
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EΠ1(mix on (0, v1 − v2)) = (NV1 −NV2)[P (xa1 > xa2)P (xa2 > xa3)+
+ (1− P (xa1 > xa2)− P (xa1 < xa2))P (xa2 > xa3) + P (xa2 > xa1)+
+
1
2
P (xa1 > x
a
2)(1− P (xa2 > xa3)) +
1
3
(1− P (xa1 > xa2)− P (xa1 < xa2))(1− P (xa2 > xa3))]+
+ (NV1 −NV3)[ 1
2
P (xa1 > x
a
2)(1− P (xa2 > xa3))+
+
1
3
(1− P (xa1 > xa2)− P (xa1 < xa2))(1− P (xa2 > xa3))]+
− xa1 [P (xa1 < xa2)(1− P (xa2 > xa3)) +
1
3
(1− P (xa1 > xa2)− P (xa1 < xa2))(1− P (xa2 > xa3))]
(A.33)
By imposing EΠ1(mix on (0, v1 − v2)) ≥ EΠ1(mix on [0, v1 − v2)) =
EΠ1(h
a) we get the condition (v1 − v2)(1− P (xa1 > 0)) + xa2(1− P (xa1 >
0)) ≥ 0 which is always true. Therefore player 1 will optimally never
put mass on zero. From Equation A.30 we know that the only chance
for player 2 to get a positive expected payoff from randomizing is to get
shortlisted with 3. But the probability that both player 2 and player 3
will be shortlisted is 0, since we know that player 1 will get shortlisted
with certainty. Therefore, player 2 neither has any advantage from ran-
domizing, since if she gets shortlisted she will meet player 1 for sure, and
hence get a zero continuation payoff. By Assumption 2.2 in the model we
conclude that also player 2 prefers to bid zero with probability 1 rather
than randomizing. Given that players 2 and 3 play zero with probability
1, player 1 will optimally bid a infinitesimal positive amount , and we
are back to the pure-strategy case.
Therefore there is no mixed strategy equilibrium for the Stage-a all-pay
auction Q.E.D.
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 2.7
Notice that since Stage-a yields basically no revenue, the relevant com-
parison is between the Stage-b all-pay auction and the standard all-pay
auction with two asymmetric players. Recalling from Baye et al. (1996)
the equilibrium of the standard asymmetric all-pay auction (with v1 >
v2), {
F1(x1) =
x1
v2
∀x1 ∈ [0, v2]
F2(x2) =
v1−v2+x2
v1
∀x2 ∈ [0, v2]
(A.34)
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we have that player 1’s spending is distributed uniformly on the in-
terval [0, v2], and so her expected outlay is E[x1] = v2/2.
Conditional upon bidding positive, player 2’s outlay also is distributed
uniformly on [0, v2], so that her expected outlay isE[x2] = (v2/2) (v2/v1)5.
Therefore, the total expected revenue from a standard two-player all-pay
auction is:
E[x1 + x2] =
v2
2
+
v2
2
(
v2
v1
)
=
v2
2
(
1 +
v2
v1
)
(A.36)
Turning to the Stage-b all-pay auction, we have from Proposition 2.6
that the upper bound of the equilibrium support is ex-ante undetermined,
since player Lwill be player 2 with probability 1
2
and player 3 with prob-
ability 1
2
. Therefore, player 1’s outlay will be distributed uniformly on
[0, v2] in half of the cases and on [0, v3] in the other half, so that her ex-
pected outlay will be:
E[xb1] =
(
1
2
)
v2
2
+
(
1
2
)
v3
2
(A.37)
As for player 2, in case she is shortlisted, she bids according to an
uniform distribution on the interval [0, v2] conditional upon spending
positive 6. Therefore her expected outlay will be:
E[xb2] =
(
1
2
v2
v1
)
v2
2
(A.38)
Analogously, player 3’s expected spending will be:
E[xb3] =
(
1
2
v3
v1
)
v3
2
(A.39)
Therefore, neglecting player 1’s first-stage bid which is very close to
zero, we have that the total expected revenue from the two-stage all-pay
auction is as follows:
5Decomposing player 2’s equilibrium distribution in its continuous and discrete parts,
we can write:
F2(x2) = 1− v2
v1
+
(
v2
v1
)
x2
v2
(A.35)
where v2/v1 is the probability of bidding positive and [1 − v2/v1] is the probability of
bidding zero.
6Notice that we need conditioning on both the event of shortlisting and the event of
spending positive.
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E[xb1 + x
b
2 + x
b
3] =
v2
4
(
1 +
v2
v1
)
+
v3
4
(
1 +
v3
v1
)
(A.40)
which can be easily seen to be smaller than E[x1 +x2] in the standard
all-pay auction (Equation A.36) Q.E.D.
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A.2 Appendix to Chapter 3
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The proof is analogous to that in LT (p. 520) and exploit a simple revealed
preferences argument. Revealed preferences imply that if a∗L is optimal
for βL, then it must hold that7:
t+ E[a∗L
F ]− ψ(βL − C + a∗L) ≥ t+ E[a∗HF ]− ψ(βL − C + a∗H) (A.41)
Analogously, if a∗H is optimal for βH , it must hold that:
t+ E[a∗H
F ]− ψ(βH − C + a∗H) ≥ t+ E[a∗LF ]− ψ(βH − C + a∗L) (A.42)
Adding up (A.41) and (A.42), one obtains:
ψ(βL−C+a∗H)+ψ(βH−C+a∗L)−ψ(βL−C+a∗L)−ψ(βH−C+a∗H) ≥ 0
(A.43)
or
∫ a∗L
a∗H
∫ βH
βL
ψ′′(β − C + a) dβ da ≥ 0 (A.44)
which, together with ψ′′(.) > 0 and βL < βH implies a∗L ≥ a∗H Q.E.D.
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4
As in the case where cost-padding is unfeasible, the politician is affected
by incomplete information only trough the rent to be given to the efficient
type, which depends on the effort of the inefficient type. The maximiza-
tion with respect to the effort of the efficient type is hence the same as
when cost-padding is unfeasible (Equation (3.25)).
7Subscript j indicating the type of the politician is omitted here.
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A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3.6
The values of ρ
M
and ρ
O
are directly derived from condition (3.32) where
the relevant values of E(αFj ), j ∈ {M,O} are determined in Proposition
3.1. Straightforward calculations yield results (ii) and (iii). Result (i) is
obtained by observing that (∂ρj/(∂α) > 0 iff
ψ(eCPH )− ψ(eCPH − α) > ψ′(eCPH − α)α (A.45)
For the Mean Value Theorem we have ψ(eCPH )−ψ(eCPH −α) = ψ′(x)α
where
eCPH − α < x < eCPH , from which we have that the inequality in (A.45) is
verified. Q.E.D.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Writing constraints (3.36) and (3.37) in the form
Φ(eH)− E[ΠL] ≤ 0 (A.46)
Γ(eH)− E[ΠL] ≤ 0 (A.47)
we have that the Lagrangian for problem (3.38) is:
L = ν[S − (1 + λ)[βL − eFB + ψ(eFB)]− λE[ΠL]]+
(1− ν)[S − (1 + λ)[βH − eH + ψ(eH)]] + ξ[E[ΠL]− Φ(eH)] + ζ[E[ΠL]− Γ(eH)]
(A.48)
where ξ and ζ are the Lagrange multipliers of constraints (A.46) and
(A.47) respectively.
Lemma A.11 Constraints (A.46) and (A.47)are qualified.
Proof. The gradients of constraints (A.46) and (A.47) are respectively
∇ = (Φ′(eH);−1) 6= (0; 0) ∀eH and ∇ = (Γ′(eH);−1) 6= (0; 0) ∀eH
Further,∣∣∣∣ Φ′(eH) −1Γ′(eH) −1
∣∣∣∣ = −Φ′(eH) + Γ′(eH) 6= 0 ∀eH ≥ 0 (A.49)
Therefore constraints are qualified Q.E.D.
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Lemma A.12 The objective function U(eH ,E[ΠL]) is concave and both con-
straints (A.46) and (A.47) are convex, so that, given constraint qualification,
the Khun-Tucker necessary conditions for a maximum are also sufficient, and
each maximizer is a global maximizer (e.g., see Chiang and Wainwright (2005)).
Proof. The Hessian matrix of the objective function is:
H =
∣∣∣∣ −(1− ν)(1 + λ)ψ′′(eH) 00 0
∣∣∣∣ (A.50)
SinceUeH ,eH = (1−ν)(1+λ)(−ψ′′(eH)) < 0, UE[ΠL],E[ΠL] = 0
and |H| = 0 we can conclude that H is semi-definite negative every-
where and hence the objective function is concave.
Similarly, it is straightforward to check that the Hessian matrices of, re-
spectively, constraints (A.46) and (A.47)
H =
∣∣∣∣ Φ′′(eH) 00 0
∣∣∣∣ H = ∣∣∣∣ Γ′′(eH) 00 0
∣∣∣∣ (A.51)
are semi-definite positive everywhere, so that both constraints are
convex Q.E.D.
Applying the Khun-Tucker necessary conditions, we need to consider
four possible cases according to which of the constraints is binding:
Case1 no constraint is binding: ξ = 0, ζ = 0
Case2 (A.46) binding, (A.47) not binding: ξ > 0, ζ = 0
Case3 (A.47) binding, (A.46) not binding: ξ = 0, ζ > 0
Case4 both constraints are binding: ξ > 0, ζ > 0
Lemma A.13 Only Case2 and Case3 yield a solution.
Proof.
Case1 ξ = 0, ζ = 0
The FOC relative to the variable E[ΠL] gives−νλ = 0, which is clearly
impossible (as we expected, since the incentive compatibility constraint
for the efficient type should be binding in equilibrium).
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Case2 ξ > 0, ζ = 0 (“Classical Regime”)
Provided that the following condition
Φ(eCLH ) ≥ Γ(eCLH ) (A.52)
holds, the unique solution for this case is: {eCLH ; ΠCLL = Φ(eCLH ); ξCL =
νλ}, where
eCLH : ψ(e
CL
H ) = 1−
λ
1 + λ
ν
1− νΦ
′(eCLH ) (A.53)
The solution is identical to the case where cost-padding is unfeasible.
Condition (A.52) corresponds to (3.39) in text.
Case3 ξ = 0, ζ > 0 (“Repressed Cost Padding Regime”)
Provided that the following condition
Γ(eRCH ) ≥ Φ(eRCH ) (A.54)
holds, the unique solution for this case is {eRCH ; ΠRCL = Γ(eRCH ); ζRC =
νλ}, where
eRCH : ψ(e
RC
H ) = 1−
λ
1 + λ
ν
1− νΓ
′(eRCH ) (A.55)
Condition (A.54) corresponds to the right hand of (3.41) in text.
Case4 ξ > 0, ζ > 0
The FOCs imply ζ4∗ < 0, impossible.
Therefore only Case2 and Case3 give solutions Q.E.D.
Lemma A.14 eRCH > eCLH .
Proof. Since Φ′(e) > Γ′(e) ∀e ≥ 0, the result follows by inspection of the
FOCs in (A.53) and (A.55).
Lemma A.15 The solutions found in Case2 and Case 3 are mutually exclusive.
Therefore for each regime there is a unique solution, which by virtue of Lemma
A.12 is global.
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Proof. Given Lemma A.14, it must be the case that if (A.52) holds for eCLH ,
it must hold also for eRCH > eCLH . Therefore, when (A.52) holds, (A.54)
cannot hold. With a similar reasoning one can conclude that when (A.54)
holds, (A.52) cannot hold. When (A.52) holds, (eCLH ,Φ(eCLH )) is the only
mazimizer, while when (A.54) holds, (eRCH ,Γ(eRCH )) is the only maximizer
Q.E.D
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 3.8
The values of ρM and ρO are directly derived from condition (3.39) where
the relevant value of E(αFj ) with j ∈ {M,O} is used. Straightforward
calculations yield results (i), (ii) and (iii), while (iv) can be be obtained by
exploiting the Mean Value Theorem to show that ∂ρj/∂α < 0 Q.E.D.
A.2.6 Checks on the IRL and ICH constraints
Type1 Optima
Check on IRL:
E[ΠL] ≥ tH +E[αFj ]−ψ(βL−CH +α) > tH +E[αFj ]−ψ(βH−CH +α) ≥ 0
(A.56)
where the first inequality comes from ICL, the second from the fact that
βH > βL and the third from IRH , Q.E.D.
Check on ICH :
In this case ICH is:
E[ΠH ] ≥ tL + E[αFj ]− ψ(βH − CL + α) (A.57)
Combining the fact that ICL is binding at the optimum:
tCPL − ψ(βL − CCPL ) = tCPH + E[αF ]− ψ(βL − CCPH + α) (A.58)
with the facts that βH > βL and CCPH > CCPL (since eCPH < eCPL ) yields:
tCPH +E[αF ]−ψ(βH−CCPH +α) ≥ tCPL +E[αF ]−ψ(βH−CCPL +α) (A.59)
Q.E.D.
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Type4 Optima
We need to distinguish between the two cases a) amL = 0 and b) amL = α.
Case a) Check on IRL:
ΠL ≥ tH − ψ(βL − CH) > tH − ψ(βH − CH) ≥ 0 (A.60)
where the first inequality comes from ICL, the second from the fact
that βH > βL and the third from IRH , Q.E.D.
Case a) Check on ICH :
The relevant solution is the “classical regime”(indicated by super-
script CL), so
tCLH − ψ(βH − CCLH ) > tCLH − ψ(βH − CCLL ) =
= tCLL + ψ(βL − CCLH )− ψ(βL − CCLL ) > tL − ψ(βH − CCLL )
(A.61)
where the first inequality comes from the fact that CCLH > CCLL (since
eCLH < e
CL
L ), the equality comes from the fact that ICL is binding at the
optimum (i.e., tCLL − ψ(βL − CCLL ) = tCLH − ψ(βL − CCLH )) and the third
inequality from βH > βL, Q.E.D.
Case b) Check on IRL:
E[ΠL] ≥ tH+E[αFj ]−ψ(eH−∆β+α) > tH+E[αFj ]−ψ(eH) > tH−ψ(eH) ≥ 0
(A.62)
where the first inequality comes from ICL (and using βL −CH + α =
eH −∆β + α), the second from the fact that ∆β > α by Assumption 3.2
(and using βH − CH = eH ), and the last from IRH , Q.E.D.
Case b) Check on ICH :
In this case ICH is:
ΠH = tH − ψ(βH − CH) ≥ tL − ψ(βH − CL) (A.63)
122
or, in terms of eH and eL
ΠH = tH − ψ(eH) ≥ tL − ψ(eL + ∆β) (A.64)
Using the fact that ICL is binding at the optimum:
tRCL − ψ(βL − CRCL ) = tRCH + E[αFj ]− ψ(βL − CRCH + α) (A.65)
or, in terms of eRCH and eRCL
tRCL − ψ(eRCL ) = tRCH + E[αFj ]− ψ(eRCH −∆β + α) (A.66)
and the fact that ∆β > α (by Assumption 3.2), we get
tRCH − ψ(eRCH ) ≥ tRCL − ψ(eRCL + ∆β) (A.67)
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A.3 Appendix to Chapter 4
Figure A.1: Empirical distribution of winning rebate (against a Kernel den-
sity estimate)
Figure A.2: Empirical cumulative distribution of winning rebate by institu-
tional class of CA
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Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
rebate (%) 16.328 18.495 0 99.946 4805
central government 0.085 0.279 0 1 4805
concessionaire 0.013 0.113 0 1 4805
institution 0.148 0.355 0 1 4805
public enterprise 0.271 0.445 0 1 4805
region 0.03 0.172 0 1 4805
municipality 0.247 0.431 0 1 4805
province 0.022 0.148 0 1 4805
mountain council 0.011 0.105 0 1 4805
other institution 0.172 0.377 0 1 4805
offers number 4.274 5.600 1 67 4805
open 0.758 0.429 0 1 4805
restricted 0.103 0.304 0 1 4805
negotiated 0.037 0.188 0 1 4805
negotiated without call 0.103 0.304 0 1 4805
lowest price 0.413 0.492 0 1 4805
met 0.537 0.499 0 1 4805
not specified 0.05 0.218 0 1 4805
population 695.096 973.627 0 2617.175 4805
reserve price 2010.871 4836.994 0.131 77656.867 4805
service 0.648 0.478 0 1 4805
ordinary 0.837 0.37 0 1 4805
utilities 0.156 0.363 0 1 4805
security 0.007 0.084 0 1 4805
behalf 0.035 0.183 0 1 4805
potential bidders 156.66 111.243 1 380 4805
incumbency 2.681 3.939 1 39 4805
CA experience 7.345 13.053 1 98 4805
repeated interact 1.143 0.594 1 12 4805
local win 0.282 0.45 0 1 4805
regional win 0.148 0.355 0 1 4805
national win 0.543 0.498 0 1 4805
international win 0.027 0.162 0 1 4805
center 0.325 0.468 0 1 4805
north 0.471 0.499 0 1 4805
south 0.204 0.403 0 1 4805
2011 0.04 0.195 0 1 4805
2012 0.465 0.499 0 1 4805
2013 0.426 0.495 0 1 4805
2014 0.07 0.254 0 1 4805
Notes: rebate (%) is the winning rebate in the tender; central government, concessionaire, institution, public
enterprise, region, municipality, province, mountain council and other institution are CA type dummies; offers
number is the number of bids received in the tender; open, restricted, negotiated and negotiated without call
are dummies for the type of award procedure; lowest price, met and not specified are dummies for the award
criteria; population is the number of resident inhabitants (in 1000) in the municipality where the CA is located;
reserve price is the starting value of the tender set by the CA in 1000 euros (2010 equivalents); service is
a dummy for whether the purchase was relative to a service rather than to a supply; behalf is a dummy
for whether the CA was awarding on behalf of another entity; potential bidders is the number of suppliers
observed in the dataset in the industrial sector to which the tender refers; ordinary, utilities and security are
dummies for the directive which rules the tender; incumbency is the number of contracts awarded to the
winning firm by all the CAs in the dataset in the previous tenders; CA experience is the number of contracts
awarded by the CA in the previous tenders; repeated interact is the number of past interactions between
the winning firm and the CA; local win, regional win, national win and international win are dummies for
whether the winning firm was registered, respectively, in the same province, region, country of the CA or in
a different country; center, north and south are dummies for the macro-area where the CA is located.
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Table A.2: Rebate by institutional class of CA
CA type N mean sd min max
central government 410 19.79 21.23 0 98.42
concessionaire 62 21.98 18.63 0 86.37
institution 710 18.37 19.85 0 99.95
mountain village 54 9.33 14.49 0 60.23
municipality 1187 12.16 17.08 0 98.16
other institution 826 17.36 18.53 0 99.88
province 107 15.39 17.47 0 89.29
public enterprise 1303 17.01 17.42 0 94.17
region 146 19.57 19.31 0 75.00
total 4805 16.33 18.50 0 99.95
Figure A.3: Regression residuals
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Table A.3: Winning rebate and CA class, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rebate (%) rebate (%) rebate (%) rebate (%) rebate (%) rebate (%)
central government 7.638∗∗∗ 7.319∗∗∗ 6.077∗∗∗ 6.534∗∗∗ 6.043∗∗∗ 6.565∗∗∗
(2.318) (2.605) (1.333) (1.551) (1.660) (1.496)
concessionaire 9.827∗∗∗ 7.549∗∗∗ 5.611∗ 5.425∗ 5.235∗ 5.479∗
(2.974) (2.629) (2.976) (2.840) (2.869) (2.782)
institution 6.210∗∗∗ 5.031∗∗∗ 4.656∗∗ 4.268∗∗ 4.385∗∗ 4.253∗∗
(1.942) (1.596) (1.759) (1.733) (1.758) (1.679)
public enterprise 4.850∗∗ 2.875∗∗∗ 3.407∗∗∗ 2.457∗∗ 3.365∗∗∗ 2.466∗∗∗
(2.108) (0.956) (1.022) (0.944) (1.079) (0.902)
region 7.416∗∗∗ 3.981∗ 4.397∗∗ 4.329∗∗∗ 4.326∗∗∗ 4.399∗∗∗
(2.295) (2.294) (1.694) (1.587) (1.583) (1.624)
province 3.235 3.432 1.305 1.877 1.757 1.787
(2.163) (2.116) (2.109) (1.925) (1.885) (1.815)
mountain council -2.827 -1.721 -0.477 -1.134 -0.844 -1.156
(1.749) (1.399) (1.651) (1.511) (1.433) (1.446)
other institution 5.206∗∗∗ 4.277∗∗∗ 3.668∗∗∗ 3.336∗∗∗ 3.397∗∗∗ 3.459∗∗∗
(1.238) (0.725) (0.750) (0.719) (0.741) (0.755)
offers number 0.911∗∗∗
(0.104)
ln(offers number) 7.997∗∗∗ 8.044∗∗∗ 8.026∗∗∗
(0.603) (0.591) (0.595)
negotiated -0.620 -0.098 0.494 0.111
(1.890) (1.810) (1.832) (1.806)
negotiated without call -9.972∗∗∗ -5.568∗∗∗ -5.549∗∗∗ -5.400∗∗∗
(1.458) (1.308) (1.579) (1.320)
restricted -2.211∗ -2.078 -1.855 -2.076
(1.249) (1.289) (1.196) (1.259)
lowest price 3.666∗∗∗ 3.848∗∗∗ 3.853∗∗∗ 3.865∗∗∗
(0.694) (0.679) (0.666) (0.723)
not specified -1.121 -0.965 -1.010 -0.944
(0.954) (1.082) (1.062) (1.119)
population -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
reserve price -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
service 0.989
(1.210)
potential bidders 0.000
(.)
utilities -1.773
(1.453)
security 3.241
(4.062)
behalf -2.698
(2.246)
incumbency 0.016
(0.098)
CA experience 0.014
(0.043)
repeated interact 0.384
(0.472)
regional win -1.475∗∗∗ -1.487∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.470)
national win -0.487 -0.510
(0.601) (0.583)
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international win -3.510∗ -3.633∗
(1.906) (1.916)
Constant 12.157∗∗∗ 14.819∗∗∗ 8.117∗∗∗ 3.177 8.289∗∗∗ 3.161∗
(1.853) (1.208) (1.761) (2.316) (2.302) (1.856)
province FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
sector FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.022 0.123 0.223 0.266 0.269 0.267
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.092 0.195 0.239 0.240 0.240
p 0.000 . . . . .
province FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
year FE 0.214 0.098 0.111 0.111 0.120
sector FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 4805 4805 4805 4805 4805 4805
Notes: rebate (%) is the winning rebate in the tender; central government, concessionaire, institution, public en-
terprise, region, province, mountain council, and other institution are CA type dummies (the omitted category is
municipality); offers number is the number of bids received in the tender; negotiated, negotiated without call and
restricted are dummies for the type of award procedure (the omitted category is open); lowest price and not
specified are dummies for the award criteria (the omitted category is met); population is the number of resident
inhabitants (in 1000) in municipality where the CA town is located; reserve price is the starting value of the
tender set by the CA in 1000 euros (2010 equivalents); service is a dummy for whether the purchase was rel-
ative to a service rather than to a supply; potential bidders is the number of suppliers observed in the dataset
in the industrial sector to which the tender refers; utilities and securities are dummies for the directive which
rules the tender (the omitted category is ordinary); behalf is a dummy for whether the CA was awarding on
behalf of another entity; incumbency is the number of contracts awarded to the winning firm by all the CAs
in the dataset in the previous tenders; CA experience is the number of contracts awarded by the CA in the
previous tenders; repeated interact is the number of past interactions between the winning firm and the CA;
regional win, national win and international win are dummies for whether the winning firm is registered in the
same region of the CA, or in the same country or in a different country (the omitted category is local win, i.e.,
registered in the same province); province FE are 109 dummies for the CA province; year FE are 3 dummies for
the year of award; sector FE are 41 dummies for the object of the tender. Standard errors robust to clustering
at the sector level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level (p < 0.10) is represented by ∗, at the 5%
level (p < 0.05) by ∗∗, and at the 1% level (p < 0.01) by ∗∗∗. Standard regression tests are reported at the
bottom of the table. Outcomes are expressed in terms of p-value.
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Table A.4: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
rebate (dec.) rebate (dec.) rebate (%) rebate (%) rebate (%) rebate (%) rebate (%)
main
central government 0.066∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 8.517∗∗ 8.782∗ 5.319∗∗∗ 6.565∗∗∗ 5.423∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.109) (2.080) (4.579) (1.775) (1.248) (1.352)
concessionaire 0.055∗ 0.453∗∗ 7.168∗∗ 5.340∗ 5.138∗ 5.479∗∗ 5.085∗
(0.028) (0.183) (2.375) (2.770) (2.787) (2.394) (2.598)
institution 0.043∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 7.135∗∗ 5.090∗∗ 3.882∗∗ 4.253∗∗∗ 3.305∗
(0.017) (0.143) (1.768) (2.282) (1.719) (1.295) (1.689)
public enterprise 0.025∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 3.927∗∗ 2.037 2.851∗∗∗ 2.466∗∗∗ 2.075∗∗
(0.009) (0.085) (1.297) (1.433) (1.015) (0.688) (0.842)
region 0.044∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 4.417∗ 3.849 4.094∗∗ 4.399∗∗ 3.605∗∗
(0.016) (0.125) (1.977) (2.857) (1.611) (1.786) (1.643)
province 0.018 0.137 1.800 2.521 1.427 1.787 1.039
(0.018) (0.156) (1.356) (2.543) (1.724) (1.583) (1.832)
mountain council -0.012 -0.126 -0.971 -1.098 -0.980 -1.156 -1.437
(0.014) (0.193) (2.485) (2.277) (1.418) (2.414) (0.950)
other institution 0.035∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 3.293∗∗ 0.887 3.125∗∗∗ 3.459∗∗ 2.813∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.077) (1.167) (1.240) (0.779) (1.352) (0.790)
ln(offers number) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 8.411∗∗∗ 7.599∗∗∗ 7.765∗∗∗ 8.026∗∗∗ 8.112∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.029) (1.037) (0.789) (0.668) (0.314) (0.572)
lowest price 0.039∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 3.445∗∗ 3.132∗∗∗ 4.990∗∗∗ 3.865∗∗∗ 4.061∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.052) (0.996) (1.054) (0.791) (0.661) (0.702)
not specified -0.009 -0.113 -1.049 -1.838 -1.149 -0.944 -1.348
(0.011) (0.098) (1.898) (1.532) (1.070) (1.004) (1.167)
negotiated 0.001 0.005 -3.561 0.730 1.803 0.111 -0.003
(0.018) (0.134) (1.926) (2.320) (3.154) (2.353) (1.768)
negotiated without call -0.054∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -2.475 -5.813∗∗∗ -6.068∗∗∗ -5.400∗∗∗ -5.422∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.140) (1.395) (1.952) (1.702) (0.804) (1.370)
restricted -0.021 -0.153∗ -0.916 -2.599∗∗ -1.005 -2.076∗∗ -2.026
(0.013) (0.089) (1.061) (1.111) (1.200) (0.897) (1.232)
regional win -0.015∗∗∗ -0.091∗ -1.155∗∗ -1.198∗ -1.515∗∗∗ -1.487∗ -1.849∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.052) (0.346) (0.687) (0.445) (0.774) (0.589)
national win -0.005 -0.014 -0.479 -0.239 -0.283 -0.510 -0.729
(0.006) (0.046) (0.927) (0.930) (0.534) (0.504) (0.568)
international win -0.036∗ -0.274 -2.546 -3.243 -2.905 -3.633∗∗ -3.977∗
(0.019) (0.191) (1.798) (2.970) (2.529) (1.813) (2.100)
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Constant 0.032∗ -2.797∗∗∗ -1.442 5.012 3.199 3.161∗∗∗ 3.449∗∗
(0.019) (0.154) (2.499) (5.883) (2.243) (1.130) (1.651)
province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
region FE No No No No No No Yes
R2 0.267 0.330 0.271 0.281 0.267 0.250
Adjusted R2 0.240 0.285 0.235 0.249 0.240 0.238
p . . . . . . .
province FE 0.000 0.000 0.689 0.000 0.000 0.000
year FE 0.120 0.059 0.037 0.039 0.104 0.100 0.157
sector FE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 4805 4805 2065 2265 4021 4805 4805
Notes: rebate (%) is the winning rebate in the tender expressed in percentage terms; rebate (dec.) is the winning rebate in the tender expressed in decimal
terms; central government, concessionaire, institution, public enterprise, region, province, mountain council, and other institution are CA type dummies (the omitted
category is municipality); ln(offers number) is the natural logarithm of the number of bids received in the tender; negotiated, negotiated without call and restricted
are dummies for the type of award procedure (the omitted category is open); lowest price and not specified are dummies for the award criteria (the omitted
category is met); regional win, national win and international win are dummies for whether the winning firm is registered in the same region of the CA, or in
the same country or in a different country (the omitted category is local win, i.e., registered in the same province); province FE are 109 dummies for the CA
province; year FE are 3 dummies for the year of award; sector FE are 41 dummies for the object of the tender; region FE are 19 dummies for the region of the
CA. Specification (2) is estimated with a GLM method which uses the logit link function and the binomial distribution. All other specifications are estimated
with OLS. In specification (6) standard errors robust to clustering at the province level are in parantheses. In all other specifications standard errors robust
to clustering at the secor level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level (p < 0.10) is represented by ∗, at the 5% level (p < 0.05) by ∗∗, and at the 1%
level (p < 0.01) by ∗∗∗. Some standard regression tests are reported at the bottom of the table: outcomes are in terms of p-value.
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